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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most dominant themes in American ideology is equality 
of opportunity. In our society, ability and willingness to work hard are 
supposed to make all things possible. But we know there are flaws in 
our ideology.1 Differences in native ability unquestionably exist. Simi-
larly, some people seem to have distinctly more than their fair share of 
good luck. Both types of differences are, however, beyond our control. 
So we try to convince ourselves that education evens out most differ-
1. See, e.g., F. HAYEK, THE CoNSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 87 (1960) ("[I]t just is not true that 
'all men are born equal.'"); T. Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1907), in 16 
MEssAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7070, 7085 (1917) ("[T]here are some respects in 
which men are obviously not equal •... "). 
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ences.2 Still, we know there are immense differences in the values vari-
ous parents imbue in their children. 3 And we also know there are vast 
differences in the educations parents can afford for their children. 4 
Here too, however, we feel there is little to be done.5 We respect, if 
regret, cultural differences that lead some parents to value the educa-
tion of their children less than others do. And we believe to the bot-
toms of our souls in the worthiness of the capitalistic game we ask 
ourselves and our children to play.6 So we take pride in the fact that 
some parents can provide their children with the finest educational 
opportunities imaginable. We have no interest in discouraging excel-
lence in education, even if it is disproportionately available to the chil-
dren of the fortunate. Instead, we satisfy ourselves with providing an 
educational safety net for all our children: our taxes support public 
education and land grant universities, and our charity funds 
scholarships. 
When forced to acknowledge these differences in ability, luck, and 
educational opportunity, we admit that we do not play on a com-
pletely level field. But because each of these differences seems beyond 
our control, we tend to believe the field is as level as we can make it. It 
is not. For no particularly good reason, we allow some players, typi-
cally those most culturally and educationally advantaged, to inherit 
huge amounts of wealth, unearned in any sense at all. So long as we 
continue to tolerate inheritance by healthy, adult children, what we as 
a nation actually proclaim is, "All men are created equal, except the 
children of the wealthy."7 
Meanwhile, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings8 is our only response to a 
frighteningly persistent $200 billion federal budget deficit.9 The con-
2. See, e.g., Friedrich, The Economics of Inheritance, in 1 SOCIAL MEANING OF LEGAL CON-
CEPTS 27, 33 (E. Cahn ed. 1948). 
3. See F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 89-91; A. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG 
TRADEOFF 75 (1975); Blum & K.alven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 417, 504 (1952). 
4. See A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 75; Blum & Kalven, supra note 3, at 503. 
5. See F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 91-93. 
6. See, for example, the words of Andrew Carnegie, infra note 95. 
7. J. BRITIAIN, THE INHERITANCE OF EcONOMIC STATUS (1977), is an important account 
of the ways in which Americans achieve economic status. Also helpful is J. WEDGWOOD, THE 
EcONOMICS OF INHERITANCE (1929). 
8. Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 
1037 (1985) (codified in scattered sections of2, 31 & 42 U.S.C.). See generally Stith, Rewriting 
the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 595 (1988). 
9. The Bush administration recently projected the deficit for fiscal year 1991 at $294 billion. 
Rasky, New Estimate Increases the Deficit for 1991 to $294 Billion, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1990, at 
Al, col. 6. Of course, all estimates of the deficit depend not only on their economic assumptions 
but also on what they count. See generally Rosenbaum, The Rosy Path to Cutting the Deficit, 
N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1990, at A20, col. 1. Many believe the real deficit is even larger than the 
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tinuing failure of the federal government seriously to address the defi-
cit indicates to many (apparently even to one who has asked us to read 
his lips) that higher taxes are inevitable,10 regardless of the fact that no 
one wants to pay them, or that they may cause adverse economic con-
sequences. The only real issue is what type of tax could help reduce 
the deficit least painfully while achieving significant social objectives.11 
About $150 billion pass at death each year. 12 Yet in 1988 the fed-
eral wealth transfer taxes raised less than $8 billion.13 Obviously, these 
taxes could raise much more. 14 If, to take the extreme example, we 
allowed the government to confiscate all property at death, we could 
figure the government uses to judge its own compliance with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. See, 
e.g., H. AARON, B. BOSWORTH & G. BURTLESS, CAN AMERICA AFFORD TO GROW OLD? 1-2 
(1989); Zuckerman, Deja Voodoo All Over Again, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 9, 1989, at 
84. In this regard, the views of Senator Hollings are particularly interesting. He predicted that 
"the true deficit for 1990 [would] be very close to ..• $300 billion." Hollings, I Want a Divorce, 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at A31, col. 2. Referring to the 1990 budget as "a spectacular 
jambalaya of tricks and dodges," he noted that the government's much lower figure was the 
product of a "con game" in which numerous items of deficit spending were simply not counted. 
His conclusion is that "Gramm-Rudman-Hollings has failed." Even Senators Gramm and Rud-
man, still defending Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, have openly acknowledged "budget trickery" 
and "gimmicks." Gramm & Rudman, We Made a Commitment, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1989, at 
A31, col. 4. 
10. E.g., Rosenthal, Bush Now Concedes a Need/or "Tax Revenue Increases" to Reduce Defi-
cit in Budget, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1990, at Al, col. 4; Apple, Taxes and Political Peril, N.Y. 
Times, May 8, 1990, at Al, col. 4 ("Most people in Washington now think some kind of tax 
increase is inevitable •••• ");Dowd, Bush Eases Stand, Saying New Taxes Can Be Discussed, N.Y. 
Times, May 8, 1990, at Al, col. 6. 
11. Some apparently are unconcerned by massive deficits. See Kilborn, Is the Deficit Really a 
Threat?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Clearly, however, we cannot continue indefi-
nitely to accumulate national debt at the current rate. Already, 18 cents of every dollar the 
federal government spends is interest on the national debt. Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1989, at B3, col. 4 
(dividing monthly interest by monthly outlays). Even worse, interest payments currently con-
sume 23 cents of every tax dollar. Id. (dividing monthly interest by monthly revenue). 
12. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 489-90 
(4th ed. 1984) (offering "speculation" as to "order of magnitude"); see also E. CLARK, L. LUSKY 
& A. MURPHY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON GRATUITOUS TRANSFERS 2 (3d ed. 1985) ("well in 
excess of $100 billion"). In fact, the amount seems to be growing. One study estimates that the 
total worth of estates at death will increase from $924.1 billion between 1987 and 1991 to $2.1 
trillion between 2007 and 2011. These estimates are in constant 1990 dollars. See Ravo, A Wind-
fall Nears in Inheritances from the Richest Generation, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1990, at E4, col. I. 
13. The federal wealth transfer taxes raised $7.78 billion in 1988. B. BITTKER & E. CLARK, 
FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 1 (6th ed. 1990). 
14. Many others have identified estate and gift taxes as prime candidates to generate addi-
tional governmental revenue. J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 255 (5th ed. 1987) ("[T]ax 
theorists almost unanimously agree that taxation of wealth should play a larger role in the reve-
nue system."); see Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259, 269 
(1983); Westfall, Revitalizing the Federal Estate and Gift Taxes, 83 HARV. L. REv. 986, 988 
(1970) ("From both a social and economic viewpoint the federal estate and gift taxes are a highly 
desirable vehicle for increasing federal revenues."); Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate 
Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 256 (1956) ("[I]t is hard to devise a better tax than a death tax."); 
Carnegie, Wealth, 148 N. AM. REv. 653, 659 (1889) ("Of all forms of taxation, [the death tax] 
seems the wisest."); 58 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 1534 (1862) (statement of Mr. Hick-
man) ("[T]here is no property upon which a tax can better be laid than upon inheritances."). 
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almost eliminate the deficit with one stroke of a Presidential pen.15 
This nation, however, rarely has used taxes on the transfer of wealth 
to raise significant revenue.16 Our historical hesitancy in this regard 
strongly suggests that we as a nation are unwilling to abolish inheri-
tance in order to raise revenue. Nonetheless, thinking about using the 
federal wealth transfer taxes to abolish inheritance may not be entirely 
futile. It may permit an entirely new type of analysis. Conventional 
attempts to reform the federal wealth transfer taxes inevitably bog 
down in the Anglo-American tradition of freedom of testation. As be-
grudged intruders upon a general rule, these taxes necessarily end up 
playing an inconsequential role. One willing, for purposes of analysis, 
to discard freedom of testation could start from the proposition that 
property rights should end at death. Inheritance then would be toler-
ated only as an exception to that general rule. This article does just 
that. I invite the reader to join me in speculating whether it might not 
make sense to use the federal wealth transfer taxes to curtail inheri-
tance, thereby increasing equality of opportunity while raising 
revenue. 
My proposal views inheritance as something we should tolerate 
only when necessary - not something we should always protect. My 
major premise is that all property owned at death, after payment of 
debts and administration expenses, should be sold and the proceeds 
paid to the United States government. There would be six exceptions. 
A marital exemption, potentially unlimited, would accrue over the life 
of a marriage.17 Thus, spouses could continue to provide for each 
other after death. Decedents would also be allowed to provide for de-
pendent lineal descendants. The amount available to any given descen-
dant would, however, depend on the descendant's age and would drop 
15. I obviously do not share Michael Graetz's opinion that federal taxes on the transfer of 
wealth have no significant role to play in dealing with the deficit. See Graetz, supra note 14, at 
269-70. Nor do I agree that, given the current levels of revenue consumed by the federal govern-
ment, raising revenue no longer justifies imposition of such taxes. See Jantscher, The Aims of 
Death Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY 40, 40-41 (E. Halbach ed. 1977). To 
paraphrase an old saying, "A billion here, a billion there - before long, you're talking serious 
money." 
16. During the period 1945 to 1980, the portion of federal revenues generated by the federal 
wealth transfer taxes hovered rather consistently in the neighborhood of 1.5%. See S. SURREY, P. 
McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAXATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 42 (successor ed. 1987) (adding cols. 4 and 6 from Table 1). Since then, these taxes have 
played an even smaller role in producing federal revenue. In 1985, for example, the federal 
wealth transfer taxes yielded substantially less than 1 % of the federal government's revenue. See 
id. 
On occasion we have, however, used the federal transfer taxes to raise a substantially larger 
portion of the government's revenue. In 1940, for example, these taxes generated more than 
6.8% of federal revenue. In 1925 and 1935 the figures were 4.2% and 6.5%, respectively. Id. 
17. See infra notes 289-99 and accompanying text. 
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to zero at an age of presumed independence.18 A separate exemption 
would allow generous provision for disabled lineal descendants of any 
age. 19 Inheritance by lineal ascendants {parents, grandparents, etc.) 
would be unlimited.20 A universal exemption would allow a moderate 
amount of property either to pass outside the exemptions or to aug-
ment amounts passing under them.21 Thus, every decedent would be 
able to leave something to persons of his or her choice, regardless 
whether another exemption was available. Up to a fixed fraction of an 
estate could pass to charity.22 In addition, to prevent circumvention by 
lifetime giving, the gift tax would increase substantially.23 
My proposal strikes directly at inheritance by healthy, adult chil-
dren. And for good reason. We cannot control differences in native 
ability. Even worse, so long as we believe in the family, we can achieve 
only the most rudimentary successes in evening out many types of op-
portunities. 24 And we certainly cannot control many types ofluck. But 
we can - and ought to - curb one form of luck. Children lucky 
enough to have been raised, acculturated, and educated by wealthy 
parents need not be allowed the additional good fortune of inheriting 
their parents' property.25 In this respect, we can do much better than 
we ever have before at equalizing opportunity. This proposal would 
leave "widows and orphans" essentially untouched. The disabled, 
grandparents, and charity would probably fare better than ever before. 
18. See infra notes 300-12 and accompanying text. 
19. See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text. 
20. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
21. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
22. See infra notes 333-43 and accompanying text. 
23. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
24. See, e.g., Epstein, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 
WASH. U. L.Q. 667, 699 (1986) (noting the "wide range of implicit and explicit transfers that 
take place when children live in the family household"). 
25. 
The decision to tax wealth is based upon ethical grounds. In choosing inherited wealth 
we are saying that the distribution of such wealth is "unfair," and that society can order the 
distribution in a more "equitable,'' or "fairer" manner. This in turn means that it is judged 
that wealth derived from luck (in this case of parentage or friends), is unfair and should be 
corrected. To be consistent we should include wealth derived from all windfalls, betting, 
treasure trove, profits, etc. In discriminating between these we are making the ethical judg-
ment that some forms of luck are socially more worthy than others; that it is more accepta-
ble to allow people to keep their football winnings, than to retain their family plate. 
Tait, The Taxation of Wealth at Death: A New Proposal, 9 SCOT. J. POL. EcoN. 38, 38-39 (1962); 
see also J. BRITTAIN, INHERITANCE AND THE INEQUALITY OF MATERIAL WEALTH 13 (1978) 
("The less the rewards of wealth are associated with one's own contribution, the better the case 
for taxing them ..•. Inheritance remains one of the purest forms of 'getting something for noth-
ing.'"); L. THUROW, THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE AMERICAN EcONOMY 157 (1971) 
("Americans seem to believe that an individual's position in the distribution of economic re-
sources should depend upon his own efforts and not those of his ancestors •.. .''), 
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But inheritance by healthy, adult children would cease immediately, 
except to the extent of the universal exemption. 
This proposal sounds radical, 26 perhaps even communistic. 27 In-
heritance does seem to occupy a special place in the hearts of many 
Americans, even those who cannot realistically expect to inherit any-
thing of significance. 28 For example, in 1982, sixty-four percent of the 
voters in a California initiative voted to repeal that state's inheritance 
tax. 29 Michael Graetz, who, like me, finds this element of the Ameri-
can psyche puzzling, explains it as a product of "the optimism of the 
American people. In California, at least, sixty-four percent of the peo-
ple must believe that they will be in the wealthiest five to ten percent 
when they die."30 This fascination with inheritance perhaps explains 
the minimal public debate about using the federal transfer taxes to 
raise substantial amounts of revenue.31 But curtailing inheritance is 
hardly radical. For years Americans have written seriously and 
thoughtfully on the subject. 32 My proposal builds on that tradition 
and reaches the conclusion that substantial limitations on inheritance 
would contribute meaningfully to the equality of opportunity we offer 
our children. It also concludes that such limitations are fully consis-
tent with our notions of private property. Neither conclusion is new. 
26. See Cole, Inheritance, 8 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1932) 35, 41-43, 
reprinted in P. MECHEM & T. ATKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON WILLS AND ADMINIS-
TRATION 12, 14 (5th ed. 1961) ("Propaganda for the abolition of inheritance is in most cases in 
effect propaganda for socialism ..•• "). 
27. In 1918 the Bolsheviks abolished inheritance in the Soviet Union. See infra notes 243-44 
and accompanying text. 
28. See J. BRITTAIN, supra note 7, at 6-7, 29-30; Kornstein, Inheritance: A Constitutional 
Right?, 36 RUTGERS L. REV. 741, 741 (1984); Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect' Wealth 
Distribution?, 117 TR. & Esr. 598, 682 (1978). 
29. L.A. Times, June 10, 1982, pt. 1, at 16, col. 3; see Fairbanks & Billiter, Voters Put Crimp 
in Plans for Tax Increase, L.A. Times, June 10, 1982, pt. 1, at 3, col. 3. 
30. Graetz, supra note 14, at 285. 
31. See generally R. CHESTER, INHERITANCE, WEALTH, AND SOCIETY (1982); Chester, In-
heritance and Wealth Taxation in a Just Society, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 62 (1976). J. Kenneth 
Galbraith has suggested a different reason for the lack of discussion: "Those who might them-
selves be subject to equalization have rarely been enthusiastic about equality as a subject of social 
comment." J. GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 33 (4th ed. 1984). Lester Thurow makes 
the same point more bluntly: "[A]re zero inheritance taxes merely the best example of the polit-
ical power that wealth can buy?" L. THUROW, GENERATING INEQUALITY 198 (1975). 
In fact, during the Reagan years the move was toward abolition of inheritance taxes - not 
abolition of inheritance. See, e.g., Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1215 (1984). 
32. W. SHULTZ, THE TAXATION OF INHERITANCE 196-98 (1926) ("Opposition to the insti-
tution of inheritance by individual protestants is as old as the institution itself."); see, e.g., G. 
MYERS, THE ENDING OF HEREDITARY AMERICAN FORTUNES (1939); H. READ, THE ABOLI-
TION OF INHERITANCE (1918); M. WEST, THE INHERITANCE TAX 223 (2d ed. 1908) (proposing 
inheritance tax rates of up to 100%); Nathanson, The Ethics of Inheritance, in 1 SOCIAL MEAN-
ING OF LEGAL CoNCEPTS, supra note 2, at 74; Haslett, ls Inheritance Justified?, 15 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 122 (1986). 
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What is new is a $200 billion deficit. Now, as at few other times in this. 
nation's history, our government needs new sources of revenue. Ac-
cordingly, I suggest changes in the federal wealth transfer taxes that 
would· curtail inheritance and raise revenue. If we cannot, or will not, 
control the deficit, this generation's primary bequest to its children 
will be the obligation to pay their parents' debts.33 
I. INHERITANCE IN PRINCIPLE 
A. Inheritance as a Natural Right 
John Locke, in his Two Treatises of Government, first published in 
1690, argued that inheritance was the natural right of children.34 He 
derived that right from the fact that children were "born weak, and 
unable to provide for themselves."35 Their right to inheritance rested, 
in Locke's words, on their "Right to be nourish'd and maintained by 
their Parents."36 
Despite Locke's powerful influence on those who founded this na-
tion, 37 his conception of inheritance as a natural right never took firm 
root here. 3s Nunnemacher v. State 39 is essentially the only opinion by 
an American court embracing that conception. Justice Winslow, writ-
ing for the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, argued eloquently that inher-
itance was an "inherent right." He found protection for it not only in 
the Wisconsin constitution but also in the Declaration of Indepen-
dence's guarantee of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." 
So clear does it seem to us from the historical point of view that the right 
to take property by inheritance or will has existed in some form among 
civilized nations from the time when the memory of man runneth not to 
the contrary, and so conclusive seems the argument that these rights are 
a part of the inherent rights which governments ... are established to 
conserve, that we feel entirely justified in rejecting the dictum so fre-
quently asserted by such a vast array of courts that these rights are 
purely statutory and may be wholly taken away by the legislature.40 
33. Even Richard Epstein, arguing in favor of property rights that extend indefinitely beyond 
an owner's lifetime, suggests we "develop institutional arrangements that insure that all members 
of the next generation will be able to develop their own talents without having to pay (say, in the 
form of higher taxes) for the extravagances of the previous one." Epstein, supra note 24, at 699. 
34. J. LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT bk. 1, § 88, at 206-07 (P. Laslett ed. 1988). 
35. Id. § 89, at 207. 
36. Id. 
37. The extent of Locke's influence on those who founded this nation is now a subject of 
debate among historians. See, e.g., J. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE 
PoLmCAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADmON 423-24 (1975). 
38. Apparently Chancellor Kent also believed inheritance was a natural right. See 2 J. KENT, 
CoMMENTARIES *326-28; 4 id. at *376. 
39. 129 Wis. 190, 108 N.W. 627 (1906). 
40. 129 Wis. at 200-01, 108 N.W. at 629-30 (emphasis omitted). 
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Nunnemacher nonetheless upheld the Wisconsin inheritance tax as a 
reasonable regulation within the legislature's prerogative. Thus, Nun-
nemacher is interesting for two reasons. It is unique in its insistence 
upon inheritance as a natural right. At the same time, it is characteris-
tically American in its refusal to protect inheritance from legislative 
control. 
B. The Positivistic Conception of Inheritance 
It was Blackstone, in his Commentaries, first published in 1765, 
who most influenced the development of the American law of inheri-
tance. 41 He argued that inheritance was "no natural but merely a 
civil, right": 
For, naturally speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have 
any dominion; else if he had a right to dispose of his acquisitions one 
moment beyond his life, he would also have a right to direct their dispo-
sal for a million of ages after him; which would be highly absurd and 
inconvenient.42 
According to Blackstone, inheritance was merely a custom turned into 
positive law: "A man's children or nearest relations are usually about 
him on his death-bed, and are the earliest witnesses of his decease. 
They became, therefore, generally the next immediate occupants, till 
at length, in process of time, this frequent usage ripened into general 
law."43 Society converted the custom into law to avoid the "endless 
disturbances"44 that would result without a clear rule designating who 
was entitled to a decedent's property. 
Blackstone's positivistic theory, rather than Locke's natural rights 
theory, has always dominated this country's thinking on inheritance.45 
41. Pascal, writing more than one hundred years earlier, had already reached the conclusion 
that inheritance was not a natural right. B. PASCAL, DISCOURSES ON THE CoNDmON OF THE 
GREAT (1648), reprinted in 48 TuE HARVARD Cl.ASsICS 382, 383 (C. Eliot ed. 1910). In 
America, James Otis, described by Stanley Katz as "no stranger to the siren song of natural 
rights,'' had already argued, in litigation occurring in 1763, that inheritance was not a natural 
right. Baker v. Mattocks (Super. Ct. 1763), in REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN 
THE SUPERIOR CoURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF MA5sACHUSETTS BAY, BE-
TWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 69, 71 (J. Quincy, Jr. ed. 1865); see Katz, Republicanism and the Law 
of Inheritance in the American Revolutionary Era, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977). 
42. 2 w. BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *10-11 (emphasis in the original); see also 2 id. at 
*2 ("[T]here is no foundation in nature or in natural law why a set of words upon parchment 
should convey the dominion of land; why the son should have a right to exclude his fellow-
creatures from a determinate spot of ground, because his father had done so before him; or why 
the occupier of a particular field or of a jewel, when lying on his death-bed, and no longer able to 
maintain possession, should be entitled to tell the rest of the world which of them should enjoy it 
after him."). 
43. 2 id. at *11-12. 
44. 2 id. at *10. 
45. See, e.g., E. SCOLES & E. HALBACH, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON DECEDENTS' Es-
TATES AND Tuusrs 11 (4th ed. 1987); M. WEST, supra note 32, at 201; Chester, supra note 31, at 
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For example, in 1787 Judge Ellsworth, of Connecticut, emphatically 
rejected the natural rights conception of inheritance.46 In the 1790s 
Thomas Paine advocated death taxes that must have seemed stagger-
ing. 47 At the same time, in England, Jeremy Bentham was advocating 
dramatic increases in death taxes.48 In 1898 the Supreme Court of the 
United States bluntly stated, "The right to take property by devise or 
descent is the creature of the law, and not a natural right .... "49 
According to one author, the courts of every state except Wisconsin 
have reached the same conclusion. so Thus, when President Theodore 
Roosevelt addressed Congress in 1907, he was on solid political and 
theoretical ground in stating that "[t]he Government has the absolute 
right to decide as to the terms upon which a man shall receive a be-
quest or devise from another."51 Even Justice Winslow noted that the 
positivistic theory had been accepted "by the great majority of the 
courts of this country" and referred to the "unanimity" of its 
acceptance. 52 
C. Why the Positivistic Conception Prevailed 
One reason for the dominance of the positivistic conception of in-
heritance is that Blackstone's explanation of how inheritance devel-
oped makes intuitive sense. Any society that respects property rights 
during lifetime necessarily reallocates those rights at an owner's death. 
86-92; Halbach, Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra 
note 15, at 4; Katz, supra note 41, at 7-9; Montgomery, The Inheritance Tax and the Constitu-
tion, 10 ILL. L. REv. 633, 634-38 (1916); Shaffer, Death, Property and Ideals, in DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 26, 35 ("Quibbles over the 'natural right' to make 
wills are trivial - private property was not invented by God .••. "). 
46. 1785-88 Kirby 438-39 (Judge Ellsworth's Notes to Adams v. Kellogg). 
47. See infra note 134. 
48. See infra note 123. 
49. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Banlc, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898). Nor was this an isolated 
statement. See Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942) ("Rights of succession to the 
property of a deceased, whether by will or by intestacy, are of statutory creation, and the dead 
band rules succession only by sufferance."); United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 627 (1896) 
("[T]he right to dispose of ..• property by will has always been considered purely a creature of 
statute and within legislative control."); United States v. Fox, 94 U.S. 315, 320 (1876). 
50. Kornstein, supra note 28, at 766-67, 789-91. Sturgis v. Ewing, 18 Ill. 176 (1856), is 
typical: 
The power to devise is not an inherent, natural right, conferred upon us by the law of 
nature, as is the right to acquire and own. So long as we can not possess, control or enjoy 
anything we have, after we are dead, we can have no absolute right to say what shall be done 
with our acquisitions after that period. As mortals we then cease to be, and all connection 
with earth and our acquisitions terminates .•.. When we acquire property, we do not ac-
quire with it, and as a part of it, the right to devise it in any particular mode, or even to 
devise it at all. 
18 Ill. at 183-85; see also Minot v. Winthrop, 162 Mass. 113, 117, 38 N.E. 512, 513 (1894). 
51. T. Roosevelt, supra note l, at 7084. 
52. Nunnemacber v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 198, 108 N.W. 627, 628 (1906). 
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In order to avoid the "endless disturbances" to which Blackstone re-
ferred, the rules relating to that reallocation must be simple and en-
forceable. Inheritance through the decedent's family or by the 
decedent's will has long met that test. Longevity does not make inheri-
tance a natural right, however. Nor does it make inheritance a neces-
sary stick in the bundle of rights we call property. Inheritance is 
merely the tool we currently use to reallocate the property rights of 
those no longer living. Other simple and enforceable rules for reallo-
cating property at death might work equally well. 53 
Another reason for the dominance of the positivistic conception of 
inheritance is the badly flawed logic of the natural rights conception. 
In America, most states expressly require parents to support minor 
children. 54 But the fact that minor children have these special claims 
hardly requires the conclusion that healthy, adult children do, too. 
Even if minor children do have natural rights of inheritance, those 
rights surely do not, in every case, extend to a parent's entire estate. 
Natural law hardly requires that the minor child lucky enough to have 
had as a parent the owner of $50 million inherit the entire $50 
million.55 
Yet another reason for the failure of the natural rights conception 
is that it is flatly inconsistent with inheritance as it exists in the United 
States. In America today, children often do not inherit all- or even 
any- of their parents' property.56 Their rights are therefore distinctly 
more contingent than natural. Under the Uniform Probate Code, the 
children of a parent who dies intestate may have no inheritance rights 
whatever if their other parent was still married to the decedent at the 
time of the decedent's death.57 Congress' 1981 amendments to the es-
tate tax and gift tax marital deductions suggest a strong national senti-
ment in favor of parental prerogative to disinherit children. 58 Even if 
53. Reallocating a substantial portion of a decedent's property to the government has always 
been thought fully compatible not only with our notions of private property but also with our 
constitutional form of government. See infra notes 76-85 and accompanying text. 
54. See, e.g., Aruz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-2451 (West Supp. 1989); CAL. Civ. CODE§§ 196, 
196.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1990); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW§ 32 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1990); 
N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 413-416 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1990). 
55. In fact, a credible argument can be made that inheritance is contrary to natural right, in 
that it denies equality of opportunity. See H. READ, supra note 32, at xxvii, 19. 
56. See generally Haskell, Restraints upon the Disinheritance of Family Members, in DEATH, 
TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 105. 
57. UNIFORM PROBATE Com;:§ 2-102(3) (1982) (first $50,000, and one half of the balance, 
passes to surviving spouse). Some states give the entire estate, no matter how large, to the surviv-
ing spouse. E.g.. Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2102(1) (1975). 
58. Econoinic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301-04 
(1981) (enacting quantitatively unliinited marital deductions for both estate and gift tax pur-
poses) (codified at I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1988)). 
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there is no surviving spouse, children in America still generally have 
no right to inheritance. In most states a decedent can leave everything 
to collateral relatives, friends, or charity. Indeed, there is no quantita-
tive limitation on either the estate tax or the gift tax charitable deduc-
tion. 59 Only if a child is pretermitted does he or she sometimes have 
rights of inheritance denied by a parent. Even then, the statutory trend 
is to create these rights as infrequently as possible. 60 And in those rare 
cases where pretermitted children do have rights, they normally ex-
tend to less than the entire estate. 61 
A final, but crucially important, reason for the dominance of the 
positivistic conception is that, in the United States, natural rights ide-
ology is, to use Stanley Katz's words, "relevant but ambiguous"62 to 
inheritance. A willingness to use the Constitution to protect "natural 
rights," coupled with a conclusion that inheritance was such a right, 
would lead to the sorts of constitutional protections Justice Winslow 
posited. Yet the primary focus of natural rights ideology is not prop-
erty, but people. Egalitarianism is much closer than property to the 
core of the natural rights world view. Treating inheritance as a pro-
tected natural right would have erected a substantial barrier to the 
creation of an egalitarian society. Even prominent proponents of the 
natural rights world view have rarely asserted, much less advocated 
protecting, a natural right of inheritance. Thomas Jefferson, author of 
the Declaration of Independence, upon which Justice Winslow relied, 
denied that inheritance was a natural right. In a letter to James 
Madison dated September 6, 1789, Jefferson asserted that it was "self 
evident" 
"that the earth belongs in usufruct to the living'~· that the dead have 
neither powers nor rights over it. The portion occupied by an individual 
ceases to be his when himself ceases to be, and reverts to the society .... 
If [the society has] formed rules of appropriation, those rules may give it 
to the wife and children, or to some one of them, or to the legatee of the 
deceased. So they may give it to his creditor. But the child, the legatee, 
or creditor takes it, not by any natural right, but by a law of the soci-
ety .... Then no man can, by natural right, oblige the lands he occupied, 
or the persons who succeed him in that occupation, to the pa[y]ment of 
debts contracted by him. For if he could, he might, during his own life, 
eat up the usufruct of the lands for several generations to come, and then 
the lands would belong to the dead, and not to the living, which would 
59. See I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (1988) (estate tax and gift tax). 
60. See UNIFORM PROBATE CoDE § 2-302 (1982). 
61. See UNIFORM PROBATE CooE § 2-302 (1982) (protected child takes only his or her intes-
tate share). 
62. Katz, supra note 41, at 9. 
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be the reverse of our principle. 63 
Still, the natural rights conception may help to explain Americans' 
continuing fascination with inheritance. It is hardly surprising that a 
nation that has equal reverence for two such divergent documents as 
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution would draw 
meaning simultaneously from two completely inconsistent conceptions 
of inheritance. 64 
D. Inheritance - Property or Garbage? 
Locke found an owner's entitlement to property in the labor ex-
pended to acquire it: 
The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands ... are properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature hath provided, 
and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with, and joyned to it something 
that is his own, and thereby makes it his Property. It being by him re-
moved from the common state Nature placed it in, it hath by this labour 
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other 
Men.65 
Curtailing inheritance in the way I suggest is consistent with Locke's 
vision of property, because healthy, adult children generally do not 
participate in the acquisition of the property they inherit. Even Locke 
seems to have realized that his theory of property did not justify inher-
itance, for, as discussed above, he justified inheritance separately, as a 
natural right. 66 
According to John Stuart Mill, in his Principles of Political Econ-
omy, first published in 1848, property consisted "in the recognition, in 
each person, of a right to the exclusive disposal of what he or she have 
produced by their own exertions, or received either by gift or by fair 
agreement, without force or fraud, from those who ·produced it."67 
Mill's definition of property is obviously broad enough to include in-
herited wealth. Mill himself, however, was openly skeptical about 
whether inherited wealth was rightfully obtained from its creator. 
In Mill's view, no presumptions in favor of the propriety of inheri-
63. 15 T. JEFFERSON, THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 392-93 (J. Boyd ed. 1958) (em-
phasis in original); see also T. PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN (P"r. I 1791), reprinted in 1 THE 
CoMPLETE WRITINGS OF THOMAS p AINE 241, 251 (P. Foner ed. 1945) ("It is the living, and not 
the dead, that are to be accommodated. When man ceases to be, his power and his wants cease 
with him •... "). 
64. Cf Michelman, Takings, 1987, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1628 (1988) ("[C]laims of 
popular sovereignty and classical property cannot, in truth, be stably reconciled at a very high 
level of abstraction or generality."). 
65. J. LocKE, supra note 34, bk. 2, § 27, at 287-88 (emphasis in original). 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 34-36. 
67. J. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF PoLmCAL EcONOMY bk. 2, ch. 2, § 1, at 218 (1909). 
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tance were to be drawn from its antiquity, because Mill believed the 
feudal family to be fundamentally different from our own. 68 In feudal 
times, the King dispensed land not to any particular individual, but to 
a family. The extended family, as a unit, worked on and defended that 
land. Each family member was in some sense responsible for the pro-
ductivity of the land. Thus, each had a certain entitlement to the land, 
regardless of who "owned" it. 69 In addition, each depended on the 
land for his or her existence. That many came to view inheritance as 
an inherent characteristic of property is, therefore, hardly surprising. 
We, however, no longer live in a feudal society: 
[T]he feudal family . . . has long perished, and the unit of society is 
not now the family or clan ... but the individual; or at most a pair of 
individuals, with their unemancipated children. Property is now inherent 
in individuals, not in families: the children when grown up do not follow 
the occupations or fortunes of the parent: if they participate in the par-
ent's pecuniary means it is at his or her pleasure, and not by a voice in 
the ownership and government of the whole .... 10 
In short, in a feudal society, it made sense to think of inheritance as a 
necessary component of property. But it does not make sense in an 
industrial society composed of individuals. Instead, according to Mill, 
inheritance amounts only to the passage of "unearned advantage" to 
those who "have in no way deserved" it.11 
Each of Mill's observations about the increasing role of the indi-
vidual and the decreasing role of the family remains true today. But 
there is another, even more significant, difference between life in feudal 
England and life in the United States today. We pride ourselves in 
never having had England's aristocracy. The Declaration of Indepen-
dence proudly proclaims, "All men are created equal." Inheritance be-
lies that proposition. We preach equality of opportunity and in the 
68. Id. bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 221-23. See generally Friedman, The Law of the Living, The Law 
of the Dead: Property, Succession, and Society, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 340. 
69. Locke, too, toyed with the idea that a decedent's heirs owned an interest in his or her 
property prior to death. J. LocKE, supra note 34, bk. l, § 88, at 207. 
70. J. MILL, supra note 67, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 222. 
71. Id. bk. 2, ch. 2, § 1, at 219. Following Bentham, see infra note 123, Mill proposed elimi-
nation of intestate succession by collaterals. J. MILL, supra note 67, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 223. In 
addition, Mill advocated limitations on the amount a decedent could bequeath to any one indi-
vidual. Id. bk. 2, ch. 2, § 4, at 226-29. Mill did believe that children ought to be allowed to inherit 
property from their parents. But he openly scoffed at the idea that they ought to inherit all of it: 
The duties of parents to their children are those which are indissolubly attached to the 
fact of causing the existence of a human being. The parent owes to society to endeavour to 
make the child a good and valuable member of it, and owes to the children to provide, so far 
as depends on him, such education, and such appliances and means, as will enable them to 
start with a fair chance of achieving by their own exertions a successful life. To this every 
child has a claim; and I cannot admit that, as a child, he has a claim to more. 
Id. bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 224. Mill, then, assumed that inheritance by children would continue but 
favored restricting it to the extent necessary to equip them to lead their own lives. 
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same breath bless inheritance. Just how is it that the son of a janitor 
has an opportunity to succeed equal to that of the son of a billionaire? 
In a society that prides itself on equality of opportunity, inheritance is 
primarily explainable as a vestige of the aristocratic times and preten-
sions of the country from which we inherited our legal system. 
Even today, however, many still claim that inheritance is a neces-
sary component of property. 72 Given the nearly unlimited control we 
still accord the Dead Hand, such statements are accurate as descrip-
tions of fact. But inheritance is not a necessary theoretical component 
of property. Instead, inheritance is part of what we commonly think of 
as property simply because we have tolerated it for centuries. 73 In fact, 
the essence of our notion of property lies in its usefulness to its current 
owner. Curtailing a parent's ability to leave property to healthy, adult 
children at death would have no effect on this aspect of property. 74 A 
property owner could continue to use property for his or her benefit in 
any way he or she saw fit during life. 
Another of the important characteristics of our notion of property 
is that an owner can give it, during lifetime, to another. Curtailing 
inheritance would not itself disturb this aspect of property, either. 
However, if restrictions on inheritance are to be effective, there must 
also be an ambitious gift tax. 75 Thus, parents could continue to make 
gifts during their lifetimes to their healthy adult children or anyone 
else; it would simply become more expensive to do so. 
Under current law, property owners also have the right to deter-
mine who will own their property after their deaths. Curtailing inheri-
tance obviously would limit this aspect of our notion of property. But 
allowing those who once owned property to do after death what they 
were unwilling to do during lifetime has never made sense. When a 
parent makes a gift to a child, the parent necessarily feels a sentiment 
something like, "Johnny needs x." Or, "I want Suzy to have y." Cur-
tailing inheritance would not alter parents' ability to satisfy either sen-
timent at any time during life, for any reason or for no reason at all. 
72. E.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT Do. 
MAIN 304 (1985) ("The conception of property includes the exclusive rights of possession, use, 
and disposition. The right of disposition includes dispositions during life, by gift or by sale, and it 
includes dispositions at death •... "). 
73. Cf. Alexander, Takings, Na"atives, and Power, 88 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1752, 1760 & n.46 
(1988) (noting that "historical-descriptive" notions of property are sometimes confused with 
"conceptual-normative" notions). 
74. "Not only are inheritance and bequest no necessary part of the institution of private 
property, but the reasons which justify private property have little application to them. Private 
property is a necessary and useful institution because it promotes industry. Can this be said of 
inheritance?" M. WFSr, supra note 32, at 223. 
75. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
84 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:69 
What it would disallow is waiting until death to do it. Why? Transfer-
ring property at death requires of a decedent neither sentiment. Trans-
ferring property by intestate succession requires no sentiment 
whatever. And transferring property by will requires only a very dif-
ferent sentiment. What a testator says is, "Johnny needs x but can 
have it only if it is left after my death." Or, "I want Suzy to have y, but 
she cannot have it until I am completely finished using it." Both senti-
ments are distinctly less emphatic and less worthy of enforcement by 
society than those underlying lifetime gifts. They are undeniably sec-
ondary sentiments. The primary (and often exclusive) sentiment with 
respect to death-time transfers is always, "I want x." Or, "I needy." 
Children and everyone else come later (if at all). In many cases, the 
parent may really want the child to take the property, but not now. 
Now, it belongs to the parent. What this proposal eliminates is, there-
fore, garbage-can parental "giving" to healthy, adult children. A par-
ent would not be allowed to use his or her property until it no longer 
had any usefulness (to the parent) and then expect the government to 
collect whatever was left over and deliver it, neatly recycled, to his or 
her healthy, adult children. Instead, when death placed a property 
owner's garbage at the curb, the government would simply pick it up. 
E. Constitutional Concerns 
As early as 1897, counsel involved in litigation before the Supreme 
Court of the United States seriously (but unnecessarily) debated 
whether a state could abolish inheritance.76 Although the Supreme 
Court properly declined to express an opinion on that issue at that 
time, 77 other American courts have been less reticent. For example, in 
1858, the Court of Appeals of Virginia wrote that the legislature 
might, "to-morrow, if it pleases, absolutely repeal the statute of wills 
and that of descents and distributions and declare that upon the death 
of a party, his property shall be applied to the payment of his debts, 
and the residue appropriated to public uses."78 In 1942, the Supreme 
Court of the United States, in a more expansive mood, wrote, "Noth-
ing in the Federal Constitution forbids the legislature of a state to 
limit, condition, or even abolish the power of testamentary disposition 
over property within its jurisdiction."79 Since no state has ever at-
76. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 288 (1898). 
77. 170 U.S. at 288. 
78. Eyre v. Jacob, 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 422, 430 (Ct. App. 1858); see also Pullen v. Commis-
sioners, 66 N.C. 361, 364 (1872); Sturgis v. Ewing, 18 Ill. 176, 185 (1856). 
79. Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942); see also Demorest v. City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 48 (1944). 
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tempted to abolish inheritance, all such statements are, of course, 
merely dicta. These statements are, nonetheless, overwhelmingly in 
favor of such legislative power. 80 
Concluding that a state legislature could abolish inheritance does 
not, however, also justify concluding that Congress could do so. Tradi-
tionally, regulation of inheritance has been the prerogative of the 
states. Nonetheless, to date, almost all congressional efforts to raise 
revenue through the federal estate and gift taxes have been upheld as 
constitutional. Despite constitutional bans on imposition of direct 
taxes without reference to the census, 81 progressive federal estate and 
gift taxes have been sustained uniformly as excise taxes on the transfer 
of wealth. 82 Thus, a congressional attempt to abolish inheritance 
might fall on the wrong side of the line.83 No transfer would remain 
for Congress to tax. Moreover, no inheritance would remain for the 
states to regulate. But Congress' authority to raise revenue from prop-
erty passing at death appears to extend to anything less than complete 
abolition of inheritance. 84 As long as Congress continues to allow 
every decedent the right to transmit a reasonable amount of property, 
almost any reform of the federal transfer taxes would appear to pass 
constitutional muster.ss 
80. See Kornstein, supra note 28, at 742 (inheritance "could constitutionally be abolished"). 
81. U.S. CoNST. art. I, §§ 2, 9. 
82. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921) (estate tax); Bromley v. McCaughn, 
280 U.S. 124 (1929) (gift tax); see also Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900) (upholding the 
1898 federal inheritance tax); Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1874) (upholding the Civil 
War federal succession tax). 
83. Cf. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. l, 24 (1916) (congressional exercise of the 
taxing power not restricted by the fifth amendment unless "so arbitrary as to constrain to the 
conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property"). 
84. In Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a 
federal law providing for escheat (to the tribe) of decedents' interests in certain highly fraction-
ated Indian lands. Determining the larger meaning of the case is difficult, because there were 
three separate concurrences, joined in by a total of eight Justices. The gist of the Court's opinion 
seems to be that "complete abolition of both the descent and devise of a particular class of 
property may be a taking." 481 U.S. at 717. Thus, ifinheritance were not completely abolished, 
as would be true if all decedents were allowed to pass a fixed amount of property at death, Hodel 
v. Irving would be inapplicable. Indeed, citing Irving Trust Co. v. Day, 314 U.S. 556, 562 (1942), 
the Court's opinion continues: "[W)e reaffirm the continuing vitality of the long line of cases 
recognizing the States', and where appropriate, the United States', broad authority to adjust the 
rules governing the descent and devise of property without implicating the guarantees of the Just 
Compensation Clause." 481 U.S. at 717. Moreover, Hodel v. Irving is clearly inconsistent with 
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979), in which the Court wrote: "[D]enial of one tradi-
tional property right does not always amount to a taking. At least where an owner possesses a 
full 'bundle' of property rights, the destruction of one 'strand' of the bundle is not a taking, 
because the aggregate must be viewed in its entirety." Yet three of the concurring Justices specif-
ically disclaimed any intention to limit Andrus v. Allard to its facts. 481 U.S. at 718. 
85. Cf. R. EPSTEIN, supra note 72, at 283-84, 303-05 (suggesting that even a "confiscatory 
tax approaching 100 percent will be attacked in vain" under current caselaw); Kornstein, supra 
note 28, at 742 (concluding that Congress could constitutionally abolish inheritance). 
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II. INHERITANCE AS A MATTER OF POLICY 
A. Society's Stake in Accumulated Wealth 
Individuals never acquire property on their own. Society plays a 
crucial role in every individual's acquisitive activities. Society deter-
mines the rules by which individuals acquire property. Society also 
educates (to one extent or another) every individual. And society en-
acts and enforces laws that protect individuals' enjoyment of what 
they acquire. 
Andrew Carnegie was one of the first and most outspoken advo-
cates of society's interest in accumulated wealth. According to Car-
negie, individualism and competition are responsible for all 
civilization's advances. 86 As the natural consequence of that competi-
tion, some individuals acquire more than others. Those who do owe a 
responsibility to the public, from whom their wealth comes. Thus, 
they hold their wealth in trust for the benefit of the public. 87 High 
death taxes are therefore appropriate. They encourage persons of great 
wealth to devote it to the public interest during life. 88 
One need not wholeheartedly accept Carnegie's optimistic vision of 
capitalism to agree with his conclusion that society has a major stake 
in the wealth it allows individuals to accumulate. 89 Those who succeed 
in accumulating large sums would, no doubt, do quite well for them-
86. 
The price which society pays for the law of competition ... is ••• great; but the advan• 
tages of this law are .•• greater still, for it is to this law that we owe our wonderful material 
development •••. [A]nd while the law may be sometimes hard for the individual, it is best 
for the race, because it insures the survival of the fittest in every department. We accept and 
welcome, therefore, ••• great inequality of environment ... as being not only beneficial, but 
essential for the future progress of the race. 
Carnegie, supra note 14, at 655. 
87. Accordingly, the wealthy should provide their dependents, after death, with only moder· 
ate amounts for legitimate needs. Carnegie, supra note 14, at 661-62; see also Carnegie, The Best 
Fields for Philanthropy, 149 N. AM. REv. 682 (1889). 
88. Carnegie, supra note 14, at 659. 
89. The argument works even better if one believes those who accumulate large sums are 
essentially robber-barons: 
[The estates of millionaires] have been accumulated out of the pockets of the citizens of the 
several States; in some instances, this has extended to the entire country and even to the 
entire world. Where profits are so enormous, they cease to be profits simply, but they are 
nothing other than a tax. The citizenship, that has paid them, is more entitled to the benefits 
from them than the heirs-at-law ••.. 
. . . It is just and fair that those who have accumulated large estates, be compelled to 
distribute them back to the citizenship of the State. An Inheritance Tax should not be im-
posed upon small estates because, by the very nature of things, such are not accumulations 
by profiteering, but by fair profits, honestly earned by unselfish dealings. 
REPORT OF THE STATE TAX CoMMISSJON OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FOR THE YEAR 1919, 
at 32-33 (1920). 
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selves, even if stranded on a desert isle.90 But they have not been. In-
stead, they have been a part of society, where they have been allowed 
to attend public or privately endowed schools and then employ their 
gifts in dealing with rights, institutions, knowledge, and fashions cre-
ated and maintained by society at large. Put another way, the wealth 
they accumulate is "largely the result of the recipient being favorably 
positioned vis-a-vis the structure of civilization."91 Such wealth is, 
therefore, "in large part produced by society itself."92 President Theo-
dore Roosevelt put it this way: "The man of great wealth owes a pecu-
liar obligation to the State, because he derives special advantages from 
the mere existence of government."93 President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
commented: 
Wealth in the modem world does not come merely from individual ef-
fort; it results from a combination of individual effort and of the mani-
fold uses to which the community puts that effort. The individual does 
not create the product of his industry with his own hands; he utilizes the 
many processes and forces of mass production to meet the demands of a 
national and international market. 
Therefore, in spite of the great importance in our national life of the 
efforts and ingenuity of unusual individuals, the people in the mass have 
inevitably helped to make large fortunes possible.94 
The inescapable conclusion is that society has a major stake in all ac-
cumulated wealth. Given that stake, society need not continue to al-
low decedents nearly unlimited control over the disposition of their 
property after death. 
B. Arguments in Favor of Curtailing Inheritance 
1. Leveling the Playing Field 
The inequality of accumulation that occurs as the by-product of 
capitalism is hardly to be despised, as Andrew Carnegie95 and Theo-




93. T. Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message (Dec. 3, 1906), in 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF 
THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 1, at 7023, 7042. Roosevelt proposed a "very heavily" graduated 
tax "on the inheritance of those swollen fortunes which it is certainly of no benefit to this country 
to perpetuate." Id. at 7043. 
94. F.D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (June 19, 1935), in H.R. REP. No. 1681, 74th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), reprinted in 1939-1 C.B. (pt. 2) 642, 642-43. 
95. 
The Socialist or Anarchist who seeks to overturn present conditions is to be regarded as 
attacking the foundation upon which civilization itself rests, for civilization took its start 
from the day that the capable, industrious workman said to his incompetent and lazy fellow, 
"If thou dost not sow, thou shalt not reap," and thus ended primitive Communism by sepa-
rating the drones from the bees ..•• To those who propose to substitute Communism for this 
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dore Roosevelt96 well realized. 97 Thus, absolute equality is a goal for 
which society ought not to strive98 and that, in any event, society 
could never even approximate without eugenics and state socialism. 
Equality of opportunity, however, is at the very core of American val-
ues.99 Philosophers tend to agree that equality of opportunity is a fun-
damental good. I00 It is hardly open to debate that inherited wealth 
contradicts equality of opportunity.IOI According to one authority, 
"inherited wealth account[ s] for half or more of the net worth of every 
wealthy man and for most of the net worth of equally wealthy wo-
men. "I02 How society reallocates accumulated wealth at death is, 
therefore, a critical determinant of the degree of equality of opportu-
nity succeeding generations will enjoy. Io3 Thus, Thomas Jefferson ad-
intense Individualism the answer, therefore, is: The race has tried that. All progress from 
that barbarous day to the present time has resulted from its displacement. 
Carnegie, supra note 14, at 656. 
96. See T. Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 7084-85 ("We have not the slightest sympathy with 
that socialistic idea which would try to put laziness, thriftlessness and inefficiency on a par with 
industry, thrift and efficiency; which would strive to break up ••. private property •••• Such a 
theory, if ever adopted, would mean the ruin of the entire country .••• "). 
97. The reader may be tempted to sneer at reliance on such rough-and-ready turn-of-the-
century defenders of American capitalism as Andrew Carnegie and Teddy Roosevelt. Arthur M. 
Okun's thoughtful lectures, delivered at the John F. Kennedy School of Government of Harvard 
University in April 1974, however, seem to reach the same ultimate conclusion: "[T]he market 
needs a place." A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 119. He, too, is very aware that inequality must occur. 
98. See F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 85-88; id. at 85 (quoting Holmes: "I have no respect for 
the passion for equality, which seems to me merely idealizing envy."). 
99. See, e.g., A. BERLE, THE AMERICAN EcONOMIC REPUBLIC 52 (1963); A. MELLON, 
TAXATION: THE PEOPLE'S BUSINESS 123 (1924) ("The theory upon which this country was 
founded is equality of opportunity."); A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 75-76; T. SMITH, THE AMERI· 
CAN PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY 148-52 (1927). 
100. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSI'ICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 28, 221 (1980); J. 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusncE 83-90, 274-80 (1971); J. WILSON, EQUALITY 180-94 (1966). 
One commentator has defined the issues this way: 
What, then, are the ethical criteria which we bring to bear on [the question of inheri· 
tance]? First, that every human being counts or ought to count as a person. Second, that in 
human relations, concern with eliciting the best possibilities in another is essential to the 
best development of oneself. Third, that this is as applicable in the relations of groups to 
groups as it is in individual relations. In this context, "best" is taken to mean that which 
forwards the life of others. 
Nathanson, supra note 32, at 76. 
101. J. BRITTAIN, supra note 25; s. MUNZER, A THEORY OF PROPERTY 383-95 (1990); J. 
WEDGWOOD, supra note 7; Haslett, supra note 32, at 125-26; Kotlikoff & Summers, The Role of 
Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 J. PoL. EcoN. 706, 730 (1981) 
("Intergenerational transfers appear to be the major element determining wealth accumulation in 
the United States."); see also c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, INHERITANCE IN 
AMERICA FROM CoLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 3 (1987); Verbit, supra note 28, at 612 n.5; 
Friedrich, supra note 2, at 35-36. 
102. R. MUSGRAVE & P. MUSGRAVE, supra note 12, at 483-84. 
103. Blum and Kalven acknowledge that "lessening inequalities" in inheritance may have a 
role to play in the quest for equality of opportunity. Blum & Kalven, supra note 3, at 502-03. 
Rawls argues that inheritance is "permissible provided that the resulting inequalities are to 
the advantage of the least fortunate and compatible with liberty and fair equality of opportu-
nity." J. RAWLS, supra note 100, at 278. He assumes that "a number of inheritance and gift 
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vacated a steeply progressive death tax as a "means of silently 
lessening the inequality of property."104 So did Thomas Paine.105 Pres-
ident Theodore Roosevelt advocated the predecessor of the current 
federal estate tax largely on the basis that it would guarantee "at least 
an approximate equality in the conditions under which each man ob-
tains the chance to show the stuff that is in him when compared to his 
fellows." 106 
Inheritance nonetheless continues to enjoy widespread support, 
even from eminent philosophers. F.A. Hayek, for example, writes: 
Egalitarians generally regard differently those differences in individ-
ual capacities which are inborn and those which are due to the influences 
of environment, or those which are the result of "nature" and those 
which are the result of "nurture .... " [N]o more credit belongs to him 
for having been born with desirable qualities than for having grown up 
under favorable circumstances. The distinction between the two is im-
portant only because the former advantages are due to circumstances 
clearly beyond human control, while the latter are due to factors which 
we might be able to alter. The important question is whether there is a 
case for so changing our institutions as to eliminate as much as possible 
those advantages due to environment .... 
The fact that certain advantages rest on human arrangements does 
not necessarily mean that we could provide the same advantages for all 
or that, if they are given to some, somebody else is thereby deprived of 
them. The most important factors to be considered in this connection are 
the family, inheritance, and education, and it is against the inequality 
which they produce that criticism is mainly directed. They are, however, 
not the only important factors of environment. 107 
However compelling Hayek's argument may be with respect to the 
inequalities generated by family and education, 108 I wonder whether it 
also justifies those generated by inheritance. Hayek admits that inheri-
tance is one of those "human arrangements" that contributes to ine-
quality of opportunity .109 He also seems to assume that, unlike many 
other sources of inequality of opportunity, inheritance is one we could 
do something about. 110 Thus, he almost seems to conclude that inher-
itance is unobjectionable because it is not the only source of inequality, 
taxes" will be imposed. Id. at 277. He acknowledges that if inequalities of wealth exceed a certain 
point, equality of opportunity is threatened. Id. at 278. 
104. 8 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 82. 
105. See infra note 134. 
106. T. Roosevelt, supra note 1, at 7085. 
107. F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 88-89. 
108. Even in the Soviet Union, which historically rejected capitalism and all it stands for, the 
children of the elite have educational opportunities vastly superior to those of the masses. Smith, 
How the Soviet Elite Lives, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1975, at 39, 49-51. 
109. F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 91. 
110. See id. at 90-91. 
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and, even were we to abolish it, inequality of opportunity would con-
tinue to exist. 
Of course, Hayek does say more.111 After justifying the inequality 
families and education produce, he continues: 
Once we agree that it is desirable to harness the natural instincts of 
parents to equip the new generation as well as they can, there seems no 
sensible ground for limiting this to non-material benefits. The family's 
function of passing on standards and traditions is closely tied up with the 
possibility of transmitting material goods.112 
In my opinion, the benefits of the family Hayek dwells on, accultura-
tion and education, are separable from the purely financial advantage 
inheritance represents. 113 Restrictions on inheritance need not affect 
adversely such benefits. We can devise a system that allows (or even 
encourages) parents to use their material advantages to benefit their 
children through acculturation and education yet prohibits transfers of 
purely financial advantage. The proposal outlined in this article at-
tempts to make that distinction.114 It is true that some varieties of 
acculturation and education may wither without ample financial irri-
gation. It is also true that denying the adult children of the wealthy 
access to their parents' fortunes would require those children to fund 
childhood "standards and traditions" from their own earnings. But I 
do not believe that would be bad. 
In any event, my proposal does not attempt to prohibit all in-
tergenerational transmission of financial advantage. In fact, it would 
allow parents to fund family "standards and traditions" long after 
their children were grown, through annual tax-free gifts115 and other 
111. Nozick does not, however. After defending the types of inequality Hayek and I regard 
as inherent in the concept of a family upbringing, he continues: 
Is it unfair that a child be raised in a home with a swimming pool, using it daily even though 
he is no more deserving than another child whose home is without one? Should such a 
situation be prohibited? Why then should there be objection to the transfer of the swimming 
pool to an adult by bequest? 
R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 238 (1974) (emphasis in original). The simple an-
swer is that we tolerate (perhaps even celebrate) the inequalities inherent in a family upbringing, 
because we put an extremely high value not only on capitalism but also on allowing parents to 
raise their own children. Not all inequalities stem from a family upbringing, however. Just be· 
cause a child has grown up swimming in a family pool does not mean that he or she should, as a 
50-year old who already owns another pool, inherit the one he or she swam in while a child. See 
Komstein, supra note 28, at 772 ("Using the sanctity of the family as justification for inherited 
wealth is an attempt to do socially what cannot be done biologically."). Interestingly, a recent 
newspaper article describes Nozick as a supporter of "increased inheritance taxes." It quotes him 
as describing inheritance as a "special kind of unearned benefit that produces unequal opportuni-
ties." Ravo, supra note 12. 
112. F. HAYEK, supra note 1, at 91. 
113. In any event, Hayek himself seems to doubt whether his argument requires the conclu-
sion that all inheritance is acceptable. Id. 
114. See infra notes 361-67 and accompanying text. 
115. See infra notes 368-70 and accompanying text. 
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lifetime giving, though limited by a gift tax.116 And it would permit 
parents at death to leave even their healthy, adult children a moderate 
amount of financial advantage.117 If particular varieties of accultura-
tion and education must necessarily wither in the absence of greater 
unearned, lifelong financial advantage, I wonder whether they are 
hardy enough for cultivation in this nation's ideological climate. We as 
a nation pride ourselves on having no Chambords.11s 
In short, my proposal attempts to distinguish those types of ine-
qualities that are inevitable in the family context from those that are 
distinctly less so. Like Hayek, I have little interest in equality as such. 
But I do believe our "human arrangements" ought to be tailored, 
wherever possible, to maximize equality of opportunity. The fact that 
inequality of ability, luck, and education would continue under a sys-
tem that curtailed inheritance119 is irrelevant. We must do what we 
can. 
2. Deficit Reduction in a Painless and Appropriate Fashion 
Another reason to curtail inheritance is the prospect of raising rev-
enue. If $150 billion pass at death each year, curtailing inheritance has 
the potential to raise a substantial amount of revenue. Unfortunately, 
my proposal would raise nowhere near $150 billion. It contains so 
many generous exceptions that its very structure limits its promise. 
Taking those exceptions into account, my best guess is that it might 
raise $25-30 billion.120 Even so, it would raise almost four times as 
116. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
117. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
118. See generally L. HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRAomoN IN AMERICA (1955). 
119. Hayek makes the "cynical" argument that, if inheritance were abolished, parents would 
merely find other ways to advance their children's interests, "such as placing them in positions 
which might bring them the income and the prestige that a fortune would have done." F. 
HAYEK, supra note 1, at 91. He cites in support of his prediction the example of the Soviets, who 
did, temporarily, abolish inheritance. See infra notes 243-52 and accompanying text. That such 
parental use of influence does, in fact, occur in the Soviet Union seems to be correct. See A. 
BERLE, supra note 99, at 52; Smith, supra note 108, at 49-51. Were Hayek only a bit more 
cynical, however, he would realize that, even in systems that celebrate inheritance, parents tend 
to look after their children's interests. Parental use and abuse of influence are simply part of the 
family. See A. BERLE, supra note 99, at 52. 
120. Forty-five-thousand-eight-hundred estates of decedents dying in 1986 filed returns re-
porting at least $500,000. Combined, they reported assets of $66 billion. Johnson, Estate Tax 
Returns, 1986-1988, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Spring 1990, at 27. If half of all decedents 
qualified for (and fully utilized) the unlimited marital exemption, infra notes 289-99 and accom-
panying text, the tax base would drop to $33 billion. Assuming all other decedents fully utilized 
the universal exemption, infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text, the tax base would drop an 
additional $6 billion (one half of 45,800 estates times $250,000). Thus, $27 billion would remain. 
The rough nature of this estimate should be obvious. It ignores four of the exceptions my propo-
sal would allow. Three, however, would be relatively inexpensive: the exemption for dependent 
lineal descendants, infra notes 300-12 and accompanying text, because few parents die with chil-
dren under age 25; the exemption for disabled lineal descendants, infra notes 313-16 and accom-
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much as the federal wealth transfer taxes currently raise. 121 But the 
exceptions are not the only limitations on the proposal,s promise. Its 
economic effects are unknown. If it decreased incentives to work or 
save, its revenue yield might be lower still. 122 All these uncertainties 
suggest that raising revenue is not the most important reason to imple-
ment this proposal. On the other hand, a country with a government 
that insists on consistently spending substantially more than it takes in 
ought to consider seriously any proposal with reasonable prospects for 
raising any significant amount of revenue. 
Denying healthy, adult children the property that once belonged to 
their parents is about as painless a tax as one could imagine. Jeremy 
Bentham, arguing in favor of severe restrictions on inheritance, 123 laid 
great emphasis on this point. He argued that restricting inheritance 
was "absolutely the best,, form of tax. 124 The title he chose for his 
pamphlet, Supply Without Burthen, suggests why. A tax on inheri-
tance imposes no restriction on the enjoyment of the current property 
owner. It is true that those who currently stand to inherit may, as an 
initial matter, be disappointed. But change the rules, and people,s ex-
pectations change. As a result, in the long run, after potential heirs 
panying text, because few beneficiaries are totally and permanently disabled; and the exemption 
for lineal ascendants, infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text, because few parents survive 
their children. The charitable exemption would be more costly, but I see no way to predict its 
cost. Each omission suggests the $27 billion figure is too high. Other factors, however, suggest 
the $27 billion figure is too low. First, the 1986 figures used above reflect only estates exceeding 
$500,000. This proposal would apply to estates above $250,000. Second, fewer than half of all 
decedents could and would utilize an unlimited marital exemption. (Only 45% of 1986 decedents 
whose estates filed estate tax returns passed anything to a surviving spouse, despite the fact that 
all who were married at death automatically qualified for an unlimited marital deduction. See 
Johnson, supra, at 48-50 (Table 2).) Third, an invigorated gift tax, infra notes 344-93 and accom-
panying text, would yield additional revenue. Fourth, if the amount of wealth passing at death 
increases as much as some expect, see supra note 12, the prospects for future growth in revenue 
are substantial. 
121. See supra note 13. 
122. I discuss these risks infra notes 169-225 and accompanying text. I conclude, however, 
that the risks involved are small. 
123. In 1795, in a pamphlet entitled Supply Without Burthen, Bentham proposed that prop· 
erty passing by intestate succession be allowed to pass only to "near relations. " All other prop· 
erty would escheat. J. BENTHAM, SUPPLY WITHOUT BURTHEN OR EsCHEAT VICE TAXATION 
(1795), reprinted in 1 JEREMY BENTHAM'S EcoNOMIC WRmNGS 283 ~V. Stark ed. 1952) (em· 
phasis in original). He also proposed that freedom of testation be limited to one half one's prop· 
erty. Even as to property passing by intestate succession to "near relations," he argued that "the 
public [should] come in for a share in the succession, (suppose an equal share)." Id. at 283-84 
(emphasis in original). Bentham thus proposed changes that would have pushed inheritance in 
two of the same directions I suggest here. Inheritance would be more rigidly defined in terms of 
the relationship of the beneficiary to the decedent, and freedom of testation would be curtailed. 
Unlike Jefferson and Paine, for whom inheritance posed a threat to elective representative 
government, see infra notes 134-36 and accompanying text, Bentham offered his proposal to raise 
revenue. In fact, he recommended that the revenue be used to retire the national debt. J. BEN· 
THAM, supra, at 298-99, 319. 
124. Id. at 283 (emphasis in original). 
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have taken the change in the law into account, they will not be 
disappointed.125 
Depriving rich parents of the right to decide who will own their 
property after death is a similarly painless and appropriate way to 
raise revenue.126 Recent evidence suggests that the elderly are among 
the deficit's primary beneficiaries.127 Such evidence also suggests that 
the elderly are becoming rich (at least on a relative basis) at the ex-
pense of the young.128 If the welfare state is allowing the elderly to 
save money they otherwise would have spent on medical or living ex-
penses, what could be more appropriate than denying them the right 
to dictate how those savings are disposed of after death? 
A tax on inheritance by healthy, adult children falls squarely on 
those whose only claim is by accident of birth. To them, inheritance is 
little more than a windfall. 129 They, more than anyone else, truly have 
the ability to pay. And the extent to which a tax is based on ability to 
pay is widely accepted as a primary measure of a tax's fairness.130 
3. Protecting Elective Representative Government 
In America, our covenant that "all men are created equal" secures 
much more than the legitimacy of the capitalistic game we ask our-
selves and our children to play. It also secures the form of elective 
representative government we cherish.131 We believe all our citizens 
125. Id. at 279, 289-94. Bentham's argument seems strained. An analogy, however, bears 
him out. In the United States, the children of presidents and senators rarely seem disappointed 
that they cannot succeed to their parents' positions. See H. READ, supra note 32, at 178. Had 
they been born a few centuries earlier, or in a different country, where the laws permitted the 
children of Kings and aristocrats to inherit their parents' power, they would have had quite 
different expectations. But the rules are clear in the United States: though a child may inherit a 
parent's money, a child generally cannot inherit a parent's political power. In short, Bentham 
may be correct. If we change the laws of inheritance, we may also change potential heirs' 
expectations. 
126. See supra note 14. 
127. Chakravarty & Weisman, Consuming Our Children?, FORBES, Nov. 14, 1988, at 228-30; 
Reeves, Elderly May Prove You Can Take It with You, Tucson Citizen, Dec. 20, 1988, at SA, col. 
2. 
128. Dentzer, A Health-Care Debacle, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 9, 1989, at 16, 17 
(poverty rate among the elderly declined from 35% in 1959 to 12% in 1987); Chakravarty & 
Weisman, supra note 127, at 222-23, 228; Reeves, supra note 127. 
129. See supra notes 25, 95-119 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., J. DODGE, THE Lome OF TAX: FEDERAL INCOME TAX THEORY AND POL-
ICY 91-94 (1989); A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2 (1776), reprinted in 39 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN WORLD 1, 
361 (R. Hutchins ed. 1952) ("The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support 
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities .... In the 
observation or neglect of this maxim consists what is called the equality or inequality of 
taxation."). 
131. In 1787, Noah Webster put it this way: 
An equality of property, with a necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy com-
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should have an equal voice in selecting their governmental representa-
tives. We also believe all our citizens should have an equal opportunity 
to serve in elective office. Inheritance is inconsistent with these be-
liefs.132 Money clearly influences politicians.133 Similarly, because 
political campaigns are expensive, the wealthy have a tremendous ad-
vantage when seeking election. 
Thomas Paine knew inheritance was inconsistent with elective rep-
resentative government. His proposals for staggering death taxes were 
motivated primarily by his fear of the corrupting influence dramatic 
inequalities of wealth would have in a representative democracy.134 
Thomas Jefferson, too, seems to have sensed that the very concept of 
inheritance was incompatible with the American form of govem-
ment.135 If "the earth belongs ... to the living,"136 the dead ought not 
decide who owns portions of it; neither ought they influence the pro-
cess by which the living decide how to use it. 
Nonetheless, inheritance reform at the time of the American 
Revolution was tame in comparison with that then advocated by 
binations of powerful families, is the very soul of a republic - While this continues, the 
people will inevitably possess both power and freedom; when this is lost, power departs, 
liberty expires, and a commonwealth will inevitably assume some other form. 
N. WEBsrER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITU· 
TION PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION HELD AT PHILADELPHIA (1787), reprinted in 
PAMPHLETS ON THE CoNSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 25, 59 (P. Ford ed. 1888) (empha· 
sis in original). 
132. See, e.g., J. RAWLS, supra note 100, at 278 (if inequalities of wealth exceed a certain 
point, political liberty "tends to lose its value, and representative government [tends] to become 
such in appearance only"); H. READ, supra note 32, at 3 ("[I)nherited wealth is the foe of 
freedom."). 
133. See, e.g., L. TuuRow, supra note 25, at 135-52. 
134. In the second part of The Rights of Man, first published in 1792, Paine openly worried 
about the corrupting influence inheritance could have on an elective representative government. 
He therefore proposed a sharply progressive tax, based on the amount inherited by each individ-
ual. The marginal tax rates rose to "the point of prohibition" (100%) on the largest "estates." T. 
PAINE, supra note 63, at 434-39. 
In Agrarian Justice, published in 1796, Paine returned to the problem of inheritance and 
offered a second proposal. He argued that, in a state of nature, all people had a natural right to 
occupy the land. Private property arose, depriving some of their right to use the land, when 
others improved it, thereby entitling themselves to possess it. This "cultivation" of the land, 
according to Paine, permitted the rise of civilization. He therefore argued that private property 
must be preserved. But he also argued that those "thrown out of their natural inheritance by the 
introduction of the system of landed property" must be compensated. Everyone, therefore, upon 
attaining age 21, should receive a one-time payment of £15. In addition, everyone over the age of 
50, as well as the "lame and blind," should receive £10 annually. T. PAINE, AGRARIAN JUSTICE 
(1796), reprinted in 1 THE COMPLETE WRmNGS OF THOMAS PAINE, supra note 63, at 605, 611-
13. Here, then, is a scheme surprisingly similar to Social Security. Instead of requiring "contribu-
tions" from the system's beneficiaries, through payroll taxes on wages, however, Paine argued 
that the necessary revenue should come from property passing at death. Id. at 613-17. 
135. See Katz, supra note 41, at 18. See generally Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to 
Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 467 (1976). 
136. 15 T. JEFFERSON, supra note 63, at 392 (emphasis omitted). 
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Paine137 and Bentham.138 It consisted mainly in elimination of primo-
geniture and entail.139 Still, its primary purpose was to prevent the 
disparities in hereditary wealth that had occurred in Europe and thus 
to protect elective representative government.140 Jefferson, author of 
the Virginia legislation, considered an "aristocracy of wealth" to be 
"of more harm and danger, than benefit, to society."141 He aimed, in-
stead, "to make an opening for the aristocracy of virtue and talent," 
which he regarded as "essential to a well ordered republic."142 Be-
cause eliminating primogeniture and entail "would prevent the ac-
cumulation and perpetuation of wealth in select families," he viewed it 
as part of "a system by which every fibre would be eradicated of an-
tient or future aristocracy; and a foundation laid for a government 
truly republican."143 In 1784 the preamble to legislation overhauling 
North Carolina's inheritance laws echoed Jefferson.144 In 1787, writ-
ing in favor of the Constitution, Noah Webster used the same argu-
ment.145 And in 1794, when the Delaware legislature eliminated the 
eldest son's double share from its law of intestate succession, the pre-
amble read: "WHEREAS it is the duty and policy of every republican 
government to preserve equality amongst its citizens, by maintaining 
the balance of property as far as is consistent with the right of individ-
uals .... " 146 Clearly, those who founded this nation understood the 
137. See supra note 134. 
138. See supra note 123. 
139. See Katz, supra note 41, at 11-14. 
140. See id. at 14-29; G. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Civic Republican 
Legal Culture (Sept. 8, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
141. T. JEFFERSON, AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1829), reprinted in 1 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEF-
FERSON 1, 58 (P. Ford ed. 1904). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 77; see id. at 77-78. 
144. 
WHEREAS it will tend to promote that Equality of Property which is of the Spirit and 
Principle of a genuine Republic .... 
AND whereas Entails of Estates tend only to raise the Wealth and Importance of partic-
ular Families and Individuals, giving them an unequal and undue influence in a Republic, 
and prove in manifold Instances the Source of great Contention and Injustice .... 
LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 488-89 (J. Iredell ed. 1791) (Act of Apr. 1784, ch. 
22). 
145. 
Make laws •.. destroying and barring entailments; leave real estates to revolve from 
hand to hand, as time and accident may direct; and no family influence can be acquired and 
established for a series of generations - no man can obtain dominion over a large territory 
- the laborious and saving, who are generally the best citizens, will possess each his share 
of property and power, and thus the balance of wealth and power will continue where it is, 
in the body of the people. 
N. WEBSTER, supra note 131, at 59 (emphasis in original). 
146. Act of Jan. 29, 1794, ch. 53, 2 DEL. LAWS 1172 (1797). 
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inconsistency between great hereditary wealth and elective representa-
tive government. 
And despite the fact that Americans have always tolerated inheri-
tance, we have never completely forgotten our duty to "maintain the 
balance of property as far as is consistent with the right of individu-
als. "147 This duty, in fact, seems to underlie President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt's 1935 Message to Congress: 
The transmission from generation to generation of vast fortunes by will, 
inheritance, or gift is not consistent with the ideals and sentiments of the 
American people . 
. . . Great accumulations of wealth can not be justified on the basis of 
personal and family security. In the last analysis such accumulations 
amount to the perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of 
control in a relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare 
of many, many others. 
Such inherited economic power is as inconsistent with the ideals of 
this generation as inherited political power was inconsistent with the ide-
als of the generation which established our Government.148 
The existence of billionaires in our country today poses the same dan-
gers the framers sought to avoid by eliminating primogeniture and en-
tail two centuries ago. If we were willing to curtail inheritance, we 
could simultaneously eliminate one of the most blatant sources of ine-
quality149 and improve the prospects for another two centuries of elec-
tive representative government in America.1so 
4. Increasing Privatization in the Care of the Disabled 
and the Elderly 
As the extended family vanishes, it leaves behind many victims. 
Elderly parents and grandparents, as well as the disabled, are often, in 
effect, homeless. 151 Increasingly, the cost of supporting these individu-
als has fallen to the government. The government, however, often pro-
vides care for such individuals in a poor and insensitive fashion. 
Moreover, the cost of providing such care is an expense we as a nation 
seem unable to afford.152 A system that encourages family members to 
provide for the care of the elderly and disabled is, therefore, desirable. 
147. 2 DEL. LAWS 1172. Our antitrust laws demonstrate our continuing acceptance of that 
duty. 
148. F.D. Roosevelt, supra note 94, at 643. 
149. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text. 
150. See Jantscher, supra note 15, at 53 (speculating that campaign contribution restrictions 
might not be necessary if wealth were more equally distributed). 
151. See generally c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, supra note 101, at 154-61. 
152. See generally Tolchin, How the New Medicare Law Fell on Hard Times in a Hurry, N.Y. 
Times, Oct. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 1. 
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Increased privatization would ensure not only better and more sensi-
tive care, but also reduction of the costs borne by the government. 
My proposal would encourage private expenditure for the care of 
the elderly and disabled. It would allow a generous exemption for dis-
abled lineal descendants.153 In addition, it would allow an unlimited 
exemption for lineal ascendants,154 most of whom would be elderly. 
Given the prospect of reallocation to the government at death, these 
exemptions generally would be utilized when available. The prospect 
of reallocation at death might also encourage people still alive to pay 
for the care of their disabled and elderly relatives more frequently than 
they do now. Given the appropriateness of such expenditures, the cur-
rent gift tax exclusions for transfers in discharge of a donor's legal 
obligation and for gifts of medical care would continue.155 The latter 
might even be expanded to include gifts of nursing-home care.156 Fi-
nally, there would be an unlimited exclusion, for gift tax purposes, for 
transfers to or for the benefit of any lineal ascendant.157 
No doubt the truly wealthy already take care of their elderly and 
disabled. Thus, curtailing inheritance might produce little privatiza-
tion at that level. Those at lower wealth levels, however, do not always 
take care of their own. "Divestment planning," a new type of estate 
planning, caters to clients desiring to shift the costs of caring for eld-
erly and disabled relatives to the government.158 By making it much 
more expensive during lifetime to give large amounts to one's chil-
dren, 159 and by limiting the amount healthy children could inherit, 160 
this proposal would achieve much greater privatization at the "near-
rich" level. 
153. See infra notes 313-16 and accompanying text. 
154. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
155. See infra notes 361-67 and accompanying text. 
156. See infra note 367. 
157. See infra notes 371-72 and accompanying text. 
158. The practice is described in Dobris, Medicaid Asset Planning by the Elderly: A Policy 
View of Expectations, Entitlement and Inheritance, 24 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 1, 14-17 
(1989). Something is surely very wrong with a system that ostensibly provides certain types of 
care only for the poor but welcomes into its fold those who have deliberately made themselves 
poor by enriching their adult children. See Quinn, Do Only the Suckers Pay?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 
18, 1989, at 52 ("Your first reaction might be to say, 'Of course a child should inherit.' But think 
about it. Are you willing to pay taxes, to support my mother in a nursing home, solely to help me 
acquire her money?") (emphasis in original). 
159. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
160. See infra notes 300-12, 319-32 and accompanying text. 
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5. Expanding Public Ownership of National and International 
Treasures 
Capitalism generally assumes that everything has a price and that 
all property is appropriate for private ownership. Yet, even in 
America, capitalism has its limits. Yellowstone National Park, for ex-
ample, does not belong in private hands. It should, and does, belong to 
all Americans. Yellowstone and the other National Parks, Forests, 
and Monuments need not be the only examples of property we find 
inappropriate for private ownership. The paintings of van Gogh, Gau-
guin, or Picasso arguably fall into the same category. By curtailing 
inheritance, we could force more treasures of this type onto the market 
each generation. Some would remain within a given family longer, as 
the result of lifetime transfers, but raising funds to pay an increased 
gift tax might cause others to surface. 
Forcing works of art onto the market more frequently would not 
alone assure their acquisition by the public. In the current art market 
many museums find it difficult to compete effectively.161 But even that 
might change. In general, works of art do not generate income. Nor 
are they regularly used as collateral.162 And their utility and ability to 
confer prestige on an owner are of an unusual variety. Major compo-
nents in their value, therefore, include their potential for appreciation 
and the fact that an owner can transmit that potential at death. De-
priving works of art of that transmissibility might make a major differ-
ence in their value to private individuals. To museums, however, it 
would not matter. 
6. Increasing Lifetime Charitable Giving 
The income, estate, and gift taxes all currently provide incentives 
for gifts to charity. 163 We as a nation seem committed to allowing indi-
viduals to do for society through the charitable sector some things the 
government cannot or will not do. We therefore apparently believe 
that charitable giving is desirable. In order to continue to encourage 
gifts to charity, the gift tax would necessarily allow a deduction for 
transfers to charity.164 Given the incentives for lifetime giving that re-
allocation at death would create, the allowance of a gift tax charitable 
161. See, e.g., In re Bayley Trust, 127 Vt. 380, 250 A.2d 516 (1969); Passell, Vincent Van 
Gogh, Meet Adam Smith, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, at Hl, col. 2; Kimmelman, How the Modern 
Got the van Gogh, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1989, at Cl3, col. 1. 
162. See Passell, supra note 161. 
163. I.RC. §§ 170, 2055, 2522 (1988) (income tax, estate tax, and gift tax). 
164. See infra notes 378-83 and accompanying text. 
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deduction would surely result in a marked increase in, lifetime charita-
ble giving.165 
7. Neutralizing the Co"osive Effects of Wealth 
According to many, great wealth is a curse. Carnegie, for example, 
wrote: 
Why should men leave great fortunes to their children? If this is done 
from affection, is it not misguided affection? Observation teaches that, 
generally speaking, it is not well for the children that they should be so 
burdened. Neither is it well for the state .... [I]t is no longer questiona-
ble that great sums bequeathed oftener work more for the injury than for 
the good of the recipients. Wise men will soon conclude that, for" the best 
interests of the members of their families and of the state, such bequests 
are an improper use of their means . 
. . . [L]ooking at the usual result of enormous sums conferred upon 
legatees, the thoughtful man must shortly say, "I would as soon leave to 
my son a curse as the almighty dollar" .... 166 
Many others have agreed.167 The reasons are obvious. Great wealth 
confers tremendous disincentives to work, extraordinary incentives to 
consume frivolously, and unbelievable power. Curtailing inheritance 
in the way I suggest would not eliminate great wealth. It would pose 
no direct obstacle to the acquisition of wealth. Moreover, selected indi-
viduals, such as surviving spouses and lineal ascendants, could still 
inherit great wealth. And large amounts would still occasionally run 
the gauntlet of the gift tax. But much less would get through than 
currently does. 168 
165. There would also be an exemption for charitable transfers at death. See infra notes 333-
43 and accompanying text. A powerful incentive for lifetime giving would nonetheless exist, 
because the gift tax charitable deduction would permit larger tax-free gifts. See infra notes 378-83 
and accompanying text. Yet other incentives could be created. For example, the rate of gift tax 
imposed on taxable charitable transfers (those in excess of the deduction) could be set lower than 
the applicable gift tax rate for other gifts. 
166. Carnegie, supra note 14, at 658. Mill's thoughts were almost identical. See J. MILL, 
supra note 67, bk. 2, ch. 2, § 3, at 221-26. 
167. E.g., G. MYERS, supra note 32, at 372 ("Wealth is [the heir's] passport to arrogance and 
snobbishness .•.• "); J. WEDGWOOD, supra note 7, at 194-95 Qarge inheritances breed "a class of 
'idle rich' "); M. Wrsr, supra note 32, at 10 (quoting Nobel: "Experience has taught me that 
great fortunes acquired by inheritance never bring happiness, they only dull the faculties."); W. 
LECKY, DEMOCRACY AND LIBERTY (1896), quoted in M. Wrsr, supra note 32, at 10 ("Wealth 
which brings with it no ties and is obtained and enjoyed with no effort is to most men a tempta-
tion and a snare."); U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1990, at 30 (quoting Vanderbilt: "Inher-
ited wealth is a big handicap to happiness. It is as certain death to ambition as cocaine is to 
morality."). 
Even those who spend their entire careers catering to the needs of the wealthy sometimes 
reach similar conclusions. A very senior and successful estate planner once told me he had only 
dealt with one "truly wealthy" family whose children had not been "ruined" by it. 
168. Sussman, Cates, and Smith have questioned whether 
inheritance functions as either a damper or a spur to achievement. Most beneficiaries in this 
study inherited too late in life for the windfall to affect their life style .... Anticipation of an 
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C. Arguments Against Curtailing Inheritance 
1. The Effect on the Economy 
[Vol. 89:69 
Several lines of argument suggest that curtailing inheritance might 
adversely affect the economy. The adverse economic effects most fre-
quently mentioned fall into three categories: decreased incentives to 
work, increased consumption leading to decreased savings, and de-
creased privately held capital. 
a. Incentive to work. One of the first retorts to any proposal to 
curtail inheritance is the assertion that such a proposal would elimi-
nate incentives to work. According to this line of reasoning, one works 
in large part for the opportunity to pass something to one's children at 
death. 169 People, however, work for many other reasons. 17° First are 
the power and prestige that work and accumulation provide. Money 
makes the world go round. We work primarily to earn it. Money al-
lows us to feed, clothe, and house ourselves. It also provides us with 
luxuries and amusement for our leisure. Money provides us with se-
curity. If we accumulate enough money, we can stop working. In-
stead, our money works for us. Put only a little differently, money 
promises to care for us in old age. Even complete abolition of inheri-
tance would have no effect on any of these truisms. Money would con-
tinue to make both the world go round and Americans go to work. 
Another reason many people work is that they like to. Some fortu-
nate people love doing what they do. Others do not exactly love their 
work but strongly prefer it to idleness. Still others work primarily for 
the joy of achievement.171 Finally, there are workaholics. Individuals 
inheritance is clouded by unknown variables: the age at death of the holder, the amount in 
the will to be received, the testator's perception of need of potential legatees, the benefici-
ary's position in the reciprocity system, changes in interaction patterns, and emergent but 
unpredictable situations requiring emergency and long-term care of the aged family 
member. 
M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 313 (1970). The point is 
well taken. I myself regard elimination of the corrosive effects of wealth as perhaps the weakest 
argument in favor of this proposal. I do, hqwever, wish to make two points in defense of the 
argument. First, not all potential heirs are as rational as Sussman, Cates, and Smith imply. In-
heritance may, therefore, play a larger disincentive role than they suggest, Second, they studied 
only inheritance. This proposal addresses not only inheritance but also lifetime giving. By impos· 
ing an aggressive gift tax, this proposal would also reduce the amount of wealth transmitted 
during life to potential heirs. The disincentive effect of large lifetime gifts is surely more difficult 
to explain away than that of inheritance. 
169. See Friedrich, supra note 2, at 33. One group of people this theory fails to explain are 
those who never have children yet work hard all their lives. See H. READ, supra note 32, at 175· 
76, 282-83. "TINKs" are another. Two-income-no-kids couples almost by definition work harder 
than most. 
170. See R. BARLOW, H. BRAZER & J. MORGAN, EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR OP THE AFFLUENT 
7 (1966); H. READ, supra note 32, at 173-76; J. MILL, supra note 67, bk. 2, ch. 2, at 228-29; J, 
BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 301, 343-44; Nathanson, supra note 32, at 85-86, 89-90. 
171. See generally D. McCLELLAND, THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY 234-37 (1961); Van Doren, 
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of each of these types, and surely many others, work for reasons not 
dependent on whether they can pass property to healthy, adult 
children. 
In our society those who manage to accumulate an unusual 
amount of money are generally branded as "successes" for that reason 
alone.172 Curtailing inheritance takes nothing away from the person 
who earns it. The incentives of status and social power inherent in 
commanding a large fortune suggest that restricting the ability to pass 
one's fortune at death would have little effect on the work ethic. In-
deed, Andrew Carnegie flatly rejected the idea that heavy death taxes 
would "sap the root of enterprise."173 
Another of the most important reasons we work and accumulate is 
to "provide" for others, particularly our children. Parents usually 
want to support their children at least as well as they were supported. 
Many parents also want their children to receive the best education 
and medical care money can buy. And all parents want to provide 
their children with little "extras" that constitute neither support, edu-
cation, nor medical care - for any reason or no reason at all. Cur-
tailing inheritance would have no effect on parents' ability to satisfy 
these desires. 
Undoubtedly it is important to ask how curtailing inheritance 
would affect incentives for work. But with so many other, more impor-
tant incentives, it is hard to believe curtailing inheritance by healthy, 
adult children would have any measurable impact.174 President Theo-
dore Roosevelt, for example, believed that "the desire on the part of 
the breadwinner to leave his children well off" was "a potent source of 
thrift and ambition."175 He nonetheless concluded that allowing peo-
ple to provide their children with "moderate amounts of property" 
Redistributing Wealth by Curtailing Inheritance: The Community Interest in the Rule Against 
Perpetuities and the Estate Tax, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 33, 56 (1975). Perhaps Andrew Carnegie 
was referring to this type of individual when he argued that high death taxes would spur some to 
even higher achievement: "[F]or to the class whose ambition it is to leave great fortunes and be 
talked about after their death, it will attract even more attention, and, indeed, be a somewhat 
nobler ambition to have enormous sums paid over to the state from their fortunes." Carnegie, 
supra note 14, at 660. 
172. See, e.g., A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 48. 
173. Carnegie, supra note 14, at 660; see also Hoover, The Economic Effects of Inheritance 
Taxes, 11 AM. EcoN. REv. 38, 44-45 (1927). 
174. See, e.g., W. SHULTZ, supra note 32, at 206-08 ("[l]nheritance tax prospects react upon 
the average individual's business initiative very little one way or another."); Boehm, Cause and 
Ejfeci: Federal Estate Tax Revision Tied by Law to Social Consequences, 43 TExAs L. REv. 479, 
486 n.28, 490 (1965) ("People of energy do not close up segments of producing plants because 
succession taxes become due •••. "). 
175. T. Roosevelt, Sixth Annual Message, supra note 93, at 7043. 
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would satisfy that desire.176 Similarly, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt believed the desire to provide for one's children would be 
"adequately served by a reasonable inheritance."177 Nor have presi-
dents been alone in reaching this conclusion. Economist Gerald R. 
Jantscher has concluded that "no one need be deterred from support-
ing" death taxes on the basis of their economic effects, including their 
impact on incentives to work.178 Similarly, Michael Graetz, while still 
a law professor, offered the "educated guess[ ]" that the "disincentive 
effects" of various taxes, including the estate tax, have a relatively 
small effect on economic activity.119 
The failure of the federal government to address the deficit sug-
gests that new or higher taxes are inevitable. The only issue is what 
type of tax could reduce the deficit with the least adverse economic 
consequences. Whatever the disincentive effects of an increase in taxes 
at death, the authorities are all but unanimous that such effects are 
smaller than those of an increase in the income tax, 18° Congress' tradi-
tional tax of choice. 
b. Increased consumption and decreased savings. The second eco-
nomic argument against curtailing inheritance focuses on its supposed 
tendency to encourage consumption.181 For years, estate planners 
176. Id. 
177. F.D. Roosevelt, supra note 94, at 643. A "moderate amount" of property and a "reason-
able inheritance" are obviously highly subjective terms. My own suggestion is $250,000. See infra 
notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
178. Jantscher, supra note 15, at 46; see id. at 41-46. 
179. Graetz, supra note 14, at 280-81. If curtailing inheritance did adversely affect incentives 
to work, surely its greatest impact would be on the oldest among us. Most such individuals have, 
however, already retired. 
180. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, supra note 14, at 234 ("[E]ven [critics] would concede that death 
taxes have less adverse effects on incentives than do income taxes of equal yield."); C. SHOUP, 
FEDERAL EsrATE AND GIFT TAXES 104 (1966) ("frransfer taxes] tend less than other taxes to 
check entrepreneurial drive. They have little tendency to push investors either toward or away 
from risk taking."); M. WEST, supra note 32, at 212 (''The inheritance tax is less a discourage-
ment to industry than an income tax •..• "); Harriss, Economic Effects of Estate and Gift Taxa-
tion (1955), in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFT TAX REFORM 41, 43 (G. Goldstein ed. 1971); 
Gutman, A Practitioner's Perspective in Perspective: A Reply to Mr. Aucutt, 42 TAX LAW. 351, 
352 (1989); Graetz, supra note 14, at 284 ("[T]axes on bequests are preferable to high tax rates on 
income."); Brannon, supra note 90, at 451-52; Westfall, supra note 14, at 989 ("[E]state and gift 
taxes, unlike the income tax, have a minimal impact on risk-taking, entrepreneurial drive, and 
resource allocation."); Groves, Retention of Estate and Gift Taxes by the Federal Government, 38 
CALIF. L. REv. 28, 30 (1950) ("Death taxes reduce savings more than income taxes and impede 
production and investment incentives less."). But see Boskin, An Economist's Perspective on Es-
tate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 56, 62 ("[O]verall, a 
substantial decrease in 'expenditures' (saving) for bequests can be expected from increasing trans-
fer taxes relative to income taxes."); B. BrrrKER & E. CLARK, supra note 13, at 3 ("The personal 
income tax . . . can accomplish infinitely more in the way of checking inflation than even a 
confiscatory estate tax."). Of course, none of these authors advocated a death tax with a flat rate 
of 100%. 
181. See, e.g., Stiglitz, Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution, and the Concept of Balanced 
Growth Path Incidence, 86 J. POL. EcON. Sl37 (1978). 
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have teasingly told their clients that the best estate planning was 
spending. If inheritance were curtailed, that advice would be truer 
than ever before. Anyone worried about what would happen to his or 
her wealth after death could consume it prior to death. If property 
owners generally followed such advice, curtailing inheritance would 
raise little revenue. More important, consumption would increase, 
and savings would decrease. 
The primary reason most inheritance is not transferred during the 
lifetime of the decedent is that the decedent wants to keep the property 
more than he or she wants to give it away.182 Greed is an undeniable 
human characteristic. Greed to the side, people with money have 
many reasons for wanting to keep it. 183 In particular, money is contin-
uing power over (and attention from) one's children (and others). The 
parent who gives children what they expect eventually to receive gives 
up a substantial source of control over (and attention from) them.184 
Moreover, adult children rarely need a parent's money in any compel-
ling sense. So, even under the current system, which itself provides 
strong incentives to transfer wealth during life, 185 parents almost al-
ways keep their money.186 In short, the incentives to retain property 
dwarf the incentives to give it away.187 
Would this parental tendency to retain property change if inheri-
tance were curtailed? Economists admit that some types of demand 
are relatively inelastic, unresponsive to changes in price. Anyone who 
has ever counselled elderly parents to make substantial (or even insub-
stantial) gifts to their children knows something of the survival in-
stinct such individuals have. Many are almost maniacal in their 
insistence on retention of property. And they are completely correct. 
182. See C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 21-25; supra text following note 75. 
183. See Ireland, Inheritance Justified: A Comment, 16 J.L. & EcoN. 421, 421 (1973) ("My 
own argument would be that the primary functions of wealth accumulation are not in fact leav-
ing wealthy heirs, but rather the status and social power inherent in holding a variety of wealth 
forms."). 
184. See C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 22; Ireland, supra note 183, at 421. 
185. See generally infra notes 345-53 and accompanying text. 
186. See, e.g., J. PECHMAN, supra note 14, at 243; C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 17-21; W. 
VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 205 (1947) (noting "a fairly strong desire on 
the part of the wealthy to hang on to their wealth to the very end, even under the pressure of a 
fairly strong tax penalty"); Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States Estate and Gift 
Tax, in C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 228, 229; Harriss, Gifts During Life, in C. SHOUP, supra 
note 180, at 174, 183; Osgood, Carryover Basis Repeal and Reform of the Transfer Tax System, 
66 CoRNELL L. REv. 297, 334 (1981) ("Although •.. tax benefits do play a role in [estate] 
planning decisions, it is fairly clear that taxpayers resist lifetime giving."); Brannon, supra note 
90, at 452. 
187. See Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States Estate and Gift Tax, in C. 
SHOUP, supra note 180, at 231; Hochman & Lindsay, Taxation, Interest and the Timing of Inter-
generation Wealth Transfers, 20 NATL. TAX J. 219 (1967); Tait, supra note 25, at 41-42. 
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Though it may appeado an "objective" estate planner that they could 
not possibly exhaust their wealth, they know their children do not 
need it. They also know they must face the unknown before they can 
face the beyond. Long-term or catastrophic illness or injury can ex-
haust almost any fortune. Old-age care is increasingly costly. Their 
children are in the primes of their lives. But elderly parents are often 
entirely dependent on their assets. So they normally make the right 
choice: they keep most of their property.188 Thus, the demand for the 
power, prestige, flexibility, and security money provides seems rela-
tively inelastic - even in persons old enough to be worrying about 
what happens to their property after death.189 In short, the instinct for 
self-preservation would continue to limit spending, even if inheritance 
were curtailed. Curtailing inheritance might, therefore, increase con-
sumption only slightly.190 Indeed, Arthur M. Okun has opined that 
"the specter of depressed saving is not only empirically implausible 
but logically fake."191 
Many economists disagree.192 They focus on "demand for be-
quests" and seem to assume it is elastic. They argue that if an increase 
in death taxation increases the "cost" of bequests, people will spend 
more and leave fewer bequests.193 They thus seem to assume that the 
only (or a very important) reason people refrain from spending is the 
possibility of leaving property when they die. I cannot believe that is 
true. On the contrary, I suspect the possibility of transmitting wealth 
at death is one of the least important reasons many people retain prop-
erty. The results of an extensive survey support my suspicion. For per-
sons with 1963 incomes of $45,000 or less (approximately $170,000 in 
188. The greatness of King Lear is that Lear did what people generally do not do: he gave his 
wealth to his children without regard to his own security. And he suffered mightily for it. 
189. See Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States Estate and Gift Tax, in C. 
SHOUP, supra note 180, at 231. Ireland, too, seems to suspect this is true. See Ireland, supra note 
183, at 421. 
190. See J. WEDGWOOD, supra note 7, at 225-27; Jantscher, supra note 15, at 41-46 (conclud-
ing that "no one need be deterred from supporting" death taites on the basis of their economic 
effects, including their impact on savings, and noting that replacement of a death tait with an 
equivalent income tait increase might in fact decrease savings); Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving 
of the United States Estate and Gift Tax, in C. SHOUP, supra note 180; Hoover, supra note 173, at 
45-47. 
191. A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 98. 
192. See, e.g., R. WAGNER, INHERITANCE AND THE STATE: TAX PRINCIPLES FOR A FREE 
AND PROSPEROUS COMMONWEALTH 16-19 (1977); Baskin, An Economist's Perspective on Estate 
Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 61. 
193. But see Starrett, Effects of Taxes on Saving, in UNEASY COMPROMISE 237, 237 (H. 
Aaron, H. Galper & J. Pechman eds. 1988) ("[l]t is not possible on the basis of theory to predict 
how taites will affect saving."); Blinder, Intergenerational Transfers and Life Cycle Consumption, 
66 AM. EcoN. R.Ev. 87, 92 (1976) ("[W]e know relatively little about the wealth elasticity of 
bequests."). 
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1988 dollars), the least important of the four most frequently articu-
lated reasons for saving was "for bequests."194 Only for persons with 
1963 incomes in excess of approximately $120,000 (approximately 
$450,000 in 1988) was saving "for bequests" the most important of 
those four alternatives. Even for those individuals, there is reason to 
believe saving for bequests was not the most important of all reasons. 
Of the four reasons most frequently articulated, two, saving for chil-
dren's educations and saving for retirement, understandably drop off 
almost to the vanishing point as wealth increases. The third, saving for 
emergencies, also decreases, though less dramatically, with increasing 
wealth. Thus, none of the other of the top four alternatives had much 
appeal for the truly wealthy. That saving for bequests was first in that 
group is therefore hardly surprising. The most important reasons for 
saving by the truly wealthy are probably distinctly less complimen-
tary. Such reasons might include "love of the game," habit, a desire 
for prestige, the quest for economic power, control over other people, 
and greed.195 One would hardly expect to glean these reasons from the 
self-generated responses of the wealthy to a survey about themselves. 
In contrast, a number of interviewees did mention saving for future 
consumption, but that reason was not even among the eight most fre-
quent responses. 196 For the wealthy, then, it appears that additional 
consumption may be less attractive than for those at lower wealth 
levels. The truly wealthy already may consume at or near the point of 
satiation. 
Seymour Fiekowsky's analysis is more persuasive. He focuses, not 
on the demand for bequests, as though it were dependent only on the 
estate tax rate, but on "the elasticity of substitution between personal 
consumption and bequests."197 Thus, Fiekowsky acknowledges that 
the demand for bequests is dependent on other factors as well. For 
persons whose primary economic motivation is to own and control 
wealth during their lifetimes, for example, loss of the ability to be-
queath that wealth is basically irrelevant. Or, to persons who already 
consume at or near the point of satiation, an increase in the cost of 
making bequests relative to that of further consumption is of little 
import: 
On the whole, then, although it may not be an overstatement to say 
194. R. BARLOW, H. BRAZER & J. MORGAN, supra note 170, at 33 (Chart 4.1). 
195. See o.w. HOLMES, Law and the Court, in CoLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 293 (1920) 
("[T]he only prize much cared for by the powerful is power. The prize of the general is not a 
bigger tent, but command."). 
196. R. BARLOW, H. BRAZER & J. MORGAN, supra note 170, at 198. 
197. Fiekowsky, The Effect on Saving of the United States Estate and Gift Tax, in C. SHOUP, 
supra note 180, at 233. 
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that consumpti6n of-market goods and services looms large in the wel-
fare functions of 90 percent of the citizens of the United States, the 10 
percent in whose welfare functions asset ownership is the major variable 
(deflated only by some index of status and power value of wealth dollars) 
have been deterred [in the accumulation process] neither by the income 
tax nor by the estate tax . . . because these individuals know that they 
could not take their wealth with them even if estates were not taxed.198 
Curtailing inheritance as suggested in this article would affect less 
than 10% of the population.199 Its impact would thus be limited to 
that group of individuals least likely to engage in additional 
consumption. 
Even if curtailing inheritance did have some adverse impact on 
savings, the forgoing analysis considers only the behavior of the dece-
dent. It ignores those who, under current law, stand to inherit prop-
erty. If imposition of a more burdensome tax at death is thought an 
incentive to consumption on the part of those for whom death is near, 
ought it not also be seen as an incentive to save on the part of those 
whose inheritances would be adversely affected? Carl S. Shoup has 
speculated, "Many fairly well-off adults in their thirties and forties 
would surely begin to retrench, and those with little capital and mod-
est incomes might even strive to get more income, as the prospect of 
inheritance disappeared."200 The knowledge that they could not rely 
on inheriting their parents' wealth would discourage consumption of 
their own earnings. Thus, if curtailing inheritance did increase con-
sumption at the decedent level, it might also decrease consumption at 
the beneficiary level. On a net basis, therefore, this proposal might 
have no or little impact on savings.201 
Looking at the issue from a completely different angle, one is 
tempted to ask whether an increase in spending would necessarily be 
bad. The answer would surely depend on what form the additional 
spending took. The usual argument is that the wealthy would ex-
change their assets for annuities.202 From the perspective of the econ-
omy as a whole, such exchanges are of little consequence. The wealth 
remains in the economy - part invested by sellers of annuities and 
part accumulating again in the hands of annuitants. Wealth does not 
198. Id. at 235. 
199. In fact, this proposal would affect less than two percent of the population. See infra note 
320. 
200. C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 89. 
201. See id. (concluding that restricting inheritance might actually increase savings); Glas-
tris, The New Way to Get Rich, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., May 7, 1990, at 27, 34, 36. 
202. E.g., R. WAGNER, DEATH AND TAXES 24 (1973); Boskin, An Economist's Perspective 
on Estate Taxation, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 60; Epstein, 
supra note 24, at 697; Tullock, Inheritance Justified, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 465, 471 (1971). 
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disappear. Wealth would disappear only if additional consumption oc-
curred. So those who make the annuity argument must also assume 
that the annuitant will spend the annuity payments. But are the 
wealthy really going to dine nightly at Lutece? Or each purchase 2000 
pairs of shoes? The truly wealthy, who are the only individuals this 
proposal would affect, may already consume at or near the point of 
satiation.203 If so, major increases in the usual types of consumption 
seem unlikely. 204 Thus, epicureanism would not consume capitalism 
simply because we curtailed inheritance.205 
John Langbein has written about the "annuitization" of wealth,206 
which he defines as the ever-growing layers of pensions and retirement 
plans designed to insulate us from old age. Others have described "life 
care contracts," under which the elderly exchange all their property 
for lifelong care in a nursing home. 207 Curtailing inheritance might 
push spending habits in this direction. Were I worried about the gov-
ernment appropriating my wealth at death, I would consider insuring 
myself and my family against all sorts of risks. First, I would want 
unlimited, lifelong medical coverage, and only the Mayo Clinic or a 
close equivalent would do. Second, I would want a super "life care 
contract" that would guarantee nursing-home care in a degree of pri-
vacy and quality rarely, if at all, currently available. And only a repu-
table, thoroughly financially backed institution would do. Third, I 
would want lifelong access for my descendants to the finest private 
education available. Each would be expensive, and together they 
would amount to a significant portion of my wealth, especially if I also 
tried to provide such protection to collateral relatives or friends. This 
spending, however, is hardly bad. To the extent I provide, by private 
means, for medical, nursing-home, and educational needs, I relieve so-
ciety of the burden of doing so. The current difficulties with providing 
catastrophic health care coverage for even a portion of this society208 
suggest that government is not always the answer, and that, in any 
203. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text. 
204. See supra notes 182·96 and accompanying text. 
205. Bentham concluded that his proposal for curtailing inheritance had no tendency to 
"promote dissipation of the national wealth, by leading men to live upon their capitals, or sell 
them for annuities for their own lives," because "a still stronger and more universal [motive than 
benefiting others after death] is the faculty of increasing a man's fund of personal enjoyment 
during life: a faculty which would be at a stand, if he parted with his capital for an annuity." J. 
BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 300-01 (emphasis in original); see also id. at 342-44. 
206. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth Transmission, 86 MICH. 
L. REV. 722, 744-46 (1988). 
207. c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, supra note 101, at 158-59; Fairbanks, Life-
time Care Contracts, PROB. & PROP., Mar./ Apr. 1990, at 5. 
208. See generally Tolchin, supra note 152. 
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event, government desperately needs all the help it can get. This type 
of spending might also be beneficial in less direct ways. To the extent 
doctors, hospitals, nursing homes, private schools, and universities 
profited from these arrangements, perhaps they could afford (or be re-
quired) to provide expanded services to those unable to pay for them. 
Or maybe the increased financial stability accompanying such funding 
would enable them to provide new or superior services. 
A more current variation of the annuity argument maintains that 
curtailing inheritance would impair savings by "shortening the hori-
zon" in which investors operate.209 Instead of investing for the "long 
haul," which presumably is good for both the investor and the econ-
omy, the investor would settle for a quick fix. One way to reach the 
conclusion that death taxes do not have this effect is to assert that 
either the "life-cycle model" or the "short-horizon model," rather 
than the "multigeneration model," more accurately explains current 
economic behavior.21o Each depends on a different primary assump-
tion about economic behavior: how far economic decisionmakers plan 
ahead. Under the "multigeneration model," economic decisionmakers 
gain utility from the consumption of heirs and act accordingly. Under 
the "life-cycle model" or the "short-horizon model," however, eco-
nomic decisionmakers pay no attention, or no attention until late in 
life, to providing for their heirs. Each hypothesis apparently has its 
adherents. Whichever is correct, impressive authority supports the 
proposition that a tax imposed at death poses less of a threat to ac-
cumulation than almost any other tax.211 The reasons are obvious. In-
come and property taxes generally are imposed on an annual basis, 
and are payable by the investor directly. A death tax occurs only once, 
at a time most individuals like to think is far in the future, and can 
never be paid by the investor. 
To the extent this proposal did negatively affect savings, it would 
be objectionable from an economist's perspective because it would be 
"inefficient." Yet it might increase efficiency by decreasing "rent-seek-
ing activity."212 When potential donees and legatees compete for the 
favor of a donor or testator, they engage in activity that creates no new 
wealth. They expend resources over the allocation of wealth already in 
existence. From each competitor's point of view, this may be rational 
209. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 24, at 695 {discussing effect oftime horizon on investment 
choices). 
210. See Graetz, supra note 14, at 281 (citing H. AARON, EcONOMIC EFFECTS OP SOCIAL 
SECURITY lQ.28 (1982)). 
211. See supra note 180. 
212. See Buchanan, Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession, 26 
J.L. & EcoN. 71 {1983). 
October 1990] Curtailing Inheritance 109 
behavior. But it is hardly efficient. By curtailing inheritance, this pro-
posal would decrease rent-seeking activity and thereby increase effi-
ciency, offsetting, at least in part, any decrease in efficiency 
attributable to increased consumption. 213 
We certainly should gauge the economic effects of curtailing inher-
itance as closely as possible. But even if curtailing inheritance in ex-
actly the way I propose did seem likely to increase spending, one· need 
not conclude that it is a bad idea.214 There are many ways to tone my 
proposal down, without reverting to the current system of essentially 
voluntary taxes. One of the easiest would be to lower the death tax 
rate to 90%, 80%, or even 70%. Even at the latter rate, substantially 
larger amounts of revenue would be raised than under the current sys-
tem. Yet, by allowing larger amounts of property to pass by inheri-
tance, there would be less consumption. In fact, the best system might 
fix the death tax rate not at 100%, but at an "optimal" rate, i.e., the 
rate that produced the highest revenue yield. In any event, the powers 
of economic prediction obviously are limited. Only a few years ago, 
one could have dreamed up few things more inflationary than a long-
term $200 billion budget deficit. Yet the lowest inflation in recent 
memory has occurred in the shadow of the deficit. Similarly, in the 
period following the tax cuts of 1981, this nation's savings rate/elL 215 
Simply put, many economic predictions, especially those involving the 
kinds of incentives discussed here, seem difficult, if not impossible, to 
verify.216 
213. See id. at 81. Buchanan goes on to describe, in general terms, a system of inheritance 
similar to mine: 
The norm of economic efficiency and the norm for intergenerational equity might be 
appropriately combined or balanced by a set of arrangements that would allow potential 
donors to retain powers of transfer in a quantitatively limited sense. The amount of value 
transferred might be restricted, ;n total and/or per person terms. Such institutional arrange-
ments would distort to some extent the donor's choices concerning capital accumulation 
(decumulation), but often less so than in the case of specifically directed transfers. The ar-
rangements suggested would also stimulate investment in rent seeking by potential donors, 
but again less investment than would be forthcoming under quantitatively and directionally 
restricted powers of transfer. 
Id. 
214. If curtailing inheritance did, in fact, serve as such a stimulant to consumption as to 
cause economic problems worth solving, a ready antidote exists. Imposition of a tax on consump-
tion (possibly in lieu of the income tax) should fully counteract any incentive to consume. See L. 
THUROW, supra·note 25, at 132-33; Chester, supra note 31, at 69; Brannon, supra note 90, at 453, 
· 457. In fact, there is strong independent support for a consumption tax. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. 
DEPT., BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM (1977); N. KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE TAX 
(1955); Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REv. 
1113 (1974); J. RA WIS, supra note 100, at 278 ("a proportional expenditure tax may be part of 
the best tax scheme"); J. MILL, supra note 67, bk. 5, ch. 2, § 4, at 813 ("[T]he proper mode of 
assessing an income tax would be to tax only the part of income devoted to expenditure .... "). 
215. Graetz, supra note 14, at 280.81; Pechman, Why We Should Stick with the Income Tax, 
THE BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1990, at 9, 13. 
216. See Graetz, supra note 14, at 280.83 (concluding that the "evidence concerning the 
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On the other hand, certain economic facts suggest we could raise 
much larger amounts of revenue from wealth without endangering the 
economy at all. In the United States the yield from wealth taxes 
amounted to only 0.2% of gross domestic product in 1984.217 Of fif-
teen industrialized nations, only Australia and Italy relied less heavily 
on that tax base. Japan relied on wealth taxes to the extent of 0.3% of 
gross domestic product. Norway taxed wealth to the tune of 0.5% of 
gross domestic product. Germany and Austria imposed wealth taxes 
equal to 0.6% of gross domestic product. Switzerland taxed wealth to 
the extent of 1.5% of gross domestic product.218 Thus, if we decided to 
derive substantially greater revenue from the taxation of wealth, we 
would be following the lead of other nations, soine of which are not 
only democratic and capitalistic but also more successful economically 
than we are. 
c. Decrease in capital privately held. By reallocating to the govern-
ment a larger portion of what is owned at death, and by subjecting 
lifetime transfers to higher gift taxes, this proposal would remove from 
the private economy a large amount of capital.219 This concern is, 
however, irrelevant to a tax providing deficit financing.220 In incurring 
the debt implicit in the deficit, the federal government has already ap-
propriated far more of this nation's capital than curtailing inheritance 
can ever hope to redeem. Because the deficit exceeds all wealth passing 
at death each year, curtailing inheritance to finance the deficit cannot 
deplete capital. 
Bentham seems to have reached the same conclusion. He, too, rec-
ommended that the revenue from his proposal for curtailing inheri-
tance be used to retire the national debt.221 Mill agreed: "[T]he 
argument cannot apply to any country which has a national debt, and 
devotes any portion of revenue to paying it off; since the produce of 
alleged adverse economic effects of the estate tax is ••• inconclusive"); B. BITTKER & E. CLARK, 
supra note 13, at 8 ("No conclusion as to the effects of estate and gift taxation on incentives can 
be more than a guess."). 
217. J. PECHMAN, supra note 14, at 371 (Table D-5). 
218. Id. 
219. All death taxes are subject to this objection. Adam Smith, in The Wealth of Nations, 
published in 1776, argued: "All taxes upon the transference of property of every kind, so far as 
they diminish the capital value of that property, tend to diminish the funds destined for the 
maintenance of productive labour." A. SMITH, supra note 130, bk. 5, ch. 2, pt. 2, appendix to 
arts. 1 & 2, at 380; see also D. RICARDO, The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in 1 
WORKS AND CoRRBSPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 152 (P. Sraff'ra ed. 1951). Bentham, too, 
was troubled by this argument. See Stark, Introduction to 1 JEREMY BENTHAM, supra note 123, 
at 68-70; 3 id. at 516-17. 
220. See W. SHULTZ, supra note 32, at 201-06; M. WEST:, supra note 32, at 209-10; Graetz, 
supra note 14, at 282-83. 
221. 1 J. BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 288-89, 319. 
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the tax, thus applied, still remains capital, and is merely transferred 
from the tax-payer to the fundholder."222 Thus, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, in advocating increased federal wealth transfer taxes, urged 
that the resulting revenue be used to balance the federal budget. 223 
However daunting this country's need for capital, the federal govern-
ment's voracious spending is much more likely than this proposal to 
upset the economic apple cart.224 On the contrary, to the extent imple-
mentation of this proposal reduced the federal deficit, it might well 
have positive economic effects. Lawrence H. Summers has recently 
written: "The most potent and reliable way to increase national sav-
ings is to reduce government deficits. Any adverse effect that tax in-
creases have on private savings is almost surely dwarfed by their 
favorable effect on national saving."225 In short, the economic effects 
of curtailing inherited wealth actually may constitute another argu-
ment in favor of this proposal. 
2. Destabilization of the Family 
One of the arguments most frequently articulated in favor of inher-
itance is that it promotes family values and stability.226 According to 
this line of reasoning, family ties are closer, richer, and more enduring 
because parents can provide for their children after death.227 One way 
inheritance is said to accomplish this is by "meeting the maintenance 
needs of family members."228 But unlimited inheritance is hardly nec-
essary to allow individuals to fulfill their families' "maintenance 
needs." A proposal that allowed inheritance by surviving spouses, de-
pendent lineal descendants, disabled lineal descendants, and lineal as-
222. J. MILL, supra note 67, bk. 5, ch. 2, § 7, at 822. 
223. F.D. Roosevelt, supra note 94, at 643. 
224. See Harriss, Economic Effects of Estate and Gift Taxation, in READINGS IN DEATH 
AND GIFI' TAX REFORM, supra note 180, at 49 ("Productive capacity depends upon things of 
vastly greater importance than death taxes .... Prices, financial structure, wages, location, com-
petition, and other aspects of business are not influenced by estate and gift taxes •... "). 
My biggest concern about the proposal in this article arises from my lack of confidence that 
Congress actually would use the revenue generated to decrease the deficit. If curtailing inheri-
tance merely allowed the government to spend more, there would appear to be no escape from 
the conclusion that the government was consuming a larger share of the nation's savings. Any 
congressionally imposed prohibition against increased spending would be just as unenforceable as 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. Perhaps the funds generated by this proposal should, nonetheless, be 
set aside in a separate trust account publicly designated for deficit reduction. This ruse would at 
least require politicians set on spending the funds to endure the embarrassment they currently 
endure for spending funds supposedly devoted to Social Security. 
225. Summers, Comments, in UNEASY CoMPROMISE, supra note 193, at 259, 265; see also 
Bosworth, Comments, in UNEASY CoMPROMISE, supra note 193, at 265, 267-68. 
226. See, e.g., HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT§§ 170-80 (T. Knox trans. 1965). 
227. See generally Nathanson, supra note 32, at 86. 
228. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 168, at 312. 
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cendants would countenance satisfaction of almost all such needs.229 
Another way inheritance is said to stabilize the family is through 
intergenerational "symbolic identification." The "transfer of me-
mentos and other items cherished by the testator, such as a favorite 
chair or art object, and feelings expressed by beneficiaries about these 
items" are said to help "perpetuate the family through time."230 
Again, unlimited inheritance is hardly necessary to accommodate the 
intergenerational transfer of most mementos and accompanying senti-
ments. A proposal that allowed each decedent to transmit at death a 
moderate amount of property would suffice. 231 
There are also reasons to question the soundness of describing in-
heritance as the glue that holds families together. Any estate planner 
or probate judge knows the values inheritance promotes are often 
much less savory than those generally thought of in the homey term 
"family values." Children all too often make their parents' lives miser-
able trying to ensure places for themselves in their parents' wills or, 
worse yet, trying to part their parents from their money while still 
alive.232 And parents all too often use their wealth as a club to ensure 
the continued attention - or even the obedience - of their chil-
dren. 233 To be sure, in many families inheritance does not cause these 
sorts of stress. But the argument that inheritance holds such families 
together ignores the healthy personal relationships almost always pres-
ent in families in which inheritance is assumed and not fought over. 
Surely the ties that bind in ways we wish to encourage are kinder, 
gentler, more loving, and much less mercenary than those inheritance 
offers. 
229. My proposal allows inheritance in all four situations. See infra notes 289-318 and ac-
companying text. 
230. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 168, at 311-12. 
231. My proposal would allow every decedent to transfer $250,000 to anyone he or she 
chose. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
232. See, e.g., Haynes v. First Natl. State Bank of New Jersey, 87 N.J. 163, 432 A.2d 890 
(1981). 
233. See, e.g., Barnes v. Marshall, 467 S.W.2d 70 (Mo. 1971). See generally Halpern, Par-
ent-Child Relationships That Affect the Will, in You MAY BE LosING YOUR INHERITANCE 50-
67 (M. Levin ed. 1979); C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 22; Nathanson, supra note 32, at 87-88. 
Bentham, on this occasion defending inheritance, described the process: 
[Through making a will] the power of the present generation is extended over a portion of 
the future .•.. By means of an order not payable till after his death, he procures for himself 
an infinity of advantages beyond what his actual means would furnish. By continuing the 
submission of children beyond the term of minority, the indemnity for paternal cares is 
increased .... In the rapid descent of life, every support on which man can lean should be 
left untouched, and it is well that interest serve as a monitor to duty. 
J. BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 184-85 (C. Ogden ed. 1931). 
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3. Nationalization of the Means of Production 
To some, curtailing inheritance implies nationalization of the 
means of production. One author has put it this way, "[T]his society is 
clearly not willing for the state to take over the means of production as 
the result of an escheat of inherited wealth, even if only those assets 
over [a certain dollar value] were taken."234 My proposal would do 
nothing of the kind.235 Its primary purposes are to increase equality of 
opportunity and to raise revenue. Nor is it in any way frustrated by 
allowing the means of production to remain in private hands.236 
Currently, payment of both the federal estate tax and the federal 
gift tax is in cash, and nothing in the concept of curtailing inheritance 
requires a change in that procedure. 237 Thus, curtailing inheritance 
would result not in nationalization of the means of production, but in 
a larger number of estate sales.238 Normal fiduciary duties,239 penalties 
for negligence and fraud, 240 fee structures based on the value of prop-
erty administered, and the possibility, in every estate, of exempted be-
quests would ensure that executors would seek the highest value for 
estate assets, even if the bulk of the proceeds were destined for the 
234. Chester, supra note 31, at 70; see also Nathanson, supra note 32, at 77-78 (abolition of 
inheritance leads ineluctably to disappearance of private property); Cole, supra note 26 (state 
inheritance means state control of capital); Epstein, supra note 24, at 696 (worrying about "polit-
ical disputes over whether government sale is preferable to government management of retained 
property"). 
235. Of course, a given proposal might have nationalization as an independent goal. Eugenio 
Rignano, an Italian socialist writing shortly after the end of World War I, grew tired of waiting 
for the cataclysm of capitalism that would inexorably lead to nationalization of the means of 
production. He also worried about how the nations of Europe would pay their war debts. So he 
conceived an ingenious plan that, he argued, would gradually result in nationalization of the 
means of production through changes in the legal system, rather than through violent revolution. 
What he advocated was a progressive inheritance tax that reached 100% under certain circum-
stances. What was unique about Rignano's proposal was that its progressivity related not to 
amounts owned at death or bequeathed to individual beneficiaries, but to the method by which 
property had been acquired. He proposed no additional death taxes on property acquired by 
one's own efforts. But he did propose a 50% tax on anything the decedent had acquired by 
inheritance or gift from the person who earned it. And he proposed a 100% tax on anything the 
decedent had acquired from one who had not earned it. Given his political goals, he naturally 
proposed that the government take its share in kind, rather than in cash. See generally E. 
RlGNANO, THE SOCIAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INHERITANCE TAX (W. Shultz trans. 1924). 
236. Chester might argue that cash, too, is a means of production. Obviously, it is. But the 
government, through the deficit, has already nationalized American's means of production, thus 
defined. My proposal merely advocates paying the resulting debt, not additional confiscation. 
237. Bentham's proposal for curtailing inheritance expressly required that the government's 
share be reduced to cash. J. BENTHAM, supra note 123, at 285. 
238. Requiring that the tax be paid in cash would also avoid much of the "intrigue and 
abuse" Epstein worries about. Epstein, supra note 24, at 696. 
239. E.g., REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusrs §§ 170(1), 174, 176, 183 (1959)(duties to be 
loyal, to use reasonable care and skill, to preserve assets, and to be impartial). If an executor 
breached any of these duties, the government would have rights of recovery against the fiduciary 
in his, her, or its personal capacity. 
240. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 665l(f), 6662, 6663 (West Supp. 1990). 
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government. Some executors would, no doubt, find the temptation for 
profit, sloth, or sloppiness too great. Still others might even refuse to 
serve. To address these concerns, a proposal might allow the govern-
ment the option of either serving as (co)executor or designating a pri-
vate individual or bank to serve as (co)executor of any estate in which 
it had or was likely to have more than a 50% interest.241 Noncash 
assets might thereby find their way into the hands of the government 
or its designee. To ensure continued private ownership of the means of 
production, however, a proposal need only require the government or 
its designee to dispose of these assets, perhaps by public sale, within a 
short, statutorily-fixed period of time.242 
4. The Failure of the Soviet Experiment 
Few have proposed to abolish inheritance completely. Yet, almost 
immediately after the Soviets came to power, they apparently at-
tempted to do so. On April 27, 1918, the Soviets, following the teach-
ings of Marx and Engels,243 decreed: "Testate and intestate succession 
are abolished. Property of an owner (moyable as well as immovable) 
becomes after his death the domain of the Russian Socialist Federated 
Soviet Republic."244 They failed miserably. Over the next several de-
cades, through a series of interpretations and outright amendments, 
the Soviets gradually transformed their experiment in abolition into a 
system for the recognition of inheritance similar to that in any of the 
United States.245 Their failure suggests that curtailing inheritance may 
be easier said than done. 
Several reasons suggest that the failure of the Soviet experiment 
has little relevance to proposals for inheritance reform in the United 
States. First, the Soviets, at least nominally, attempted to abolish in-
heritance. I suggest nothing of the kind.246 What I propose is much 
241. Bentham suggested that the government serve, in essence, as executor of those estates in 
which it had an interest. J. BENTIIAM, supra note 123, at 285. 
242. Bentham also suggested that all sales of estate assets be at public auction. Id.; see also 
Haslett, supra note 32, at 137-38. 
243. Marx & Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in BASIC WRmNGS ON PoLmcs 
AND PHILOSOPHY 1, 28 (Feuer ed. 1959). 
244. 1 V. GsOVSKI, SOVIET ClvIL LAW 623-24 (1948). 
245. See id. at 624-29; id. at 657-58 ("[N]o restriction upon the accumulation of private 
wealth flows from the soviet law of inheritance. This does not mean that no such restrictions exist 
under the soviet law. There are strong and rigid restrictions, but these are to be found outside of 
the law of inheritance .••. They are fully expressed ••. in the soviet law of property."); see also 2 
V. GsOVSKI & K. GRZYBOWSKI, GOVERNMENT, LAW AND CoURTS IN THE SOVIET UNION 
AND EASTERN EUROPE 1163-74 (1959); Griffin, The About Tum: Soviet Law of Inheritance, 10 
AM. J. CoMP. L. 431 (1961). 
246. See infra notes 289-343 and accompanying text (detailing the exemptions I propose). 
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less an experiment in abolition than an evolution of the regulation and 
taxation of inheritance this country has employed since its founding. 
Second, the Soviet experiment failed in large part because the So-
viet government had "no adequate apparatus to check upon all the 
estates in Russia."247 Thirty years later, the Soviets continued to per-
mit inheritance on an essentially informal basis; they still had neither 
executors nor probate.248 In this country, we have a long tradition of 
requiring executors, lawyers, and probate for the testamentary disposi-
tion of wealth. Most states have special court systems, whose primary, 
if not exclusive, jurisdiction is the transmission of wealth at death. 
Thousands of estate planners' careers depend on the wealth transmis-
sion process. As a nation, we have decades of experience with the fed-
eral estate and gift taxes. Most states have been in the business of 
collecting death taxes even longer. In short, we have a grand tradition 
of intricate and intrusive regulation of decedents' estates, and we have 
created and paid for a large, dedicated, and professional bureaucracy 
to do it.249 It is inconceivable that a federal attempt to curtail inheri-
tance in the United States would go essentially unnoticed. 
Finally, the most important reason the Soviet experiment is irrele-
vant is that, until very recently, the Soviets allowed their citizens to 
own only certain types ofproperty.250 As a result, the amounts passing 
by inheritance were inevitably small.251 Thus, abolishing inheritance 
turned out to be unnecessary to state socialism. Moreover, denying 
inheritance, even as to the types of property permitted, affected not 
only the (formerly) wealthy, but also those able to accumulate modest 
amounts through their own efforts. The impact on incentives, when 
combined with that resulting from the abolition of private property, 
must have been devastating. In fact, it appears the Soviets abandoned 
their experiment in a deliberate effort to restimulate the worker pro-
ductivity that abolition of private property had crushed.252 
247. 1 V. GsovsKI, supra note 244, at 624-25. 
248. Id. at 639, 647; see also Griffin, supra note 245, at 440. 
249. See generally Friedman, The Law of Succession in Social Perspective, in DEATH, TAXES 
AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 9, 18-19 (describing America's probate system). 
250. See 2 V. GsovsKI & K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra note 245, 1130-37; Griffin, supra note 245, 
at 443; Holman, The Law of Succession in Soviet Jurisprudence, 21 IOWA L. REV. 487, 489-91 
(1936). But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1990, at El8, col. 2 ("The Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union believes that the existence of individual property, including ownership of the means of 
production, does not contradict the modem stage in the country's economic development.") 
(from the Communist Party Central Committee's platform, adopted Feb. 7, 1990). 
251. But cf. Smith, supra note 108, at 50 (suggesting that "high-ranking fathers" in the Soviet 
Union sometimes "do succeed in passing on private wealth and property" to their children). 
252. See K. GRZYBOWSKI, SOVIET LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 155 (1962) ("The inheritance of 
items acquired by the workers •.. through their own labor promotes thrift and constitutes an 
added incentive toward raising productivity oflabor."); 2 V. GsovsKI & K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra 
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5. Tax Evasion and Fraud 
Curtailing inheritance might encourage tax evasion and fraud. But 
consider the fact that the marginal federal estate tax rate was as high 
as 77% as recently as 1976.253 I am not aware that the problems of tax 
evasion and fraud under that tax were out of line with those of other 
federal taxes before or since. Nor am I aware that there is any less tax 
evasion or fraud under the much lower current rates.254 On the con-
trary, probably because in this country the transfer of any significant 
amount of wealth at death is next to impossible without the involve-
ment of both lawyers and the court system, the estate tax traditionally 
has been one of the easiest taxes to enforce. 
During an individual's lifetime, greater opportunities for fraud and 
evasion exist. Thus, under my proposal, assets, such as gold and 
diamonds, that are not registerable might become fertile sources of gift 
tax evasion. But surely we could develop effective antidotes. For exam-
ple, if too many unreported gifts of gold and diamonds occurred, we 
could impose on jewelers and dealers in precious stones and metals the 
same reporting requirements banks currently abide by in handling 
large amounts of cash. 
6. Emigration - of Capital and Citizens 
Curtailing inheritance may also encourage emigration of both capi-
tal and citizens. Much wealth consists, however, of interests in busi-
ness enterprises or real property.255 Such wealth generally is not 
note 245, at 1171-74; 1 V. GsovsKI, supra note 244, at 618-21; Griffin, supra note 245, at 435 
("The re-institution of inheritance rights was seen ..• as of assistance in developing thrift and an 
incentive to work."); Holman, supra note 250, at 498. For an account of the disastrous conse-
quences of the Soviets' abolition of private property, see 2 V. GsovsKI & K. GRZYBOWSKI, supra 
note 245, at 1131. 
253. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2001, 68A Stat. 3, 373 (1954) (amended 
1976). 
254. Currently the maximum federal estate tax rate is 55% and is scheduled to drop to 50% 
in 1993. I.R.C. § 200l(c)(l), (2)(D) (1988). For amounts between $10 million and $21,040,000 
($18,340,000 after 1992), however, there is also a 5% surtax designed to recover the benefits of 
the graduated rate structure and the unified credit. I.R.C. § 200l(c)(3) (1988). 
The federal income tax has been the victim of even more drastic rate decreases. As recently as 
1963, the highest marginal federal income tax rate applicable to individual taxpayers was 91 %. 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § l(a), 68A Stat. 3, 5 (1954) (amended 1964). Currently 
the maximum nominal federal income tax rate is 28%, though the maximum actual rate is 33%. 
Compare I.R.C. § l(a)-(d) (West Supp. 1990) with I.R.C. § l(g) (West Supp. 1990). I am una-
ware that tax evasion and fraud have taken a holiday as a result of that change, either. In fact, 
though the data is fragmentary, there seems to have been steady, and perhaps even accelerating, 
growth in the rate of noncompliance since 1969. See Henry, Noncompliance with U.S. Tax Law 
-Evidence on Size, Growth, and Composition, in REPORT OF THE ABA SECTION OF TAXATION 
INVITATIONAL CoNF. ON INCOME TAX CoMPLIANCE, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 15, 63 
(1983). 
255. Based on 1986 federal estate tax returns, 39% of the assets of estates in excess of $5 
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moveable. Thus, the amount of capital relocated is likely to be 
small. 256 In any event, efforts to relocate capital would, in theory at 
least, be ineffective, because, subject to various tax treaties, the federal 
estate tax is already universal,257 and any proposal for curtailing inher-
itance would surely also be. 25s 
As to the movement of citizens, there should be fewer limitations. 
Nonetheless, to escape the current federal estate tax one must not only 
cease residing in the United States but also renounce American citi-
zenship. 259 These are drastic measures few would undertake, even 
under a system that curtailed inheritance.260 
7. Decreased State Revenues 
The federal government and every state currently impose death 
taxes. Combined, they yielded $9.1 billion in 1985.261 Assuming that 
$150 billion passed at death that year,262 only 6% went for taxes. At 
present, then, there is no conflict between the federal estate tax and the 
death taxes of the states. 
Under my proposal, however, there would be less room in which to 
maneuver two tax systems. If the rate of tax imposed on nonexempt 
property were, in fact, 100%, states would have no source of revenue 
at death other than the property designated as exempt from the federal 
tax. Currently, some states do tax property exempt from the federal 
estate tax. 263 But allowing the states to tax amounts my proposal 
designates as appropriate for specific beneficiaries would defeat much 
million consisted of corporate stock. Johnson, supra note 120, at 36 (Table 1). Another 14% 
consisted of real property. Id. 
256. See W. SHULTZ, supra note 32, at 320-21; M. WF.Sr, supra note 32, at 212 ("no tax 
which can be levied on movable wealth will have less effect in driving away capital"). 
257. See I.R.C. § 2031(a) (1988) (gross estate includes all property "wherever situated"); cf. 
I.R.C. § 2014 (1988) (credit for foreign death taxes). 
258. Mitigation of any practical benefits of relocating capital (such as creation of jurisdic-
tional clogs on collection efforts) could be had at the expense of imposition of a combination of 
"toll taxes," prohibitions on international transfers of capital, and/or renegotiated tax treaties. 
259. See I.R.C. § 2001(a) (1988) (imposing the estate tax on every "citizen or resident of the 
United States"). 
260. Even under current law, those willing to take these measures generally must survive 
renunciation by 10 years to avoid taxation on property situated in the United States. See I.R.C. 
§§ 2107(a), 2103 (1988). If additional deterrence proved necessary, the period of survival could 
be lengthened. Alternatively, the definition of property situated in the United States could be 
expanded. 
261. J. PECHMAN, supra note 14, at 2 (Table 1-1). 
262. See supra text accompanying note 12. 
263. For example, a state may impose a quantitative limitation on the marital deduction for 
purposes of its own death tax. If so, the state's death tax may fall on property exempted by the 
federal estate tax, which ha5 a quantitatively unlimited marital deduction. See I.R.C. § 2056 
(1988). 
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of its theory. Moreover, allowing the states to add to the tax burdens 
of death would aggravate whatever adverse economic effects my pro-
posal might have. The necessary conclusion, then, seems to be that 
curtailing inheritance at the federal level would preempt the death 
taxes of the states. 264 
During fiscal year 1987 state wealth transfer taxes raised about $3 
billion, slightly more than one percent of all state revenues.265 A deci-
sion by the federal government to claim the transfer of wealth at death 
as its own exclusive tax base would thus not threaten the states with 
economic disaster; nonetheless, such a decision would have serious im-
plications that ought to be addressed, if possible. For example, the 
federal government could remit, to the state of domicile, a fixed por-
tion of the death tax from each decedent's estate.266 Admittedly, this 
would not be a complete solution. First, it would deny the states flexi-
bility to increase the revenues derived from the transfer of wealth. Yet 
at least it would assure them a constant source of revenue. And Con-
gress could, at any time, vary the sharing ratio. Second, all states 
would share in their own domiciliaries' wealth at the same rate. Thus, 
depending on the sharing ratio, states that currently impose high 
death taxes likely would receive less; states that currently impose low 
death taxes likely would receive more. Third, states would no longer 
be able to tax property located within their jurisdiction that belonged 
to nonresident decedents. On the other hand, they would no longer 
lose revenue to other states in which their own decedents owned 
property. 
Nevertheless, elimination of fifty separate transfer tax systems cre-
ates attractive independent benefits. First, reduced bureaucracy and 
duplication of effort would allow death tax revenue to be obtained 
\ 
264. Vickrey reached the same conclusion. W. VICKREY, supra note 186, at 309. 
Another call for exclusive federal taxation of the transfer of wealth at death came from an 
intriguing source, the State Tax Commission of the State of Mississippi: 
The Federal Government would be justified in confiscating all property in excess of 
$5,000,000 of large estates, upon the death of the owner. The revenue should be used to pay 
off the bonded debt incurred in the prosecution of the world war. • • • There are many 
arguments in favor of the Government's having all of the inheritance tax. The tax-payer can 
change his residence or can shift his property from one State to others so as to evade the 
payment of the tax. Some states consider the residence of the decedent as the situs for taxa· 
tion; others, the location of the property. These differences in statutes impose double taxa· 
tion in some cases. 
REPORT OF THE STATE TAX CoMMISSION OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI FOR THE YEAR 1919, 
at 33 (1920). 
265. B. BITI'KBR & E. Cl.ARK, supra note 13, at 2. 
266. This amount might, for example, bear the same ratio to the federal death tax imposed 
on the estate as the total revenue all states raised from death taxes in the year immediately prior 
to implementation bore to total federal death tax revenues in the first year of implementation. 
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more efficiently. 267 Second, executors would no longer be required to 
file multiple death tax returns. Third, retirement states, such as Flor-
ida and Arizona, would be forced to compete for retirees on the basis 
of overall attractiveness, rather than as tax havens. Retirees could die 
where they chose, rather than where they thought they should. 
Fourth, multiple domiciliary state death taxation, which is theoreti-
cally impossible but supposedly constitutionally permissible,268 would 
cease to exist. If two or more states, each purporting to be the dece-
dent's domicile, claimed the domiciliary state's share, the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue would interplead them, raising a clear 
federal question the Supreme Court could not lightly shirk. 
$. "Wiping Out the Dream" 
In the 1972 Presidential campaign, Senator George McGovern ad-
vocated a $500,000 limitation on the total any one individual could 
receive by gift or inherit during his or her lifetime.269 John A. Brittain 
has described the public reaction as a "national cry of outrage. "27o 
Arthur M. Okun has noted that "a storm of protest from blue-collar 
workers greeted Senator McGovern's proposal for confiscatory estate 
taxes."271 McGovern's own press spokesman, Richard Dougherty, ex-
plained the public reaction: "[I]t would wipe out the dream factor -
every slob in the street thinks that if he hits the lottery big, he may be 
able to leave half a million to his family; it wipes out dreams."272 Mc-
Govern thus stumbled over what appears to be the only real reason 
this country continues to tolerate unlimited inheritance. Recall the 
1982 California initiative in which 64% of the voters favored repeal of 
the California inheritance tax.273 Americans seem attached not only to 
buying tickets in state lotteries and watching television game shows, 
but also to dreaming about "rich uncles" whose imminent death will 
make them instant millionaires. 274 
Curtailing inheritance in the fashion I suggest is in many ways less 
radical than McGovern's proposal. Spousal inheritance would be po-
267. Cf. Groves, supra note 180, at 41 (advocating that the federal government administer 
the state death taxes). 
268. Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292 
(1937). See generally Groves, supra note 180, at 35, 37. 
269. T. WHITE, THE MAKING OF THE PRESIDENT 1972, at 118-19 (1973). 
270. J. BRITTAIN, supra note 7, at 30. 
271. A. OKUN, supra note 3, at 49. 
272. T. WHITE, supra note 269, at 119. 
273. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
274. See R. CHEsTER, supra note 3l, at 51, 74-76; J. BRITTAIN, supra note 25, at 13 n.31; A. 
OKUN, supra note 3, at 49. 
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tentially unlimited.275 Parental inheritance would be unlimited.276 
And inheritance by dependents, the disabled, and charity would be 
generous. 277 But inheritance by healthy, adult children, collateral rela-
tives, and unrelated individuals would be limited. Like McGovern's 
proposal, this proposal would, therefore, "wipe out" many "dreams" 
of instant wealth, as well as many "dreams" of passing great wealth at 
death. A crucial distinction is that this proposal would continue to 
permit lifetime giving, though subject to a more ambitious gift tax.278 
Thus, those who really did dream about sharing their wealth with 
others could do so - if they ever had any to share. 
A second distinction relies on the pendulum theory of transfer tax-
ation. In the late 1970s, the federal wealth transfer taxes affected a 
larger share of the American population than at any time in our his-
tory. 279 In that, they erred. Substantial changes occurred in 1976, but 
it was only with the Reagan Revolution in 1981 that the federal wealth 
transfer taxes began to go the way of the dodo. That the public chafed 
at such taxes in 1972, and continued to do so in 1982, is hardly sur-
prising. But I wonder how a proposal for deriving additional revenue 
from the federal estate and gift taxes would fare today if the public 
realized that, under the changes made in 1981, less than one percent of 
the population pays any estate tax. And I also wonder how the public 
would react if the alternative to such a proposal were the decrease in 
take-home pay that an increase in the income tax would cause. 
Of course, more than nonexistent rich uncles is involved. For 
some, leaving bequests appears to be means of achieving immortality. 
It is also a way to continue demonstrating love for others,280 influenc-
ing (controlling?) their lives,281 and enjoying property, after death. 
These are psychological concerns of potential importance. Whether 
they are important enough to offset the egalitarian benefits and reve-
nue promised by curtailing inheritance is, however, doubtful. In other 
times, and in other places, the psychological or theological concerns of 
275. See infra notes 289-99 and accompanying text. 
276. See infra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
277. See infra notes 300-16, 333-43 and accompanying text. 
278. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
279. See c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, supra note 101, at 128-29 (Table 6.1) (in 
1977, 7.8% of all estates of decedents over age 25 paid federal estate tax); Gutman, Federal 
Wealth Transfer Taxes After the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, 35 NATL. TAX J. 253, 266 
n.36 (1982); Bentz, Estate Tax Returns, 1983, STATISTICS OF INCOME BULL., Fall 1984, at 4 (in 
1977, 10.5% of all estates were required to file federal estate tax returns). 
280. M. SUSSMAN, J. CATES & D. SMITH, supra note 168, at 10 ("(I)nheritance symbolizes 
what were at one time the love links and bonds between family members, most often those be-
tween marital partners, and between parents and children."). 
281. See supra text at note 233. 
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the wealthy required that their possessions, servants, and even wives 
be buried or immolated with them. Today, we frown on such conduct. 
In other times, the psychological, theological, and political concerns of 
the wealthy required that political power descend through their chil-
dren. We fought and won a war to end that form of inheritance. 
In any event, I suggest curtailing inheritance, not abolishing it. A 
universal exemption would allow every decedent to bequeath a sub-
stantial amount of property.282 If set at $250,000, this exemption 
would exempt approximately 98% of the population.283 Thus, for the 
vast bulk of society, all my proposal would do is "wipe out the dream" 
of inheriting a purely imaginary fortune or passing a purely imaginary 
fortune to healthy, adult children. For the few truly wealthy, my pro-
posal would, of course, represent a major change in the wealth trans-
mission process. But even the truly wealthy could still pass, in 
addition to lifetime gifts, and in addition to other exempted amounts, 
$250,000 to whomever they wished. The psychological needs of2% of 
the population to control more than that amount of wealth after death 
ought not prevail over the benefits my proposal promises. 
III. A PROPOSAL FOR USING THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER 
TAXES To CURTAIL INHERITANCE 
There is no natural right to inheritance. Nor is inheritance a neces-
sary stick in the bundle of rights we refer to as property. Society's role 
in all acquisitive activities gives it an important stake in how property 
is reallocated after an owner's death. Numerous policy arguments sup-
port curtailing inheritance. Increasing equality of opportunity is some-
thing each of us ought to support. So is raising revenue in a relatively 
painless and appropriate fashion for a government that seems unable 
to raise the revenue it insists on spending. Protecting our elective rep-
resentative government, increasing privatization in the care of the eld-
erly and disabled, expanding public ownership of nationai and 
international treasures, increasing lifetime charitable giving, and neu-
tralizing the corrosive effects of wealth are yet other policy benefits 
that curtailing inheritance would confer. Other policy concerns seem 
to argue against curtailing inheritance. Fears of adverse economic con-
sequences, destabilization of the family, and loss of the psychological 
benefits of unlimited inheritance are among those most often 
mentioned. 
Over the years, numerous thoughtful individuals, finding the argu-
282. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
283. See infra note 320. 
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ments in favor of curtailing inheritance convincing, have advanced 
schemes to limit inheritance. The need to reduce the deficit seems to 
justify a contemporary proposal, one specifically tailored to this coun-
try's probate and wealth transfer tax systems. The primary assumption 
underlying my proposal is that inheritance should be allowed only 
where public policy justifies it. Thus, my main premise is that, except 
for property described in one of six exceptions, all property owned by 
a decedent, after payment of debts and administration expenses, would 
be sold and the proceeds paid to the U.S. government. 
The current tests for determining includibility in "gross estate" for 
federal estate tax purposes would determine the extent of property 
"owned" at death. For example, if section 2040 would include an 
amount attributable to jointly owned property,284 this proposal would, 
absent an exemption, result in a tax equal to that amount.285 Similarly, 
since section 2038 would include the entire value of the typical revoca-
ble inter vivos trust,286 this proposal would, absent an exemption, re-
sult in a tax equal to the value of the trust at the death of its 
grantor.287 
I have three reasons for adhering to the current tests. First, the 
current tests, despite their problems (and there are some big ones), 
amount to a reasonable estimation of property "passing" at death. Sec-
ond, any system of death taxation must face the issues of inclusion and 
exclusion that the current system has already resolved. Using those 
tests would greatly reduce the switch-over costs of adopting my propo-
sal. Third, although I know "gross estate" is an imperfect tax base, I 
prefer to tilt at windmills one at a time. 288 
Four of the six exceptions rest on relatively indisputable grounds. 
The marital exemption, the exemption for dependent lineal descend-
ants, the exemption for disabled lineal descendants, and the exemption 
for lineal ascendants all allow a decedent to provide for family mem-
bers who may need support. In addition, each of these exemptions rec-
284. See I.R.C. § 2040 (1988). 
285. But see infra note 299 (spousal joint tenancies). 
286. See I.R.C. § 2038 (1988). 
287. The typical revocable inter vivos trust continues after the death of the granter, primarily 
for the benefit of the surviving spouse. If the continuing trust qualified for the marital exemp-
tion, part or all of the tax would be deferred until the death of the surviving spouse. See infra 
notes 289-99 and accompanying text. Similarly, if, upon the death of the granter or the surviving 
spouse, the trust provided for a different exempted beneficiary (for example, a disabled lineal 
descendant or a lineal ascendant), there might still be no tax to pay. See infra notes 300.32 and 
accompanying text. But as soon as the trust ran out of exempted beneficiaries it would terminate 
in favor of the federal government. 
288. But see infra note 299 (spousal joint tenancies); infra text accompanying notes 354-60 
(gifts in contemplation of death); infra text accompanying notes 391-93 (life insurance). 
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ognizes the legal and ethical entitlements family members have in a 
decedent's estate. The marital exemption and the exemption for lineal 
ascendants also recognize the innumerable ways spouses, parents, and 
grandparents contribute to the accumulation of wealth. Each is thus 
easy to justify conceptually. 
The other two exceptions are harder to justify. Ultimately, the ra-
tionales for allowing a universal exemption boil down to decreasing 
the proposal's administrative costs and increasing its feasibility. The 
charitable exemption responds to this country's apparent commitment 
to do through charity things the government is either unable or un-
willing to do directly. 
I also suggest a reinvigorated gift tax designed to backstop the 
death tax. 
A. Marital Exemption 
In 1981 Congress determined that interspousal transfers were gen-
erally inappropriate occasions for imposition of either the estate tax or 
the gift tax.289 By removing quantitative limitations on the marital de-
duction for both estate and gift tax purposes, Congress essentially im-
munized the spousal unit from both taxes. This is one aspect of the 
recent spate of tax "reform" that has received little criticism, from 
either academics or the Bar.290 Given "the common understanding of 
most husbands and wives that the property they have accumulated is 
'ours,' "291 it does seem appropriate to ignore spousal transfers when-
ever possible. 
Would complete freedom of interspousal transfer continue to make 
sense against the backdrop of sharply curtailed inheritance? Or would 
unmarried seventy-seven-year-olds, denied unlimited testamentary 
freedom, marry more frequently to avoid the death tax? Certainly 
changes in the transfer tax system ought not encourage people to 
marry who would not otherwise. The number of predominantly tax-
motivated marriages may be quite small. If so, a quantitatively unlim-
289. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403, 95 Stat. 172, 301 (1981) 
(codified as amended at I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (1988) (quantitatively unlimited estate tax and gift 
tax marital deduction)). 
290. There was impressive support for enactment of a quantitatively unlimited marital de-
duction long before Congress took action. See, e.g., R. WAGNER, supra note 192, at 65·68; Os-
good, supra note 186, at 319-24; Kurtz & Surrey, Reform of Death and Gift Taxes: The 1969 
Treasury Proposals, the Criticisms, and a Rebuttal, 70 CoLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1394-96 (1970); 
U.S. TREAS. DEPT., TAX REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 357-
60 (1969), reprinted in READINGS IN DEATH AND G!Fr TAX REFORM, supra note 180, at 114-17. 
291. U.S. TREAS. DEPT., supra note 290, at 358; see also c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. 
DAHLIN, supra note 101, at 211 ("[T]he vast majority of married couples, when surveyed, want 
the surviving spouse to inherit the entire estate."). 
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ited marital exemption would continue to make sense. On the other 
hand, curtailing inheritance would increase the tax "cost" of dying 
single. Thus, full interspousal immunity probably would result in an 
increase in the number of marriages of senior citizens. Intrafamily gen-
eration-skipping marriages might even occur. For example, if there 
were no other way to keep the family fortune in the family, a seventy-
seven-year-old widower and his fifty-year-old cousin might give seri-
ous thought to marriage, especially if they were already close. I there-
fore conclude that full interspousal immunity ought not always be 
available. 
If the only reason to abandon full interspousal immunity is to 
avoid tax-motivated marriages, why not tailor the amount of spousal 
immunity to the length of the marriage? After some length of time, all 
of us would probably be willing to concede that a particular marriage 
was not entered into to avoid taxes. The period of time that comes to 
my mind is twenty years.292 Couples who have remained married 
twenty years occupy a special place in this society. They have shared 
their lives and property long enough that the inheritance expectations 
of either are likely to be safe in the hands of the other. Moreover, any 
children are likely to be approaching the age of independence. Their 
rightful demands on their parents' wealth therefore are subsiding. It 
seems entirely proper that spouses' claims on each others' estates 
should mature as their children's claims fade. 
Yet the difficulty of selecting a period of time sufficient to shield a 
marriage from accusations of tax motivation highlights the logically 
obvious fact that a marriage's longevity is an imperfect measure of the 
motives behind it. Reliance on that measure, therefore, must be judi-
cious. An all-or-nothing twenty-year rule would be much too arbi-
trary. Perhaps marriages should be able to "earn" immunity over a 
period of years. If twenty years entitled a marriage to full interspousal 
immunity, perhaps one year should entitle a marriage to one-twentieth 
immunity. Thus, for each year of marriage, a decedent could leave his 
or her spouse 5% of the estate. This scheme has the additional advan-
tage that it is consistent with the "sharing principle"293 that motivates 
292. Please do not reject my proposal simply on the basis of the numbers I suggest. All tax 
proposals are, at bottom, political. See Final Report of the American Assembly on Death, Taxes 
and Family Property, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 183, 185 ("It 
would appear that limitations on wealth transmission ultimately will be set by political judg-
ments rather than solely by a process of reasoning and logic."); Gutman, supra note 279, at 262 
("Political considerations rather than substantive judgments were the principal motivation for 
the 1981 changes (to the Tax Reform Act of 1976]."). The numbers they contain are especially 
so. Therefore, please regard every number I suggest as highly negotiable. 
293. See generally Prager, Sharing Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 
UCLA L. REV. 1 (1977). 
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so much of current divorce law,294 as well as community property and 
the Uniform Marital Property Act.295 The idea is not that a spouse is 
entitled to share in property owned prior to marriage, but that a 
spouse is entitled to share in everything acquired during marriage. 
Accruing marital immunity simulates this accrual of spousal rights. 
Still, the idea of relegating spouses to a pure accrual theory of 
spousal immunity sticks in the craw. In most cases, Willingness to en-
dure the marriage ceremony does mean something. Moreover, that 
the spouse widowed after less than a year would be entitled to no mari-
tal exemption under a pure accrual theory may lead some to conclude 
that pure accrual would be unduly sensitive to the needs of the govern-
ment and disrespectful of the institution of marriage. J;"inally, particu-
larly in cases involving small estates and marriages of short duration, 
the reasonable needs of the surviving spouse may extend to a larger 
portion of the estate than pure accrual would allow. 
One way of making accrual more palatable is to "front-load. "296 
Perhaps every marriage, regardless of length, should be entitled to 
some amount of spousal immunity. Still, since we resorted to accrual 
solely to minimize the incidence of tax-motivated marriages, front-
loading must be used sparingly. Twenty percent seems appropriate. I 
am prepared to live with the knowledge that tax-motivated marriages 
could cost the government 20% of its take. 
In summary, this proposal would allow an exemption for transfers 
to spouses. The exemption would grow with the length of the marriage 
until sufficient, after twenty years, to shelter the full value of the estate 
of the first to die. On the other hand, all marriages, however short, 
would qualify for a 20% exemption. An additional 4% (the remaining 
80% divided by twenty years) would accrue for each full year the mar-
294. See generally Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law Mari-
tal Property States, 28 UCLA L. R.Ev. 1269 (1981); Annotation, Divorce: Equitable Distribution 
Doctrine, 41 A.L.R.4th 481 (1985). 
295. 9A U.L.A. 21 (1987 Supp.). See generally Wenig, The Marital Property Act, 69 WOMEN 
LAW. J. 9 (1983); Volkmer, Spousal Rights at Death: Re-evaluation of the Common Law Premises 
in Light of the Proposed Uniform Marital Property Act, 17 CREIGHTON L. REV. 95 (1983); Note, 
Sharing Debts: Creditors and Debtors Under the Uniform Marital Property Act, 69 MINN. L. R.Ev. 
lll (1984). 
296. Even a mildly front-loaded acerual system may not deal adequately with all marriages 
of short duration. Perhaps, therefore, the marital exemption should include a fixed, dollar-
amount minimum, such as $250,000, as the pre-1981 estate tax marital deduction did. See Inter-
nal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056(c)(l)(A)(i), 68A Stat. 3, 394 (1954) (amended 1976, 
repealed 1981). For similar reasons, Langbein and Waggoner have advocated a minimum 
spouse's forced share of $50,000. Langbein & Waggoner, Redesigning the Spouse's Forced Share, 
22 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 303, 319-20 (1987). This proposal rejects such a refinement, 
instead allowing a $250,000 universal exemption, which a decedent could use to pass property to 
a surviving spouse. See infra notes 319-32 and accompanying text. 
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riage endured. The following chart illustrates how the marital exemp-









The scheme can be faulted on many grounds. It may front-load too 
much or too little. It may accrue too quickly or too slowly. Even if 20 
years is the correct time period, perhaps the accrual should occur at a 
decelerating rate or an accelerating rate. These, however, are not the 
crucial elements. The crucial elements are: that a marital exemption 
should exist; that it should not be total for every marriage; that it 
should be total for many marriages; and that it should accrue over the 
life of the marriage.291 
Jointly Owned Property. Jointly owned property presents a problem 
for an accrual-based marital exemption. The idea that property owned 
jointly by spouses married less than twenty years might be sold to pay 
death taxes goes down hard. With respect to property owned by the 
decedent and adult children, however, this is the correct result. If we 
really believe in limiting inheritance, a decedent ought not be able to 
avoid it by holding assets in joint ownership with individuals not 
granted an exemption. A forced sale is not, however, an obviously cor-
rect result with respect to spousal joint property. A family residence 
probably ought not be sold out from under a surviving spouse, simply 
because the marriage has not lasted twenty years. On the other hand, 
a $250,000 universal exemption goes a long way toward solving the 
problem.298 The 20% front-loading of the marital exemption, when 
added to a $250,ood universal exemption, would allow a jointly owned 
home worth $625,000 to remain in the hands of a surviving spouse, 
even if the marriage had lasted less than a year, the house was unen-
cumbered, and the decedent owned nothing else.299 
297. Each of these elements is shared by a recent proposal for reform of spouse's forced share 
statutes. Langbein & Waggoner, supra note 296, at 316-17. That proposal settles on 10% front-
loading and a constant 5% rate of accrual over 18 years of marriage. Those numbers are entirely 
acceptable for this purpose as well. Correlation of the two proposals is not, however, particularly 
important, since the proposed spouse's forced share rises to a maximum of 50% of an estate. 
298. See infra note 323 and accompanying text. 
299. The decedent would be treated as owning one half, or $312,500. I.R.C. § 2040(b) 
(1988). Twenty percent of the decedent's $312,500 would equal $62,500, leaving the amount of 
the universal exemption, $250,000. 
I do not regard protecting "family" residences worth more than $625,000 for the benefit of 
spouses married less than one year as particularly important. If it is, there are simple ways to do 
it. For example, a decedent might be allowed to designate one jointly owned residence for exemp-
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B. Exemption for Dependent Lineal Descendants 
Any effort to impose truly meaningful limitations on inheritance 
must have, as a primary goal, a substantial decrease in inheritance by 
healthy, adult children. Unlike spouses, who generally contribute to 
the acquisition of wealth, children rarely do. Moreover, inheritance by 
children usually occurs in middle or late life, long after they are well 
established. 300 In few cases do they really need the property they in-
herit. In fact, "most heirs of wealthy decedents are rich adults."301 
What most inheritance by children therefore represents is the 
unearned passing of financial advantage from parent to adult child. 
In some situations, however, inheritance by children must be toler-
ated and even encouraged. Sometimes parents do die while their chil-
dren are unable to take care of themselves. Surely parents ought to be 
encouraged to provide for that contingency. In this society, until a 
child's education is complete, he or she remains, in a very real sense, a 
dependent. Therefore, children under the age at which formal educa-
tion generally is complete should be permitted to inherit their parents' 
property, as necessary for their support and educational needs.302 
In 1976 Congress created an "orphan's deduction."303 It was 
hedged with limitations and so chintzy that even estate planners called 
for its repeal, which occurred in 1981.304 The provisions allowed, in 
certain rare instances, an estate tax deduction equal to $5000 for each 
year a child was less than the age of twenty-one at the time of a par-
tion, regardless of the size of the marital.exemption. The decedent's share of the residence would 
then "count against" both the marital exemption and the universal exemption. 
300. See c. SHAMMAS, M. SALMON & M. DAHLIN, supra note 101, at 148 (children who 
inherit "are often in their fifties and sixties and are parents and grandparents themselves"); 
Verbit, supra note 28, at 615 n.72 ("[I]nheritances of above $25,000 tend to be received by benefi-
ciaries heavily concentrated in the age 55-74 category."); Bittker, Federal Estate Tax Reform: 
Exemptions and Rates, 57 A.B.A. J. 236, 238 (1971) ("Solicitude for the orphaned babe in arms 
or young child should not blind us to the fact that the children of these estate tax decedents are 
less likely to be five or fifteen years old than thirty or forty."). 
301. Graetz, supra note 14, at 284. Wedgwood put it this way: 
But it is nonsense to suggest that the great bulk of the property bequeathed and inherited 
goes to sustain indigent widows and young children, who cannot fend for themselves .•.• 
[T]he average age of children who survive well-to-do parents is somewhere about forty ...• 
The sons who inherit large estates are usually men rather beyond the prime of life, at the 
time of their inheritance, whose parents gave them in youth an expensive training, and who 
were already receiving before their inheritance a considerable income whether from earnings 
and savings, or from gifts of property made during their parents' lifetime. 
J. WEDGWOOD, supra note 7, at 190. 
302. For a similar proposal, see Andrews, What's Fair About Death Taxes?, 26 NATL. TAX J. 
465, 466 (1973). 
303. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2007(a), (c), 90 Stat. 1520, 1890-91 
(1976) (adding I.R.C. § 2057 (repealed 1981)). 
304. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 427(a), 95 Stat. 172, 318 
(1981) (repealing I.R.C. § 2057). 
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ent's death. Both the amount and the age were objectionable,305 but 
the structure could support a workable exemption for dependent 
children. 
Few children are still in school after attaining age twenty-five. If 
inheritance were allowed for children based on a particular amount 
per year they were under the age of twenty-five, their inheritance 
would match, at least in a rough sense, their needs. Picking the 
amount allowed per year is obviously difficult. The amount I have in 
mind is $40,000. Even given current tuition costs at the nation's most 
expensive schools, such a figure would provide a reasonable standard 
of living for almost any child. Using twenty-five as the cut-off age and 
$40,000 as the annual allowance, the following chart illustrates the 
amounts children of various ages could inherit:306 
< 1 year old, 
6 years old, 
13 years old, 
17 years old, 






The orphan's deduction was unavailable if the decedent had a sur-
viving spouse. 307 Under my proposal, however, the exemption would 
be available in that event. Because the marital exemption may be as 
low as 20%, it could shelter even less than the marital deduction did 
when the orphan's deduction was enacted. Moreover, if a surviving 
spouse were not the parent of the decedent's children, an increasingly 
likely situation, the children could hardly count on support from the 
marital exemption assets. 
The orphan's deduction was also unavailable if, after the death of 
the decedent, the child still had a "known parent. " 308 This limitation 
is also inappropriate. The remaining parent might not be the surviving 
spouse of the decedent and would, therefore, qualify for inheritance 
only under the universal exemption. Even if the remaining parent were 
the surviving spouse, the theory of the marital exemption relates ex-
305. Ten years before enactment of the orphan's deduction, Shoup had advocated one with 
much wider availability (children under "age 30 or 40"). C. SHOUP, supra note 180, at 114. 
306. The present value of a right to receive $40,000 annually for a term of years is substan-
tially less than $40,000 multiplied by the number of years. Perhaps, therefore, the actual amount 
of the exemption should be reduced to the appropriate present value. For ease of analysis, how· 
ever, I have chosen to discuss the exemption without reference to a present value discount. 
307. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2057(a)(l), 90 Stat. 1520, 1890 (1976) 
(repealed 1981). 
308. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2057(a)(2), 90 Stat. 1520, 1890 (1976) 
(repealed 1981). 
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elusively to the surviving spouse and does not envision requiring the 
surviving spouse to support minor children. It shelters the smallest 
amounts during the early years of marriage, which are the very years 
in which there are most likely to be young children. Accruing the mar-
ital exemption is, therefore, inconsistent with depending on the surviv-
ing spouse to support minor children out of the assets sheltered by the 
marital exemption. Even if there were a surviving spouse entitled to an 
unlimited marital exemption, the decedent justifiably might prefer to 
divide the estate between the spouse and dependent children. 
If restricted to inheritance from parents, little wealth :would pass 
pursuant to an exemption for dependents, because few parents die with 
children under age twenty-five.309 But many grandparents do. If this 
exemption were available for lineal descendants generally, it would 
permit transmission of much more wealth. I do not propose to 
broaden the exemption in this fashion. Parents generally support and 
educate their children. I suspect this remains true, even as to children 
who have inherited wealth sufficient to satisfy their own needs. If this 
is so, an exemption for lineal descendants generally would permit the 
grandchildren of the wealthy to acquire assets unnecessary for the pur-
poses underlying the exemption. Presumably those assets would be 
used to purchase luxuries beyond the parents' means or would be 
saved to give the child a purely financial advantage over his or her 
peers later in life. Neither seems particularly attractive. Accordingly, 
this proposal does not include an exemption for all lineal descendants. 
In one instance, however, inheritance should be permitted from 
generations older than parents. Suppose a child's parents die while the 
child is still a dependent. The child may inherit everything his or her 
parents own but still be in dire financial need. As to such a child, 
inheritance from grandparents, great grandparents, and so on, subject 
to the limitations already described, is entirely appropriate. Nor need 
both parents die first. Even if one survives, the death of the other is so 
likely to have impaired the family's financial affairs that the child 
should be allowed to inherit from any lineal ancestor.310 
Multiplicity of wealthy ancestors should not, however, enable any 
descendant to exceed, on a cumulative basis, the limits mentioned 
above. The exemption exists only to satisfy the needs of dependents, 
and its limitations are designed to assure fit between tb,ose needs and 
the amount inherited. The exemption should, therefore, be available 
not on a per-decedent basis, but on a per-beneficiary basis. All inheri-
309. See supra notes 300-01 and accompanying text. 
310. Cf. I.R.C. § 2612(c)(2)(B) (1988) (generation-skipping transfer tax exception available 
even if one parent is still alive). 
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tances would count toward exhaustion of the exemption.311 In other 
words, if father and mother both died in the first year of a child's life, 
the child could inherit $1,000,000, not $2,000,000. Similarly, if both 
father and grandfather died after a child had reached age thirteen, the 
child could inherit a total of $480,000.312 
C. Exemption for Disabled Lineal Descendants 
Physically or mentally disabled descendants also provide a compel-
ling case for allowing inheritance. Quite apart from the legitimate de-
sire of parents and grandparents to provide for such descendants, 
society has a direct interest in having family members, rather than the 
government, see to their care. Given the potentially enormous costs 
involved, limitations akin to those applicable to the exemption for de-
pendent lineal descendants are inappropriate.313 
Defining who qualified for the exemption would be an important 
and sensitive task. One possibility is the "totally and permanently dis-
abled" standard already used in disability insurance contracts. Yet, 
this standard might require additional safeguards against fraud in or-
der to avoid the manipulation of medical opinion that seems inevitable 
if substantial sums are inheritable by adult children only if they are 
found to be disabled. Requiring the beneficiary to qualify for Social 
Security disability benefits is one possibility. 
In addition, the exemption should be available only if the amount 
311. In addition, the present value (at decedent's death) of any taxable lifetime transfers to 
the beneficiary in question would count against the exemption. 
312. How should prior inheritances exhaust the exemption? Return to the example in which 
a child's father dies during the child's first year. The exemption would permit the child to inherit 
$1,000,000, but the father may have only $500,000. Later, when the child is six, her grandmother 
may die. How much should .she be able to inherit from her grandmother? If she had inherited 
nothing from her father, she could inherit $760,000 (19 years X $40,000). On the other hand, if 
she had inherited $1,000,000 from her father, she could inherit nothing more. The primary limi-
tation decreases $40,000 per year, so the reduction on account of the prior inheritance should 
too. Thus, the $500,000 already inherited should be decreased by $40,000 times the number of 
years since the first inheritance ($40,000 X 6). In other words, the reduction on account of the 
first inheritance should be $260,000 ($500,000 - $240,000). Reducing the primary limitation for 
a six-year old ($760,000) by $260,000 leaves a maximum second inheritance of $500,000. 
Sometimes there would be no reduction on account of prior inheritances. Assume the previ-
ous facts, except that the grandmother dies when the child is 20. The primary limitation would 
be $200,000 (5 years X $40,000). Again, the $500,000 inherited before reaching age I must be 
reduced by $40,000 for each of the intervening years. Twenty years times $40,000 equals 
$800,000. Since the initial inheritance was less than $800,000, it is ignored. The child would, 
therefore, be entitled to a second inheritance of the full $200,000. 
313. There may, however, be limits on the needs of even the most severely disabled descen-
dant. Therefore, a limit of, say, $5,000,000 might be appropriate. If there were a limitation, it 
should be on a per-beneficiary (rather than a per-decedent) basis, like the dependent lineal de-
scendant exemption. Similarly, the present value (at decedent's death) of any taxable lifetime 
transfers, as well as any continuing medical insurance or prepaid nursing-home care arranged for 
during the decedent's lifetime, would count against the exemption. 
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exempted is held in trust, under rather rigid terms, for the exclusive 
benefit of the qualified beneficiary. For example, a qualified trust 
might be defined as one under which only income was payable to or 
for the benefit of the qualified beneficiary until death, when the trust 
principal and any accumulated income would pass to the govem-
ment. 314 I have three reasons for requiring use of such a trust. First, 
use of a sufficiently rigid trust would assure the government of its 
money after the death of the qualified beneficiary. Since the only rea-
son for allowing the exemption is the disability of a given descendant, 
he or she, at least as a general rule, ought not be able to transfer the 
exempted amount either during lifetime or at death.315 Second, use of 
such a trust would assure the beneficiary of a constant and dependable 
stream of support over an entire lifetime. Third, the trustee would not 
be forced to make impossibly difficult choices between dipping into 
principal to provide the beneficiary with immediate care and refusing 
to do so to ensure continued benefits.316 
D. Exemption for Lineal Ascendants 
As the cost of health and old-age care explodes, and as America 
grays, the number of needy parents surviving their children promises 
to increase. Surely social policy should favor allowing children to pro-
314. Assuming the exemption was available only for transfers in trust, a federal statutory 
mechanism for converting attempted outright bequests and rights under intestate succession laws 
into qualified trusts would be necessary. Otherwise, in the absence oflocal law to that effect, the 
exemption would be unavailable. Similarly, there would need to be a federal statutory mecha-
nism for cutting down trusts for qualified beneficiaries that contained excessive benefits, such as 
powers to invade principal. Likewise, if trusts for disabled beneficiaries purported to create inter-
ests in nonqualified beneficiaries, those interests would necessarily be ignored. Upon the death of 
the qualified beneficiary, the trust property would pass to the government, regardless of whether 
the controlling instrument purported to create a subsequent interest in another beneficiary, sub-
ject, perhaps, to the embellishment discussed infra note 315. 
315. Obviously, disabled lineal descendants can have surviving spouses, dependent lineal de-
scendants, disabled lineal descendants, lineal ascendants, etc. Allowing the trust to continue after 
the death of the disabled beneficiary for whom it was created, so that trust income could continue 
to benefit those in an exempted category who may have come to depend on it during the benefici-
ary's lifetime involves no theoretical obstacle and may be a desirable embellishment. I have not 
included such a suggestion in the hope of keeping the proposal as simple as possible. 
316. At funding levels near $5,000,000, this suggestion seems reasonable. The income from 
such a trust ought to provide adequately for all contingencies. If the trust were smaller, however, 
use of principal for the benefit of the qualified beneficiary frequently would seem appropriate 
when analyzed from either the decedent's or the beneficiary's perspective. Yet, from the govern-
ment's perspective, each invasion would constitute a loss in revenue. I am gravely torn about how 
rigid a qualified trust should be. On the one hand, I would prefer not to allow the truly wealthy 
to pass $5,000,000 in trust for the benefit of disabled children (some of whom inevitably will be 
much less disabled than others) and then allow the trustee to spend not only the income but also 
the principal, leaving the government with nothing. on the other hand, if a parent had only 
$300,000 to care for a truly disabled child, I would want the trustee to be able to use the $50,000 
in excess of the universal exemption in any way the trustee saw fit. I have opted in the text for the 
more rigid approach to emphasize the position of the government as remainderman. 
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vide for their elders.317 My proposal therefore exempts all transfers to 
lineal ascendants. 
Several reasons support making this exemption completely unlim-
ited. First, lineal ascendants rarely survive their descendants. Second, 
when they do, they are usually old. To put it bluntly, the government 
would not have long to wait for the tax at the ascendant's death. 
Third, this may be a reverse-flow situation. In other words, the wealth 
passing from child to parent may have come from the parent origi-
nally. If it did, and if large amounts were involved, its transfer would 
have cost the parent a heavy gift tax.318 In a sense, therefore, the gov-
ernment would already have taken its share and could well afford to 
allow the wealth to return to its original owner during his or her re-
maining time. 
E. Universal Exemption 
Whether every decedent should be able to pass a minimum amount 
to whomever he or she pleases is a difficult question. If so, with respect 
to the estates of the vast majority of decedents, this proposal would 
have neither the potential for inheritance reform nor the ability to 
raise revenue. Estates below the exempted amount would be com-
pletely unaffected. If we really believe that almost all inheritance is 
bad, a universal exemption would be a major step in the wrong direc-
tion. But if we believe that inheritance in small doses is less bad than 
in large doses,319 perhaps we can live with exemption of almost the 
entire population. 
Exempting almost everyone does carry with it very distinct bene-
fits. First, a universal exemption of any significant size, by removing 
most of the population from the operation of the tax, would substan-
tially decrease the administrative costs of imposing the tax. A proposal 
that affected only two percent of the population320 would be much 
cheaper for the government to administer than one that affected every-
one. 321 Similarly, if almost everyone were exempt, the public would 
spend far less on planning and compliance. 
Second, a universal exemption would serve to exempt assets in 
317. Locke argued that, but for children's supposed natural right to inherit their parents' 
property, a decedent's parents ought to be preferred. J. LocKE, supra note 34, bk. 1, § 90, at 207-
08. 
318. See infra notes 344-93 and accompanying text. 
319. See E. HALBACH, Introduction to Chapters 1-4, in DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROP· 
ERTY, supra note 45, at 4. 
320. In 1985 federal estate tax returns reporting gross estates of $300,000 or more were filed 
on behalf of 1.52% of all decedents. J. PECHMAN, supra note 14, at 350 (Table B-9). 
321. It would also be more politically feasible. 
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which the government has little interest but that are of significant 
value to a decedent's family. Heirlooms and mementos are classic ex-
amples. The family portrait of grandfather and grandmother Car-
rington likely would be essentially valueless if sold at public auction. 
Yet, hanging on the walls of the home of Mr. and Mrs. J. Blake Car-
rington, III, the portrait may be the source of legitimate family pride. 
Allowing it to hang there poses no significant threat to equality of 
opportunity. An exemption designed specifically for such items would 
be difficult to draft and enforce. A universal exemption, on the other 
hand, would allow a decedent to pass a few chosen items, be they a 
family portrait, the family Bible, a favorite chair, or shares of I.B.M. 
Third, exempting a limited amount of property would respond to 
two of the most serious arguments against curtailing inheritance. In-
heritance, it is said, provides not only an incentive to work but also an 
incentive to save. 322 A universal exemption would virtually obliterate 
these arguments for those below - and likely to remain below - the 
exempted amount. In other words, a threshold amount relatively few 
people would actually realize would dramatically reduce any diminu-
tion of incentive curtailing inheritance might have. 
Fourth, a universal exemption would allow strict conformity of the 
other exemptions to the policies that recommend them. Should they 
prove too constraining in any individual case, the decedent by will or 
the state by its law of intestate succession could provide relief. For 
example, the marital exemption suggested above would operate on an 
accrual basis, modified only by a limited amount of front-loading. 323 
If, therefore, one spouse died before twenty years of marriage, the sur-
vivor could not take the entire estate. Less than the entire estate 
might, however, fail to satisfy the surviving spouse's needs, particu-
larly if the estate were small. A universal exemption would allow the 
decedent or the state to augment the amount passing to such a surviv-
ing spouse. 
Fifth, allowance of a universal exemption would eviscerate the 
most likely constitutional objection. As discussed above, progressive 
federal estate and gift taxes have long been upheld as constitutional on 
the ground that they are not direct taxes but excise taxes on the trans-
fer of wealth. 324 Without a universal exemption, a decedent might 
qualify for no exemption and thus be unable to make any transfer. By 
322. But see supra notes 169-218 and accompanying text. 
323. See supra notes 289-99 and accompanying text. 
324. See supra text accompanying note 82. 
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allowing everyone to devise a moderate amount of wealth, a universal 
exemption would allow every decedent to make a transfer. 
Sixth, allowance of a universal exemption would substantially re-
duce one particularly vexatious type of tax evasion. In the absence of 
such an exemption, there would be a great incentive to remove items 
of moveable property from a decedent before a representative of the 
estate (or the government) arrived. Undoubtedly, these removals 
would also occasionally occur prior to the decedent's death, sometimes 
without the decedent's permission. A universal exemption would elim-
inate the need for most people to engage in such activity. It would 
also make those who do engage in such activity less "criminal" than 
they would be if they were also engaging in tax fraud. 
I propose a universal exemption of $250,000. The exemption 
equivalent of the current unified credit is $600,000. 325 As a result, at 
1982 wealth levels, all but three tenths of one percent of the popula-
tion are exempt from the federal transfer taxes.326 Many have ven-
tured the opinion that these taxes should reach a substantially larger 
segment of society,327 an opinion I share. On the other hand, in 1976 
Congress determined that the old $60,000 exemption was too low.328 
And in 1981 Congress indicated that it meant what it said in 1976.329 
My suggestion of $250,000 is mid-way between the pre-1976 figure 
and the current figure. That figure approximates what the $60,000 fig-
ure would be worth today, after adjustment for inflation.330 It also is 
the figure Congress chose in 1976 for the minimum marital deduc-
tion.331 A more general reason for settling on a figure in that range is 
that relatively few Americans attain that level of wealth. A rather con-
325. Cf. I.R.C. § 6018(a)(l) (1988) (return required at over $600,000). Compare I.R.C. 
§ 2010(a) (1988) ($192,800 unified credit) with I.R.C. § 2001(c)(l) (1988) (rate table). 
326. S. SURREY, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 16, at 715; Gutman, supra note 
279, at 253. 
327. E.g., s. SURREY, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 16, at 715; Gutman, Re· 
fanning Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes After ERTA, 69 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1207-12 (1983). 
328. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2001(a)(2), (d)(l), 90 Stat. 1520, 1848 
(1976) (creating I.R.C. § 2010 and an immediate $121,000 exemption equivalent); H.R. REP. 
No. 1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15-16 (1976). The $60,000 exemption would have exempted all 
but seven to nine percent of decedents at 1981 wealth levels. S. SURREY, P. McDANIEL & H. 
GUTMAN, supra note 16, at 690. On the other hand, Professor Bittker had argued that the old 
$60,000 exemption should have been reduced to $25,000. Bittker, supra note 300, at 239. 
329. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 401(a)(2)(A), 95 Stat. 172, 
299 (1981) (amending I.R.C. § 2010 to increase the exemption equivalent to $225,000 in 1982 
and providing for further annual increases through 1987, when the exemption equivalent reached 
$600,000); H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 154-55 (1981). 
330. The $60,000 exemption, adjusted for inflation to 1981, would have been $280,000. S. 
SURREY, P. McDANIEL & H. GUTMAN, supra note 16, at 690. 
331. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 2002(a), 90 Stat. 1520, 1854 (1976) 
(amending I.R.C. § 2056(c)(l)(A)(i) (repealed 1981)). 
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crete way of verifying the last point is through reflection on the fact 
that a major component of most Americans' wealth is their home. 
Home ownership occupies a very special and important place in the 
work ethic and acquisitive fabric of this society. Yet $250,000 still 
buys a fine home in most parts of the country. Selecting a figure in that 
range therefore responds nicely to the fear that this proposal might 
otherwise impair incentives for work and saving. 332 
The universal exemption should be on a per-decedent basis. If it 
were on a per-beneficiary basis, many testators, facing limitations on 
their ability to bequeath property, would execute wills that read like 
family trees, address books, or even the telephone book. Blocks of 
wealth would be disbursed, but no revenue would be raised. The rea-
son the gift tax annual exclusion works, though available on a per-
beneficiary basis, is simple. Gifts are different from bequests. The self-
interest of a living donor ensures that he or she will not spray gifts in 
essentially random directions. The self-interest of a decedent is decid-
edly less. 
F. Charitable Exemption 
Currently, the income tax, the estate tax, and the gift tax all have 
deductions for transfers to charity.333 Traditionally, these deductions 
stand on the logic that charities provide services the government 
would otherwise have to provide. 334 There are other justifications, as 
well: 
[P]rivate philanthropy serves a valuable function in our social order in 
supporting a variety of exceedingly important activities whose support 
otherwise would depend upon the bestowal of political favor. Private 
schools and universities provide alternatives to government in educating 
the populace. Religious institutions provide an important diversity in the 
articulation of cultural norms and common concerns, as well as in the 
undertaking of certain charitable activities. Private foundations offer al-
ternative sources of support for a variety of scientific, cultural, and chari-
table activities. By diminishing contributions to private philanthropic 
institutions, estate taxation promotes government monopoly over such 
332. A final reason for setting the universal exemption at a figure many consider low is to 
minimize abuse by generation-skipping trusts. This proposal assumes continuation of the genera-
tion-skipping transfer tax. Under that tax, however, each individual has an exemption of 
$1,000,000. I.R.C. § 2631(a) (1988). If generation-skipping is a temptation under the current 
system of essentially voluntary estate and gift taxes, think how much greater the temptation 
would be under this system. One way of minimizing the temptation, without modifying the gen-
eration-skipping tax, is to minimize the amount available for generation-skipping trusts. 
333. I.R.C. § 170 (1988) (income tax); I.R.C. § 2055 (1988) (estate tax); I.R.C. § 2522 (1988) 
(gift tax). 
334. See, e.g .. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), reprinted in 1939-1 (Pt. 2) 
C.B. 728, 742. 
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areas. Yet concern for the maintenance of basic liberties, the preserva-
tion of minority preferences and points of view, and effectiveness in pro-
viding services all suggest that competition among institutions providing 
related services is preferable to monopoly.335 
Moreover, an exemption for charitable bequests poses almost no threat 
to equality of opportunity.336 
The current estate and gift tax deductions for charitable transfers 
are quantitatively unlimited. 337 If those deductions were transplanted 
unmodified into this proposal, the government would raise little reve-
nue. Almost every testator would be able to find at least one charity he 
or she preferred to the federal government. So, like the income tax 
charitable deduction, 338 the charitable exemption must be quantita-
tively limited. 339 I suggest limiting deductibility of charitable bequests 
to 20% of a decedent's estate, after payment of debts and administra-
tion expenses. 340 
No doubt charity would vigorously oppose any limitation on chari-
table transfers. Yet I believe the combination of substantial limitations 
on inheritance and a charitable exemption in any reasonable amount 
would yield a net increase in charitable bequests. 341 In particular, I 
think that a 20% charitable bequest would become standard equip-
ment in the wills of those with wealth potentially in excess of the other 
exemptions. 342 Thus, notwithstanding the quantitative limitation on 
charitable bequests, my proposal would probably increase the amount 
of wealth passing to charity at death. 343 
335. R. WAGNER, supra note 192, at 58. 
336. An exemption for charity might, however, pose a low-level threat to elective representa-
tive government. Notwithstanding I.R.C. § 50l(c)(3) (1988), some charities deliberately attempt 
to influence public opinion or even the political process. Others do so as the incidental conse-
quence of carrying out their primary missions. Yet many charities are supported almost exclu-
sively by the wealthy. This potential for distorting the political system merits strict monitoring 
by the Internal Revenue Service, Congress, and the public at large. 
337. See I.R.C. § 2055(a) (1988) (estate tax); I.R.C. § 2522(a) (1988) (gift tax). 
338. For income tax purposes, each taxpayer may deduct only a percentage of his or her tax 
base for the year. Depending on various factors, a taxpayer may deduct 20%, 30%, or 50% of 
his or her tax base. See I.R.C. § 170(b) (1988). 
339. See Westfall, supra note 14, at 1002-06 (suggesting a percentage limitation on the chari-
table deduction). 
340. The pre-1976 marital deduction was subject to a ceiling of 50% of "adjusted gross es-
tate," which was defined as "gross estate," the estate tax base, less debts and administration 
expenses. See Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2056(c)(l)-(2), 68A Stat. 3, 394 (1954) 
(amended 1976, repealed 1981). 
341. See Westfall, supra note 14, at 1006 (noting the increased "dollar incentive" for charita-
ble giving that would exist under higher estate tax rates). 
342. Only 20% of all 1986 decedents whose estates filed estate tax returns passed anything to 
charity. See Johnson, supra note 120, at 50 (Table 2). Even at the highest levels (gross estates in 
excess of $10 million) less than 43% made charitable bequests. See id. 
343. Boskin, Estate Taxation and Charitable Bequests, 5 J. PUB. EcoN. 27 (1976), concludes 
that even a 50% ceiling on charitable bequests would result in a substantial decrease in the 
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G. The Gift Tax 
Curtailing inheritance would surely encourage lifetime givmg. 
Thus, if the current weak and leaky gift tax structure were left un-
modified, this proposal likely would raise little revenue. 344 One alter-
native would be to bar gifts, in order to preserve the proposed 
limitations on inheritance. It is doubtful, however, whether such an 
alternative would be even vaguely workable. Massive evasion would 
almost certainly occur. Moreover, the ability to make gifts seems such 
an important component of the bundle of sticks we call property that 
abolition of gifts is essentially unthinkable, and probably should be. 
1. Rates 
Assuming, then, that lifetime giving must be allowed, there must 
be a gift tax, and it must be far more effective than the current gift tax. 
First, the gift tax must be imposed at far higher marginal rates than at 
the present. Currently, the gift tax is imposed at relatively low rates, 
on a tax-exclusive basis.345 The highest marginal rate is 55%.346 Thus, 
the highest cost the gift tax ever imposes on the transfer of a dollar is 
fifty-five cents. Put in slightly different terms, out of a total diminution 
of wealth equal to $1.55, the share taken by the government is a mere 
35%. In contrast, the estate tax is calculated on a tax-inclusive basis. 
The 55% marginal rate on the last dollar still yields the government 
fifty-five cents. But, after paying the fifty-five cent tax, only forty-five 
cents remain for beneficiaries. In short, 55% currently means 55% 
only when referring to the estate tax. It means 35% when referring to 
the gift tax. The difference in the rates of the estate and gift taxes thus 
amount passing to charity. He does not, however, assume substantial limitations on inheritance 
as the background. Instead, he assumes the continued existence of a host of noncharitable alter-
natives. His conclusions, therefore, are essentially irrelevant in evaluating my proposal. 
344. One reason the current gift tax will never be a significant revenue raiser is that it is 
imposed, at relatively low rates, on a tax-exclusive basis. See infra notes 345-48 and accompany-
ing text. Another is that the gift tax is graduated on the basis of the amount of wealth transferred 
by the donor. See infra note 350 and accompanying text. Yet another is the $600,000 unified 
credit equivalent. Compare I.R.C. § 2505(a) (1988) with I.R.C. § 200l(c) (1988). 
345. See Sims, Timing Under a Unified Wealth Transfer Tax, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 34, 39 
(1984); see also W. VICKREY, supra note 186, at 204-05; Harriss, Economic Effects of Estate and 
Gift Taxation, in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFI' TAX REFORM, supra note 180, at 174; Gut-
man, A Comment on the ABA Tax Section Task Force Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 
TAX LAW. 653, 656-57 (1988); Isenbergh, Simplifying Retained Life Interests, Revocable Trans-
fers, and the Marital Deduction, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1984); lsenbergh, Further Notes on 
Transfer Tax Rates, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 91 (1984). 
346. See I.R.C. §§ 2502(a), 200l(c)(2)(D) (1988). The highest marginal rate is scheduled to 
drop to 50% in 1993. See I.R.C. § 2001(c)(l)-(2) (1988). For amounts between $10 million and 
$21,040,000 ($18,340,000 after 1992), there is also a 5% surtax designed to deny the ultra-
wealthy the benefits of the graduated rate structure and the unified credit. l.R.C. § 200l(c)(3) 
(1988). For purposes of simplicity, and because the surtax, by its own terms, applies to only a 
handful of taxpayers, this article ignores its effect on the highest marginal transfer tax rate. 
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constitutes an incentive for lifetime giving, even under the current sys-
tem. 347 A death tax equal to 100% of nonexempt property would 
make the current gift tax rates an even bigger (and less justifiable) 
bargain. 348 
Arriving at a gift tax rate that correlates well with a 100% death 
tax is difficult. The only true match would be confiscation of all life-
time transfers. But that would be functionally indistinguishable from 
barring gifts, which we have already found unacceptable. So the gift 
tax rate must necessarily be lower than that imposed at death. A rate 
differential would thus continue to exist, and it would continue to con-
stitute an incentive for lifetime giving. So if giving is not to gut the 
principle of curtailed inheritance, the gift tax rates must approximate 
the tax imposed at death (100% on a tax-inclusive basis). 
One gift tax rate that seems particularly attractive, given the possi-
bilitY of reallocation to the government at death, is 100%. Admittedly, 
a tax-exclusive gift tax rate of 100% is really only a tax-inclusive rate 
of 50%, or a matching grant to the government. In other words, the 
person who made a $1,000,000 taxable gift to an adult child would be 
required to write the government a check for another $1,000,000,349 
Yet stating the rate as "100%" gives the illusion of consistency be-
tween the tax consequences during lifetime and those at death. In any 
event, increasing the tax-inclusive gift tax rate from a high of 35% 
under the current system to 50% would be a meaningful move in the 
direction of protecting the death tax. 
2. Graduation 
Another reason the current gift tax raises little revenue is that it is 
graduated on the basis of the amount of wealth transferred by the do-
nor. Those rates are as low as 37%350 (27% on a tax-inclusive basis). 
Moreover, they rise to only 55% (35% on a tax-inclusive basis), and 
then only on transfers exceeding $3,000,000. 
In advocating reallocation to the government at death, my propo-
sal abandons graduation. The first dollar unprotected by any exemp-
tion is just as repugnant to the level playing field and just as effective in 
347. See generally Hearings on Tax Reform Act of 1969 Before the House Committee on Ways 
and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 11, at 3977, 3981-82 (1969) (statement of J. Kurtz), re-
printed in READINGS JN DEATH AND GIFT TAX REFORM, supra note 180, at 67. 
348. Cf. Eisenstein, supra note 14, at 244 (describing the federal gift tax as "a bargain made 
available to those who are willing to give before they die"). 
349. This statement ignores the effect of the various exclusions. See infra text accompanying 
notes 361-70. 
350. I.R.C. § 200l(c) (1988). The $600,000 unified credit equivalent traverses brackets as low 
as 18%. 
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reducing the deficit as the thirty-millionth dollar.351 Assuming the va-
lidity of these propositions, there is no need for graduation, at least 
that based on the amount transferred, in the gift tax, either. But an-
other kind of graduation is appropriate. 352 Consider the incentive for 
giving that reallocation to the government at death would create for 
the seventy-seven-year old. Paying a 100% gift tax that was really only 
a matching grant to the government might seem incredibly attractive 
- at least to those who could afford to make gifts. Perhaps, therefore, 
gift tax rates should be graduated on the basis of the donor's age. A 
100% tax might be appropriate for a forty-year old, but 3_00% (75% 
on a tax-inclusive basis353) might be necessary to control a seventy-
seven-year old with estate planning on the brain. Such age-based grad-
uation might look like this: 


















3. Gifts in Contemplation of Death 
Notwithstanding graduation based on age, the gift tax rates sug-
gested above would still encourage lifetime giving, even at age seventy-
seven. A 75% gift tax often would be substantially more attractive 
than a 100% tax at death. Even the rates suggested above would there-
fore aggravate the familiar problem of gifts made in contemplation of 
death. 
One way of dealing with gifts in contemplation of death would be 
to subject them to an even higher rate of tax than that suggested for 
donors over seventy. For example, gifts in contemplation of death 
351. See L. THUROW, supra note 25, at 158 ("If society really believes its rhetoric that no one 
should start life with a substantial financial head start on the rest of the population the inheri-
tance tax might be organized with two rates, zero and 100 percent."); cf I.R.C. § 2641 (1988) 
(abandoning graduation for purposes of the generation-skipping transfer tax). 
352. See W. VICKREY, supra note 186, at 216-23 (suggesting graduation on the basis of the 
difference in the ages of the donor and the donee); E. RIGNANO, supra note 235, at 51-55 (sug-
gesting graduation on the basis of the method of the donor's acquisition of the property in ques-
tion); Jantscher, supra note 15, at 54 (suggesting graduation on the basis of the age of the donor). 
353. The marginal estate tax rates (tax-inclusive) were as high as 77% as recently as 1976. 
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2001, 68A Stat. 3, 374 (1954) (amended 1976). Even 
then, Senator Muskie advocated increasing the highest rate to 80%. See Covey, Estate and Gift 
Taxation, 26 NATL. TAX J. 459, 460 (1973). Earlier, Professor Bittker had advocated the same 
thing. Bittker, supra note 300, at 240. 
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might be subjected to a tax-exclusive rate of 400% or 500%, which 
would be a tax-inclusive rate of either 80% or 83%. At either rate, 
however, gifts in contemplation of death would continue to occur. As 
long as the rate of tax imposed on gifts in contemplation of death was 
less than that imposed at death, gifts in contemplation of death would 
make sense. The only solution is that gifts in contemplation of death 
must be taxed at the same rate as that imposed at death. In other 
words, if a transfer is determined to have been made in contemplation 
of death, the government must be entitled to confiscate the gift itself, 
unless the donee is willing and able to pay an additional tax equal to 
the value of the gift. 354 
This presents the thorny issue of determining which gifts were 
made in contemplation of death. Prior to 1976, the test was exactly 
that. 355 But determining which gifts actually were made "in contem-
plation of death" proved an incredibly fertile source of litigation, even 
though a presumption operated in favor of such a finding with respect 
tQ gifts made within three years of death and barred such a finding 
with respect to gifts made outside that period.356 In 1976 Congress 
gave up on the literal test and resorted to a black-and-white three-year 
rule. 357 If a gift occurred within three years of death, it was included 
in the estate tax base. If it was made outside the three-year period, it 
was excluded. Although there were exceptions,358 and although Con-
gress in essence repealed section 2035 for decedents dying after 
1981,359 the three-year rule worked. I adopt it here, with one caveat. 
An escape hatch is necessary to ameliorate the rigid operation of 
the three-year rule. Placing the burden of proof on the donee to 
demonstrate that the gift was not made in contemplation of death did 
not work prior to 1976 and would not work under this proposal, 
either. A more workable escape hatch might be limited to "accidental 
deaths." Presumably those words already have meaning from their use 
"' 
354. Currently, the donee of any property included in gross estate is liable for the tax as a 
transferee. See I.R.C. § 6901(a)(l)(A)(ii) (1988). Under my proposal a gift that would have quali-
fied for an exemption at death would not be retaxed. Thus, as to such a gift, no transferee 
liability would exist. 
355. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2035, 68A Stat. 3, 381-82 (1954) (amended 
1976). 
356. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2035(b), 68A Stat. 3, 382 (1954) (amended 
1976). 
357. Tax Reform Act of 1976 § 200l(a)(5), (d)(l), Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1848 
(1976) (amending I.R.C. § 2035(a)). 
358. Kg., I.R.C. §§ 2035(b)(2) (1988) (exception for transfers with respect to which no re-
turn was required). 
359. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 424(a), 95 Stat. 172, 317 
(1981) (enacting I.R.C. § 2035(d)). 
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in accidental death insurance policies. A donee would be allowed to 
show that the decedent's death had been accidental. Gifts made within 
three years of an accidental death would not be confiscated. 360 
4. Exclusion for Transfers in Discharge of Legal Obligation 
Parents spend a great deal of money raising children. In fact, state 
law generally imposes various legal obligations on parents to support 
minor and disabled children and on spouses to support each other.361 
Under the current version of the gift tax, transfers made in discharge 
of a legal obligation of the donor are deemed made for "adequate and 
full consideration in money or money's worth" and thus fall outside 
the scope of the gift tax. 362 This is entirely proper. Transfer taxes 
ought not intrude upon the "normal" transfers of wealth that occur in 
raising children or supporting family members. 
Continuing this exception against the backdrop of curtailed inheri-
tance poses problems of significant scope for equality of opportu-
nity. 363 Children supported in a grand style during minority may well 
gain substantial advantages on life's playing field. The governmental 
intrusion necessary to tax all intrafamily transfers, however, would be 
unacceptable. Moreover, the ability to support family members in a 
particular lifestyle is one of the greatest incentives this society offers its 
workers, entrepreneurs, and investors. Take that away, and this na-
tion's productivity would certainly suffer. Thus, my proposal draws 
the line at "normal" intrafamily transfers. 364 Defining what is "nor-
mal" is obviously difficult. In the absence of a better guide, I adopt the 
current exemption of transfers in discharge of a legal obligation. 
360. Jantscher has suggested a fascinating alternative. He would include in the death tax base 
a fraction of all gifts made during a much longer period preceding death, such as 20 years. The 
older the gift, the smaller the fraction included. Jantscher, supra note 15, at 54. His solution 
would nicely avoid the blatant arbitrariness of the three-year rule. I have, however, chosen to rely 
on the three-year rule. First, it represents less of a departure from the current system. Second, I 
have proposed that the gift tax be graduated on the basis of the age of the donor at the time of the 
gift. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text. Thus, in the usual case, gifts made in con-
templation of death would produce a substantially enhanced tax, even if they escaped the opera-
tion of the three-year rule. Third, precise estate planning would be extremely difficult if gifts 
remained potentially taxable for such a long time. All taxes should be "plannable" - especially 
those with rates as high as those I advocate. 
361. See supra note 54. 
362. See I.R.C. § 2512(b) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 25.2516-2 (1990); Rev. Rul. 68-379, 1968-2 
C.B. 414; Gutman, supra note 327, at 1241 n.168. 
363. See supra notes 1-7, 107-19 and accompanying text. 
364. See Final Report of the American Assembly on Death, Taxes and Family Property, in 
DEATH, TAXES AND FAMILY PROPERTY, supra note 15, at 185 (society should not intervene to 
prevent transfers of "human capital" through "[e]ducation, home environment, genetic and nu-
tritional differences, and family tradition and status"). 
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5. Exclusion for Medical and Educational Expenses 
Section 2503(e) excludes from the gift tax transfers made directly 
to an educational institution as tuition for the education or training of 
any individual or to a provider of medical care for the medical care of 
any individual. The educational and medical expenses of minor chil-
dren are generally legal obligations of parents, so their discharge usu-
ally falls outside the scope of the gift tax in any event.365 But in many 
families, even if the recipient of education or medical care is an adult, 
someone else may pay the expense. For example, parents frequently 
continue to pay the tuition of "adult" children they are no longer le-
gally obligated to support. Or adult children may pay the medical ex-
penses of elderly parents. Section 2503(e) exempts these transfers from 
the gift tax. Section 2503(e) is thus an important response to the con-
cerns described in the preceding paragraphs. The transfers of wealth 
that occur in providing education for one's children or medical care 
for one's parents do not occur for estate planning reasons. Instead, 
these transfers satisfy generally accepted and socially approved needs. 
They are an inherent part of a lifestyle society encourages. Moreover, 
satisfaction of such needs is a good that society itself desires. Society as 
a whole benefits when any of its members is educated or provided with 
medical care. And if certain members of society are educated or pro-
vided with medical care at private expense, government need not bear 
those costs. 
The prospect of reallocation to the government at death makes the 
presence of an exclusion for educational and medical expenses all the 
more important. As discussed above, one of the primary arguments 
against curtailing inheritance is that doing so would increase spend-
ing. 366 What one spends during lifetime cannot be reallocated to the 
government at death. Presumably, one of the forms this increased con-
sumption would take is increased spending for the educational and 
medical needs of family members. For all the reasons stated above, an 
increase in these types of spending is desirable. Therefore, my proposal 
continues to exempt direct expenditures for education and medical 
care.367 
365. See supra notes 361-64 and accompanying text. 
366. See supra notes 181-218 and accompanying text. 
367. In fact, the scope of § 2503(e) could even be expanded. For example, extending the 
exclusion to cover direct payments for nursing-home care seems entirely consistent with the 
motivations that underlie enactment of§ 2503(e), as well as those that underlie my proposal. See 
supra text accompanying notes 151-60, 313-18. Section 2503(e) might also be expanded to cover 
direct payment for room and board at educational institutions. See A.B.A. Task Force on Trans-
fer Tax Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 395, 402 (1988). 
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6. Annual Exclusion 
The annual exclusion is not only a popular and frequently used 
component of the current gift tax; it also provides a measure of immu-
nity from the gift tax roughly analogous to that the universal exemp-
tion would provide from the death tax. By excluding from the gift tax 
all transfers to any person during any year under a fixed amount, the 
annual exclusion exempts from the gift tax most transfers not made 
primarily for estate planning reasons. Exemption of these transfers 
seems appropriate and ought to be continued. The administrative sav-
ings, from the perspectives of both the government and the donor, are 
substantial. And the freedom to make gifts of reasonable amounts of 
property without even telling the government is desirable in and of 
itself. 
The amount of the exemption is another issue. The current level of 
$10,000 has been the subject of serious criticism.368 Not only is it an 
amount beyond the means of most people; those with persistence can 
use it to pass immense amounts outside the transfer tax system. 369 
Therefore, the amount of the exclusion should be reduced to no more 
than $5000. 370 
7. Exclusion for Transfers to Lineal Ascendants 
We have already concluded that transfers to lineal ascendants 
should be exempt from taxation at death. 371 Such transfers should also 
be exempt from taxation during the lifetime of the donor. If transfers 
to lineal ascendants were excluded from the gift tax base, there would 
be a powerful incentive to care for one's elders. Increased privatization 
of the care of the elderly is one of the goals underlying my proposal. 372 
It therefore exempts all transfers to lineal ascendants. 
8. Marital Deduction 
One of the reasons for allowing the marital deduction for gift tax 
purposes is to permit spouses to rearrange their property interests so 
368. E.g., A.B.A. Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on Transfer Tax Restruc-
turing, supra note 367, at 401-02. 
369. A 30-year-old who, with the consent of his or her spouse, undertakes a program of 
annual gifts of $20,000 to each of three children can deplete his or her estate by almost 
$3,000,000 by the time he or she attains age 77. 
370. An additional reason for settling on $5000 is elimination of the need for estate planning 
gimmickry to deal with the lack of conformity between the annual exclusion and the "5 and 5" 
exception for taxable lapses. Compare l.R.C. § 2503(b) (1988) ($10,000 annual exclusion) with 
I.R.C. §§ 204l(b)(2), 2514(e) (1988) ($5000 or five percent exception for lapsing powers). 
371. See supra notes 317-18 and accompanying text. 
372. See supra notes 151-60 and accompanying text. 
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that, regardless which spouse dies first, each can exhaust his or her 
estate tax exemption. The presence in this proposal of a universal ex-
emption means that a gift tax marital deduction would remain impor-
tant on that basis alone. But there are other reasons to allow a gift tax 
marital deduction. Interspousal transfers frequently occur for reasons 
unrelated to estate planning. Almost every home purchased in this 
country is titled in the name of husband and wife, as joint tenants with 
right of survivorship. Even if one spouse contributes disproportion-
ately, the title is likely to come out the same way. This phenomenon 
reflects the fact that spouses generally want to share not only the use 
of certain assets but also the ownership of those assets.373 Even outside 
the context of jointly owned property, interspousal transfers often oc-
cur for reasons other than estate planning. Expensive anniversary 
rings usually are not given to avoid the estate tax. Presumably one 
gives a spouse a mink coat, a sailboat, or an expensive car for other 
reasons. Thus, interspousal gifts of such items ought not cause a gift 
tax if the gift tax's primary mission is to prevent avoidance of the 
death tax. 
The marital deduction, however, cannot be quantitatively unlim-
ited. If it were, the limitations on the death tax marital exemption374 
would be voluntary. Any spouse not married long enough to pass a 
"sufficient" amount at death to the survivor could give the difference 
during lifetime at no tax cost. The gift tax marital deduction should, 
therefore, be limited in the same fashion as the death tax marital ex-
emption. The percentage limitations would be based on the donor's net 
worth, calculated as of the end of the taxable year in which the gift 
occurred. Thus, a spouse married seven years could transfer 48 % of 
his or her net worth to his or her spouse, free of gift tax. 
Requiring net worth reporting is, from several perspectives, unat-
tractive. 375 It would represent an additional governmental intrusion 
373. Joint ownership also frequently occurs with respect to cars and bank accounts. 
374. See supra notes 289-99 and accompanying text. 
375. Requiring such reporting, however, would carry with it an important benefit. The gov-
ernment would receive a great deal of information about donors' wealth. This information would 
be invaluable in dealing with subsequent claims for marital deductions, in proving subsequent 
unreported gifts, and in enforcing the death tax. Additionally, the information would be more 
reliable than much of the information currently obtained from taxpayers. Under the present 
system, there is acute pressure on the taxpayer to low-ball almost all values reported. Generally 
speaking, the lower the value, the lower the tax. In determining one's net worth for purposes of 
sheltering a spousal transfer, however, the pressure would be just the opposite. To shelter such 
transfers fully, it would often be necessary for the donor to report the existence of all assets and 
to value them accurately. Since the tax would be imposed only on assets transferred, the down-
side potential of a high value on assets retained would be limited to the possibility that the 
overvalued asset might itself become the subject of a subsequent gift or that, at death, it might 
qualify for one of the exemptions. 
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into individuals' private financial affairs. It would also sometimes re-
quire appraisals of hard-to-value assets. Yet gifts to spouses married 
more than twenty years would not necessarily require even a gift tax 
return. And with respect to gifts to spouses married less than twenty 
years, the donor would not necessarily be required to report his or her 
full net worth if reporting less would justify the marital deduction in 
question. Moreover, the decision to make a gift to a spouse is generally 
voluntary. If the additional intrusion and expense of filing the gift tax 
return were too great, a would-be donor could simply refrain from 
making the gift until later in the marriage.376 
The gift tax would continue to be imposed on an annual basis. 
Thus, because the marital deduction would grow with each year of 
marriage (up to twenty years), and with the donor's net worth, each 
donor would be permitted repeated uses of the marital deduction, even 
if exhausted in a previous year. Yet each subsequent use would take 
into account all prior uses. In other words, the gift tax marital deduc-
tion would operate cumulatively.377 
9. Charitable Deduction 
The freedom to make gifts to charity during lifetime is at least as 
important as the freedom to make such gifts at death. Therefore, my 
proposal includes a gift tax charitable deduction. To avoid completely 
undermining the quantitative limitation imposed on the de~th tax 
charitable exemption, 378 however, the gift tax charitable deduction 
would also be quantitatively limited. 379 Computation would be on a 
cumulative basis, just as in the case of the marital deduction.380 
It may not, however, be necessary to limit the gift tax charitable 
376. An alternative, for those who find lifetime net-worth reporting unacceptable, would be a 
marital deduction equal to the applicable percentage (based on years of marriage) of the spousal 
transfer. Cf. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 736, § 2523(a), 68A Stat. 3, 412 (1954) 
(amended 1976) (marital deduction equal to one half the spousal transfer). Under this variation, 
the gift tax would be the excess of the "spousal transfer'' over the allowable marital deduction. 
377. The marital deduction might be limited to the excess of (1) the current applicable per-
centage times the total of current net worth, previous taxable gifts, gift tax previously paid, and 
previously allowed marital and charitable (see infra text accompanying note 378) deductions, 
over (2) the total of marital deductions previously allowed. 
Allowing a gift tax marital deduction would necessitate making the death tax exemption 
cumulative, as well. To calculate a similarly limited marital exemption, one would multiply the 
total of net wealth at death, taxable gifts, gift tax paid, and marital and charitable deductions 
allowed by the applicable percentage. Then one would subtract the total of marital deductions 
allowed during the decedent's lifetime. 
378. See supra notes 333-43 and accompanying text. 
379. Much of the discussion dealing with the marital deduction is rurectly applicable to the 
issue of a charitable deduction. 
380. The death tax charitable exemption would also be reduced on account of charitable 
deductions allowed during lifetime. 
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deduction as severely as the death tax charitable exemption. The need 
for strict limitation at death-time is clear. Almost every decedent for 
whom the government is essentially the only alternative will become 
charitably inclined. During lifetime, however, there are thousands of 
alternatives to charity. A gift to charity may deprive the donor of the 
ability to make a subsequent gift. More importantly, it deprives the 
donor of the ability to use the wealth for his or her own benefit. It also 
deprives the donor of economic security, additional income, and possi-
bly even prestige. In short, a gift to charity during lifetime costs some-
thing very real, but a gift to charity at death, when the alternative is 
reallocation to the government, does not. Is this a difference that justi-
fies making the charitable deduction quantitatively unlimited in all 
cases? Probably not. One can imagine a seventy-seven-year-old giving 
away $50,000,000 of a $55,000,000 estate primarily to avoid realloca-
tion to the government at death. But the difference does mean that the 
20% limitation on death-time charitable transfers is much too strict 
for lifetime giving. The limitation should vary inversely with the age of 
the donor. Using the same age brackets already used in the gift tax 
rate structure, 381 one possibility is: 











The rationale for the differential between the proposed 30% limitation 
for gifts by those over age seventy and the proposed 20% limitation at 
death is not that such a "small" differential would not encourage char-
itable giving in contemplation of death. It would. But the alternatives 
to lifetime charitable giving - even those available to a seventy-seven-
year-old - are so great that a differential of some sort seems to be in 
order. Moreover, the three-year pull-back rule382 would permit confis-
cation of any transfer within three years of death to the extent it ex-
ceeded the death-time 20% limitation.383 
381. See supra notes 350-53 and accompanying text. 
382. See supra notes 354-60 and accompanying text. 
383. Those who find lifetime net-worth reporting unacceptable in the context of the marital 
deduction, see supra note 376, surely also find it unacceptable in the context of the charitable 
deduction. The same alternative might work here. The charitable deduction could equal the ap-
plicable percentage (based on the donor's age) of the charitable transfer. Under this formulation, 
the gift tax would be the excess of the "charitable transfer'' over the allowable charitable 
deduction. 
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10. Universal Exemption 
Currently the unified credit is available for both estate tax and gift 
tax purposes. 384 Even before creation of the unified credit, there were 
exemptions, albeit of different sizes, for both taxes. 385 A gift tax uni-
versal exemption would further decrease administrative costs for both 
the government and taxpayers. But several reasons suggest there 
should be no universal exemption for gift tax purposes.386 One of the 
primary purposes of this proposal is to increase equality of opportu-
nity. Unfortunately, few people can afford to make gifts.387 Thus, the 
primary beneficiaries of a gift tax universal exemption would be the 
adult children of wealthy parents. That is hardly an egalitarian effect. 
Because this proposal includes an annual exclusion, 388 it has already 
minimized administrative inconvenience. Moreover, the amount of the 
annual exclusion is itself out of the reach of most people. Given all the 
other incentives for lifetime giving, a universal exemption for gift tax 
purposes would forgo an unacceptable amount of revenue. 
Relying on the annual exclusion as the only universal exemption 
for gift tax purposes would not impair unreasonably a parent's ability 
to use wealth for the benefit of children. The exclusion for transfers in 
discharge of a legal obligation389 and the exclusion for educational and 
medical expenses,39° in addition to the annual exclusion, would con-
tinue to allow a parent extensive freedom during his or her lifetime to 
benefit children in almost any way he or she chose. My proposal 
would tax transfers to children other than those required for their sup-
port, education, or medical care, if greater than $5000 in any given 
year. Is that inconsistent with "natural" parenting instincts? Parents 
of means should not be allowed to transfer, free of gift tax, amounts in 
excess of $5000 to healthy, adult children who have no socially gener-
alizable need for the amounts transferred. 
384. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (1988) (estate tax and gift tax). 
385. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 11, § 2052, 68A Stat. 3, 389 (1954) (repealed 1976) 
($60,000 estate tax exemption); Internal Revenue Code of 1954, ch. 12, § 2521, 68A Stat. 3, 410 
(1954) (repealed 1976) ($30,000 gift tax exemption). 
386. See Dodge, Redoing the Estate and Gift Taxes Along Easy-to-Value Lines, 43 TAX L. 
REV. 241, 341 (1988). 
387. See Hearings on Tax Refonn Act of 1969 Before the House Committee on Ways and 
Means, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess. 3977, 3979, (1969) reprinted in READINGS IN DEATH AND GIFT 
TAX REFORM, supra note 180, at 69 ("Except as to those with quite large fortunes, the making of 
significant irrevocable gifts during lifetime is an impossibility. The individual himself may well 
need the property."). 
388. See supra notes 368-70 and accompanying text. 
389. See supra notes 361-64 and accompanying text. 
390. See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text. 
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11. Life Insurance 
Under the current estate tax, anyone who has an incident of own-
ership in a policy on his or her own life can remove it from the tax 
base at death by giving it away during lifetime. 391 Yet, because so 
much of its worth is derived from its death benefit, life insurance often 
has little value during the lifetime of the insured. Thus, its value for 
gift tax purposes generally is but a tiny fraction of its death benefit. 
Given the marital deduction and the annual exclusion, gift tax is rarely 
due on the gift of a life insurance policy. Even now, therefore, gifts of 
life insurance policies are estate planning bargains. Under this propo-
sal, parents could benefit healthy, adult children at death only to the 
extent of the universal exemption. And though lifetime gifts would 
still be allowed, the gift tax would make most nonexempted gifts too 
expensive for most parents. But gifts of life insurance policies would 
remain cheap from an estate planning perspective. Such gifts would, 
therefore, offer an easy way for parents to provide after death for chil-
dren, or anyone else, not exempted from this proposal. 
Earlier, I promised to tilt at only one windmill at a time.392 This, 
however, is an opportunity I cannot resist. If a primary effect of my 
proposal were to encourage the wealthy to convert substantial portions 
of their assets into life insurance policies given to their children, it 
would fail either to expand equality·of opportunity or to raise revenue. 
Since life insurance is an inherently testamentary arrangement, section 
2042 is woefully underinclusive even under the current transfer tax 
structure. 393 Given the additional incentives my proposal would pro-
vide for gifts of life insurance, its adoption would mandate expansion 
of the scope of section 2042. 
H. Summary 
My proposal starts from the proposition that inheritance should be 
permitted only where public policy clearly justifies it. I find that justifi-
cation in six different contexts. Spousal inheritance would always be 
allowed, but the amount would depend upon the length of the mar-
riage. Inheritance by dependent lineal descendants would be permit-
ted, subject to limitations based on the beneficiary's age. Large trusts 
391. See I.R.C. § 2042(2) (1988). 
392. Supra text accompanying note 288. 
393. See, e.g., Gutman, supra note 345, at 665-71; Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructur-
ing, A.B.A. Section of Taxation, supra note 367, Exhibit E, at 440-41; H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 57 (1942), reprinted in 1942-2 C.B. 372, 417-18 (recognizing "the testamentary 
nature of insurance on the life of the decedent"); Internal Revenue Code of 1939, ch. 2, 
§ 811(g)(2)(A), 53 Stat. 1, 122 (1939) (amended 1942) (gross estate included life insurance pro-
ceeds if decedent paid the premiums). 
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for disabled lineal descendants would be encouraged. Inheritance by 
lineal ascendants would be unlimited. Charity could take up to 20%. 
And, in any event, $250,000 would be exempt. Thus, many types of 
inheritance would continue. In fact, my proposal leaves untouched es-
tates of $250,000 or less. 
My entire proposal would fit snugly within the current federal 
transfer tax structure. 394 Of the six exceptions, three already exist: the 
marital exemption, the universal exemption, and the charitable exemp-
tion. A fourth, the exemption for dependent lineal descendants,. only 
recently was repealed. Only two, the exemptions for lineal ascendants 
and disabled lineal descendants, are entirely new. Both respond di-
rectly to the biggest change I advocate: reallocation to the government 
of all property that would otherwise pass at death to nonexempt 
beneficiaries. 
The gift tax would adhere even more closely to the current federal 
gift tax structure. Since imposing the death tax at the rate of 100% 
would strongly encourage lifetime giving, the gift tax would be im-
posed at substantially higher rates than those currently in effect. These 
rates would increase with the age of the donor but would, except for 
gifts within three years of death, always be lower than the rate at 
death. In almost all other respects, the gift tax would mirror the cur-
rent gift tax. Exclusions would continue for transfers in discharge of a 
legal obligation of the donor and for direct payment of medical and 
educational expenses. In addition, there would be an exclusion for 
transfers to lineal ascendants. And the annual exclusion would remain. 
There would also be deductions for transfers to spouses an4 charity. 
394. It also would coexist peaceably with many currently popular estate planning devices 
and techniques. For example, the revocable inter vivas trust would continue to flourish. AJ3 is 
currently the case, creation of such a trust would generate no gift tax liability, because the trans-
fer would be incomplete. See Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-2(c) (1990). Thus, revocable inter vivas 
trusts would continue to provide, during the donor's lifetime, each of the benefits they currently 
provide: avoidance of the costs, delays, court supervision, and publicity inherent in probate, per-
sonal delegation of management responsibility, and financial protection during incompetency. 
See generally J. PRICE, CoNTEMPORARY EsrATE PLANNING § 10.10 (1983). AJ3 is also currently 
the case, upon the death of the creator of a revocable inter vivas trust, the trust would be subject 
to taxation. See I.R.C. § 2038 (1988). Even so, the trust would not necessarily be immediately 
taxed out of existence. If devoted to the benefit of the donor's surviving spouse, depending on the 
length of the marriage, little or no tax might be due. Similarly, if, upon the death of the donor 
(or, to the extent the trust qualified for the marital deduction, upon the death of the donor's 
spouse), the trust provided for another beneficiary (such as a dependent lineal descendant, a 
disabled lineal descendant, a lineal ascendant, or charity) exempted from the tax, even then there 
might be little or no tax. Only when the trust had exhausted the donor's pool of exempted benefi-
ciaries would it become subject to taxation, and.then only to the extent in excess of any unused 
portion of the decedent's universal exemption. 
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CONCLUSION 
My proposal builds solidly on taxes this country has imposed for 
almost a century. It is, therefore, an evolutionary proposal. Curtailing 
inheritance is very much in keeping with important strands of Ameri-
can ideology that were in existence at the time of the Declaration of 
Independence and continue to this day. Revolutionaries and presi-
dents, philosophers and entrepreneurs, as well as state legislators, have 
advocated395 and sometimes even enacted396 proposals at least as 
radical. 
The old saying, "Nothing is certain but death and taxes," has 
never been entirely true, at least with respect to taxes imposed at 
death. By tolerating almost unrestricted dead hand control over prop-
erty, this nation has always allowed the children of the wealthy all the 
financial advantages inheritance has had to offer. Curtailing inheri-
tance as suggested here would make death taxes substantially more 
certain. Thus, the wealthy could control much less of their property 
from the grave. Curtailing inheritance would significantly increase 
equality of opportunity. In addition, it would enable the federal gov-
ernment to reduce its monumental deficit. Yet curtailing inheritance 
would abridge neither natural nor constitutional rights. It would also 
be consistent with our notion of property. And its economics seem less 
frightening than those of an increase in the income tax. The deficit is 
395. In 1972, a bill that would have substantially limited the passage of wealth at death was 
introduced in the California legislature. It would have barred inheritance in excess of $1 million 
by any given beneficiary. Its only other exemption was for spousal transfers. Assembly Bill 333, 
Calif. Leg., 1972 Reg. Sess., reprinted in J. DUKEMINIER & s. JOHANSON, FAMILY WEALTH 
TRANSACTIONS 50-51 (1972). The bill was introduced by Assemblymen Burton, Brown, Miller, 
Waxman, Brathwaite, Bill Greene, Ralph, and Vasconcellos. It was coauthored by Senators 
Dymally and Roberti. It was not enacted. 
In 1887 the Illinois legislature rejected a proposal that would have limited inheritance by 
direct descendants to $500,000 and inheritance by collaterals to $100,000, notwithstanding rec-
ommendation by the Illinois Bar Association. H. READ, supra note 32, at xi n.1; Montgomery, 
supra note 45, at 640. 
396. In 1908 Oklahoma enacted an inheritance tax that reallocated to the government all 
inheritance in excess of certain levels. Act of May 26, 1908, ch. 81, 1907-1908 Okla. Sess. Laws 
733. There were five classes of beneficiaries, defined in terms of their relationship to the dece-
dent. After modest exemptions (ranging from $10,000 for surviving spouses to $100 for distant 
relatives and unrelated beneficiaries), bequests (and amounts passing by intestate succession) 
were subject to taxation at low "primary rates" (ranging from 1 % to 5%) on small fixed amounts 
(ranging from $5000 to $500). On all bequests in excess of the applicable exemption and "pri-
mary" amount, however, the rate of tax rose a fixed percentage (ranging from 1/125th of one 
percent to l/lOth of one percent) for every $100. Given a large enough bequest, this secondary 
rate would eventually become 100%. After working through the details, one finds that, in the 
case of bequests to distant relatives and unrelated beneficiaries, this point occurred at $100,600. 
It occurred for siblings at $502,500. And it occurred for surviving spouses at $1,265,000. The 
Oklahoma tax was thus designed to abolish inheritance above certain levels. Unfortunately, in 
McGannon v. State, 33 Okla. 145, 124 P. 1063 (1912), the Supreme Court of Oklahoma gutted 
the act by interpreting it to provide for only one rate increase per class. 
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the inheritance we as a nation are leaving our children. We could take 
a major step toward denying them that sad legacy if we were also will-
ing to deny our healthy, adult children the right to inherit private 
fortunes. 
